Page Lebanon

On Monday, January 25, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 crashed en route from Beirut to Addis Ababa. According to reports 54 Lebanese, 54 Lebanese, 22 Ethiopians, one Iraqi, one French woman, one Syrian and seven crew members (as well as two British-Lebanese, one Canadian-Lebanese, and one Russian-Lebanese dual nationals) were on board the flight.

CNN has recently reported that airtraffic controllers had instructed the plane to change course shortly before it crashed some 3.5 kilometers west of the town of Naameh which lies about 15 kilometers south of Beirut. For the CNN story, which reporters are constantly updating, please click here.

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has again ignited controversy in Lebanon. Having already stirred the pot with a proposal to establish a committee on deconfessionalization, Berri is now pushing to lower Lebanon’s voting age from 21 to 18.

The Controversy

Of course, the controversy relates to the proposal’s implications for Lebanon’s delicate sectarian balance. According to media reports, the Ministry of Interior estimates that lowering the voting age to 18 will add another 232,000 voters to the rolls. 174,000 of these prospective voters are Muslim; 58,000 are Christian. Other reports have the total number additional voters at 283,000 people, but list the Muslim-Christian ratio as roughly the same.

The 3:1 Muslim-Christian ratio in the 18-21 age bracket obviously disturbs the Christian establishment and Christian-dominated political parties like the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and Lebanese Forces (LF). Politicians like LF executive chairman Samir Geagea and Phalange leader Amin Gemayel have tied voting age reform to the creation of an expatriate right to vote abroad.

Because Christians constitute the majority of Lebanon’s vast diaspora, granting Lebanese expatriates the right to vote in their countries of residence has long been viewed as a counterweight to lowering the voting age. The balance is quite simple: most young resident Lebanese are Muslim; most Lebanese abroad are Christian.

Fairly or not, the Lebanese political class has seemingly reached a consensus that the two reforms must proceed in tandem.

Mechanisms of Change

Article 21 of the Lebanese Constitution grants citizens above the age of 21 the right to vote. As such, any reform will require a constitutional amendment, which may come about under two alternative processes.

First, under Article 76 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic may “propose” an amendment, thereby compelling the cabinet (headed by the Prime Minister) to submit a draft amendment to Parliament.

Second, under Article 77 of the Constitution, any group of ten Members of Parliament, with the approval of two thirds of the Parliament, may “request” the “revision of the Constitution.” Under this process, the cabinet must consent, by a two-thirds vote, to amend the constitution and follow up by submitting a draft law to Parliament within four months.

If the cabinet rejects the Parliament’s request to amend the Constitution, three-fourths of Parliament is required to “insist upon the necessity” of amending the constitution. If the Parliament so insists, the President must either (a) accept the “request,” which would effectively compel the cabinet to submit a draft amendment to Parliament, or (b) ask the cabinet to dissolve the Parliament.

Present Prospects

Reform cannot proceed unless two-thirds of Parliament sign off on it. As matters stand, only Berri’s AMAL movement and a cluster of smaller parties and independents seem ready to push the issue now.

Most parties – including Berri’s main Christian ally, the FPM, which controls a sizable parliamentary bloc – have opted for gradualism and a comprehensive package that includes expatriate voting and (ostensibly) other reforms (balloting, media coverage, campaign finance, transparency). On paper, this looks good. But that is nearly always the case with procrastination and posturing in Lebanon.

2009 was a mixed year for Lebanon. Here’s a (very) brief recap:

Politics

Politically, the country averted a repeat of May 2008’s armed clashes, held free and fair elections, and continued to walk the tightrope between East and West. At the regional level, detente between the U.S., conservative Arab, and Israeli camp and a front consisting of Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, and Hamas, allowed for the continued viability of the Doha Accords and brought calm to Lebanon.

Of course, calm came at a price. The much ballyhooed elections – which saw the March 14 coalition “defeat” the opposition of Hizbullah, the Change and Reform Bloc, and AMAL – gave way to a five-month-long tussle over cabinet formation.

Once more, Lebanese politicians chose the “controlled chaos” of an extended political vaccuum rather than settling for an arrangement that reflected the results of an election. And once more, a terrible precedent was set.

Additionally, despite rapprochment, particularly between Saudi Arabia and Syria and their respective partisans in Lebanon, political discourse remains dominated by the negative (and by mutual accusations of fearmongering and treachery).

Against this backdrop, the Lebanese state remains weak and dependent on the coalescence of sub-state factions, Hizbullah remains armed, and regional stability is as delicate as ever. Nevertheless, the consequences of these unresolved issues will manifest tomorrow, not today; in looking back, Lebanon dodged a bullet (or bunker buster) in 2009. 

Economy

Economically, Lebanon certainly benefited from its newfound political stability (however fragile). Tourism and banking, which have long stood as pillars of the Lebanese economy, impressed greatly in 2009. 

The Ministry of Tourism claims that more than 2 million tourists visited Lebanon over the past year, which easily eclipsed the previous record of 1.4 million set in 1974. Buoyed by cautious fiscal policies, stringent  reserve requirements, and a robust secrecy regime, Lebanon’s bank assets and deposits now stand at 334 percent and 274 percent of GDP, respectively, among the highest rates in the world.

But not all is rosy. Tourism, banking, the buying up of properties by foreigners and nationals living abroad, an influx of politically-linked funds (which probably approached $1 billion this year), and the flow of remittances have created a “country for others.” Money from abroad, while put to good use in furthering the ambitions of diaspora Lebanese and foreign investors, has driven up the cost of living and made it difficult for many resident citizens to cope.

Culture

In summer 2009, a revitalized festival season helped remind tourists, members of the diaspora, as well as resident citizens, that there is more to the country than Beirut’s sizzling night scene. Alongside old stalwarts like the Baalbeck and Beiteddine festivals, which for decades have drawn some of the biggest names in international culture and entertainment, newer festivals in Batroun, Byblos, Tyre, Zahle, and Zouk offered an assortment of options for the cultural tourist.

Of course, with impressive Phoenician remnants, Greek and Roman ruins, a dozen Crusader castles, and the ever-present Turkish and French legacies – not to mention monasteries that date back to the 4th century A.D. – Lebanon has much to offer any tourist.

Unfortunately, with an unstable regional environment and a focus on Beirut, Lebanon’s tourism industry has yet to capitalize on the country’s cultural heritage as an attraction. Perhaps that’s for the best: a tourist in Baalbeck can basically wander the Temple of Jupiter alone, undisturbed by the hordes of people found, for instance, at the Acropolis in Athens. Again, it’s a mixed bag.

Cuisine

On the one hand, the country broke several world records – and can now lay claim to the largest dishes of hummus, tabbouleh, and kibbeh on record. Lacking the capability to confront Israel militarily and having been outflanked (to date) in Western markets, the Lebanese seem to have launched a culinary counterattack with the aim of regaining ascendency on Levantine cuisine in the minds (and markets) of the world.

On the other hand, in a food fight that encompasses everything from hummus to shawarma, it would be difficult – not to mention, arrogant and unfair – for one country to lay claim to a culinary tradition that in large part is common to Levantine Arabs, Greeks, and Turks.

Hummus and tabbouleh rightfully stir the passions: they are basic dishes that have fed Levantines for centuries, and may soon come to symbolize a broader struggle over land, culture, and history. However, if food serves to divide rather than unite the people of the region, then there may be little hope for tomorrow.

Sports

The Lebanese basketball team, with a myriad of dual citizens like Matt Freije and Daniel Faris teaming with established domestic players like Fadi El-Khatib and Rony Fahed, failed to finish second in Asia as it had in the past three major tournaments. Deflated by a close and controversial 72-68 defeat to China, Lebanon collapsed against Jordan in the third-place game and thus missed out on qualifying for the 2010 World Championships in Istanbul. In December, however, FIBA awarded Lebanon – along with three European countries – one of four ‘wildcard’ births in the tournament.

The Lebanese soccer team, by contrast, continued to struggle on the international stage. Despite signs of improvement, a lack of funds, political infighting in the domestic competition, and am underdeveloped training program for the national team ensured a year of unremarkable performances (some speculate that basketball, Lebanon’s flagship sport, will soon fall prey to the same problems).

The Lebanese rugby league team, again including a host of dual-citizens, finished third in the European Cup. After demolishing the Italy’s inexperienced Azzuri side 86-0 and losing a 22-10 scratcher against the Scotland Bravehearts, Lebanon’s Cedars beat the Ireland Wolfhounds 40-16 to set the tone in an emerging rivalry that will feature centrally in next year’s Cup.

Four years ago today, a carbomb took the life of Gebran Tueni, a Lebanese journalist, activist, and politician. Like others before him, and others sure to follow, Tueni lost his life for refusing to remain silent.

As is often the case in Lebanon, Tueni took over the family business, which for him meant publishing the influential “An-Nahar”  (The Day) newspaper that his grandfather had founded in 1933 with an initial circulation of less than 500.

Tueni’s father, the indefatigable 83-year-old journalist, politician, and former UN Representative Ghassan Tueni had gradually turned the paper into a powerhouse read by many in Lebanon, the region, and throughout the world.

By the time Gebran assumed a more active role in writing and publishing, Syria’s tutelage in Lebanon was at its apex. Using An-Nahar’s pages as a pulpit, Tueni repeatedly criticized Syria’s suffocating presence in Lebanon and thus drew the ire of Damascus and its local beneficiaries. 

Indeed, his zeal could irk those who shared his anti-Syrian views. Passionate and polished, Tueni nevertheless lacked his father’s depth, balance, and caution, which made him a sometimes abrasive commentator.

Yet, for all his flaws, Tueni refused to trade voice for life, while others did so for mere silver and gold.

On December 12, 2005, Gebran ignored warnings – delivered, though perhaps differently, by friends and foes alike – and returned to Beirut from Paris, where he had been living for months for fear of assassination. He did not make it home.

It matters not that Tueni’s views were not shared by all. It matters not that he could lose a perfectly valid point in the excess of his expression. It matters not that his newspaper, accomplished as it may be, remains a family heirloom of sorts.

What matters is that, in conquering fear and expressing his thoughts, this father of two lost his life. Such is the culture of violence that threatens expression throughout the Middle East.

It matters not that he was brazen.

What matters is that he paid the price.

How profoundly ironic it is that Lebanon’s anthem touts the nation’s “sword and pen” as the “envy of the ages,” for the balance seems to have been lost. Tueni’s killers have reminded the complacent of the dangers that lurk in a corner of the world where the sword all too often silences the pen.

With usual pomp and circumstance, November 22  featured parades, parties, and grandiose rhetoric to mark Lebanon’s Independence Day. Against this backdrop, and just in time for the winter holiday season, Lebanese leaders - at each other’s throats merely six months ago – have discovered dialogue.

What gives?

In short, Lebanese politicians continue to adjust to Syria’s return from the wilderness. While Syria was able to impact politics in Lebanon over the past few years, the Asad regime had to rely on assassinations and overt political obstruction to salvage its interests, having lost a structural advantage to the Cedar Revolution of 2005.

As recently as June 2009, Syria had seemingly failed to reclaim political spance. Then, the pro-Western coalition’s victory in parliamentary elections, combined with the strong position of Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement within the opposition itself, had dealt a blow to Syria’s traditional allies in Lebanon. 

However, Syria soon found some breathing room. Since the elections, the Lebanese political class has scrambled to adjust to changes in American, French, and Saudi foreign policy.

Regional Changes

Despite the Obama administration’s best efforts to reassure Lebanese politicians of a lasting American commitment to Lebanon, U.S. pursuit of engagement with Syria – and negotiations with Iran – have had the effect of discouraging a bellicose anti-Syrian posture. The understandable goal of mending ties with the broader Arab and Muslim world has upset the calculations of politicians in Lebanon, which until now has been a relatively successful area of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

In a similar vein, jealously guarding its political relevance in the Levant, France has continued to court Syria. Entry into a relatively untapped Syrian market, home to some 22 million people starved of enterprise, infrastructure, technology, and services, is also important in French calculations. Finally, to a lesser degree, French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s vision of a Mediterranean Union as a platform for French power would doubtlessly benefit from broader inclusion of the Levant.

Saudi Arabia – wary of Iran, concerned with Iraq, troubled by Yemen, and anticipating a shift in Western policy – has moved to mend ties with Syria. Instead of engaging in proxy confrontations in Lebanon, the Saudis and Syrians seem keen on restoring the division of labor that existed before the assassination of former Premier Rafic Hariri. 

Local Adjustments

First, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt left the March 14 coalition. Though Jumblatt’s attempt to balance conflicting threats to communal and self-preservation has been awkward at best – the chieftain fears Hizbullah, cannot lose support of Lebanese Sunnis, relies on Saudi financial support, and needs access to Syria if he is to remain relevant now - progress on the Saudi-Syrian front continues to ease his burden.

Meanwhile, Zghorta chieftain Suleiman Franjieh, a stalwart of the pro-Syrian camp in Lebanon, has become more assertive within the opposition. Further, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri remains a reliable ally of Damascus, and President Michel Sleiman’s role as an internal “swing” actor will depend on accommodating Syria and the pro-Syrian camp.

Thus, an effective (albeit small) pro-Syrian bloc has emerged in Lebanon. This will allow Damascus to return to a subtle, and highly more effective, approach to influencing events, especially given the fluid Lebanese context that prevails today.

The Division of Labor

Under the arrangement that existed in Lebanon from 1992 until the earlier part of this decade, the Saudi-backed camp and politicians close to the late Prime Minister controlled fiscal and economic policy while the Syrian-backed camp and the Lebanese-Syrian security apparatus held sway over the security sector.

At first glance, desertions from March 14 coalition and disruptions within the opposition have created an environment for such a division of labor by making individual parties, with narrower support bases and more particular political visions, prone to their respective patrons’ influence. 

The sudden formation of a Lebanese government after five months of gridlock seemingly illustrates the Saudi-Syrian ability to jointly shape politics in Lebanon by exerting pressure on their respective proxies. Yet, things are not so simple. 

Complicating Factors

Much has changed since the pre-2005 period, when harmonious Saudi-Syrian relations were enough to keep Lebanon under wraps.

First, current U.S. policy in the region – including policy towards Syria and Lebanon - differs markedly from that of the 1990s.

Second, international investigations of the Hariri assassinations will have an unforeseen effect on Lebanese politics and Saudi-Syrian relations.

Third, the political landscape in Lebanon is more complex now than it was before 2005: Hizbullah is more assertive and increasingly tows the Iranian line; Christian infighting has replaced Christian impotence as a factor to consider; and the July 2006 War has kick-started a more aggressive Israeli posture towards its neighbors. 

And so, it appears Lebanon’s Sister has returned home - with a brother, a cousin, a neighbor, an acquaintance, and a stranger. Whether they play nice remains to be seen.

All is not sweet in the land of milk and honey… Having dithered on government formation for five months, thereby squandering a chance to garner international support in the wake of successful democratic elections, Lebanese politicians continue to bicker over the wording of the cabinet’s “Ministerial Statement.”

In Lebanon’s eclectic system, ministerial statements amount to declarations of policy that shape the contours of a particular cabinet’s mandate. Section 24 of the previous cabinet’s ministerial statement recognized “… [the] right of Lebanon’s people, army and Resistance to liberate or recover the Shebaa Farms, the Kfar Shouba Hills and the Lebanese part of Ghajar, and defend Lebanon and its territorial waters in the face of any enemy and by all available and legitimate means.”

Two things stand out. First, the statement explicitly grants the “Resistance” – that is, Hizbullah – the authority to liberate or recover Israeli-occupied territories. Second, and more significantly, the statement embraces Hizbullah’s shifting narrative: the right to bear arms is not subject to Israel’s occupation of parts of Lebanon, but extends further. By allowing Hizbullah to assume the role of defending Lebanon, the ministerial statement effectively consecrates a non-state actor’s performance of a function best reserved for the state.

Of course, the Lebanese Armed Forces remains ill-equipped to ward off Israel or even Syria; in fact, the military is more of an internal police force at this point. With a weak national force, Hizbullah claims it must defend Lebanon against external aggression. Setting aside the thousands of lives lost and billions of dollars in damage that Hizbullah failed to shield Lebanon from in 2006, the fact is that the Lebanese state can only disarm or integrate Hizbullah once it has adopted and begun to implement a viable defense policy in tandem with comprehensive security sector reform.

Ultimately the Lebanese political elite  must decide when – or whether – this process will start. On the one hand, confronting Hizbullah now may undermine efforts to place the disarmament back on the “National Dialogue” table. Further, challenging the party may again paralyze politics, sapping revenue and stalling reform in a country that has momentarily emerged from half-a-decade of war, institutional paralysis, and internal strife.

On the other hand, the National Dialogue process may be for naught. First, the Dialogue is an extra-constitutional and non-institutional means of resolving problems that could very well be resolved within the state framework. Second, the Dialogue has allowed Hizbullah to draw its opponents down an empty path, like the Pied Piper leading rats down to the Weser River.

With that in mind, it is worth noting that a Lebanese government with two Hizbullah ministers and a policy that legitimizes Hizbullah’s arms will provide the mother of all legal pretexts for a devastating Israeli response should Hizbullah embark on another adventure (the same holds true should Israel construct a cause for war).

By standing firm on the cabinet statement, the March 14 coalition (or what remains of it) could take the first step towards integrating Hizbullah’s arms. However, if the hapless coalition – knowing, as it knew in May 2008, the consequences of its actions – intends to bend over, then it would do better to relax and make it easy on all those involved.

MARCH 14 COALITION

Future Movement

                        Saadedine Hariri: Prime Minister 

                        Rayya al-Haffar: Finance

                        Hassan Mneimneh: Education

                        Mohammed Rahhal: Environment

                        Jean Ogassapian: Of State

Progressive Socialist Party 

                        Ghazi al-Aridi: Public Works

                        Akram Chouhayib: Displaced

                        Wael Abou Faour: Of State

Lebanese Forces

                        Ibrahim Najjar: Justice

                        Salim Wardeh: Culture

Phalange

                        Salim Sayegh: Social Affairs

Independents

                        Boutros Harb: Labor

                        Mohammed Safadi: Economy

                        Tarek Mitri: Information

                        Michel Pharaon: Of State

OPPOSITION COALITION (March 8 and the Change and Reform Bloc)

Change and Reform Bloc (A grouping of the Free Patriotic Movement, Marada Movement, and others)

                        Charbel Nahhas (Free Patriotic Movement): Telecommunications

                        Gebran Bassil (Free Patriotic Movement): Energy

                        Fadi Abboud (Free Patriotic Movement): Tourism

                        Ibrahim Dadayan (Free Patriotic Movement): Industry

                        Youssef Saade (Marada Movement): Of State

March 8 (AMAL and Hizbullah)

                        Ali Shami (AMAL): Foreign Affairs

                        Mohammed Khalifeh (AMAL): Health

                        Ali Hussein Abdallah (AMAL): Youth & Sports

                        Hussein Hajj Hassan (Hizbullah): Agriculture

                        Mohammed Fneish (Hizbullah): Administrative Development

PRESIDENTIAL SHARE (ostensibly loyal to President Michel Sleiman)

                        Ziad Baroud: Interior

                        Elias Murr: Defense and Vice Premier

                        Mona Afeish: Of State

                        Adnan al-Sayyed Hussein: Of State

                        Adnan Qassar: Of State

Please click here to read the article, which a friend and I co-authored.

Winter is approaching in Lebanon, and with it, a last respite before the country’s brief resurgence is once again battered by the regional fates. In 2010, Lebanon will face a series of challenges that will threaten to disrupt the slow progress made since Syria withdrew its troops in 2005. 

Justice for Peace

First and foremost, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will test the country’s unity and its strained relations with Syria. Established by the U.N. to investigate the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri – and rightfully so, reservations here notwithstanding – the Tribunal carries the potential to rip the country apart. 

A controversial Der Spiegel report pointing the finger at Hizbullah has reminded all Lebanese parties, if a string of crises has not, that peace is the price of justice. It matters not whether investigators pursue Hizbullah or the Asad regime. Both tracks threaten the Party of God, and its cadres will use all available means to maintain their arms and project a political vision that conflicts with that of the Lebanese state. 

Lebanon’s recent history attests to this. Hizbullah’s border raid, which ignited the July 2006 War (though the Olmert government seems to have planned a war in any event), was an attempt to postpone dialogue on disarmament; the party’s subsequent 18-month-long government boycott was an attempt to stall the Tribunal’s launch; and the May 2008 assault on Beirut was aimed at preserving logistical and informational autonomy while creating a new political reality on the ground. 

War Games

Another hazard lies in the Israeli predicament regarding Iran. A preemptive attack on Iran would most certainly catalyze another Israel-Hizbullah war. Since 2006, both prospective belligerents have upped the ante, creating a new equation in the Levant: Hizbullah will look to strike Tel Aviv for an attack on Dahiyeh; Israel will punish all of Lebanon for Hizbullah’s actions. 

The possibilities are as frightening as they are numerous.

Will Israel drop commandos in the northern Bekaa, infiltrate Beirut’s southern suburbs, or attempt to cut off South Lebanon from a logistics and information network in the rest of the country? Will Hizbullah strike Tel Aviv, send autonomous guerilla units into Northern Israel, or hit at Israeli interests abroad? Time will tell how, or even if, this war plays out, but it seems likely to happen at some point.

Divided They Stand

Finally, a less spectacular, but nevertheless troublesome issue on the horizon is Lebanon’s election to a rotating position on the U.N. Security Council. At first glance, a seat on the Security Council is a positive. States undoubtedly increase their influence and prestige, and the Lebanese are perpetually concsious of their “brand-name” image (though they may differ on what that brand represents).

Further, Security Council membership is a lucrative enterprise: in a 2006 study, entitled “How Much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth?,” two professors from Harvard University found that “[on] average, a non-permanent member of the council enjoys a 59 percent increase in total aid from the United States and an 8 percent increase in total development aid from the United Nations.” 

Clearly, then, there are benefits to a seat on the Security Council – but there are also burdens. 

Two problems may plague Lebanon’s two-year term on the Council. First, the country is deeply divided on several issues – foreign policy is no exception. Lebanon’s role in the region is a contentious issue, as are its relations with Israel, Syria, Iran, and the West. Asking diplomats in New York (or anywhere) to speak with one voice is almost impossible given the discord in Beirut.

Second, Lebanon, home to a U.N. contingent of 15000 peacekeepers, is on the agenda: the divided country will be the subject of the many of the investigations, deliberations, and resolutions that it must vote on. Likewise, decisions impacting the broader “Arab world” will weigh on the country’s diplomatic capabilities.

When the Snow Melts…

Having emerged from one of the best summers on record, the Lebanese would do well to enjoy the slopes this winter. For, as the Lebanese themselves are fond of saying, “when the snow melts… the shit shows.”

For the second, or perhaps third, time since Lebanon’s successful June 2009 parliamentary elections, the regional situation seems to favor a settlement in the divided country – or so we are told.

Regardless of whether Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s trip to Saudi Arabia leads to a thaw between Damascus and Riyadh, the actions of regional leaders – and the reactions of their local allies – have again exposed the ugly truth behind politics in Lebanon. The puppet masters are puppets themselves.

In a country where millions heed the beck and call of a few tribal chiefs, warlords, playboys, and politicians masquerading as clerics, it should come as no surprise that these elites look to their patrons for guidance. Sitting across the kitchen table, a wise man once told his son that “these ‘people’ [to use an acceptable word] are not from Mars: they are from Lebanon; they are Lebanon.” 

In the current mess, the March 14 coalition has squandered nearly four months of its renewed mandate since expanding its parliamentary majority in free and fair elections. True, the not-so-loyal opposition continues to obstruct the formation of a government, but March 14’s leaders have not helped in behaving like they lost the elections.

Of course, a Hizbullah armed to the teeth and backed by Iran and Syria would make any group of Lebanese think twice before crossing the line, particularly after the May 2008 assault on Beirut. As such, March 14 may have done well in exercising restraint over the past few months.

However, it should not be forgotten that the March 14 coalition’s regional patrons too had an interest in prolonging the cabinet formation process. Lebanon is a place where the Saudis and Syrians, among others, can frustrate each other’s ambitions without immediate consequences at home (though problems in Lebanon have a funny way of eventually affecting others).

Ultimately, the cabinet crisis’s local dimensions are superfluous Lebanese rituals.

Hopes, aspirations, and dreams aside, former General Michel Aoun and his Free Patriotic Movement do not matter. The same applies to the Phalange. These parties’ demands simply cover up the real mess. That these demands – an extra cabinet portfolio or the appointment of a particular minister – are genuine only illustrates the political myopia at play.

On the same note, Aoun’s reported willingness to accept the Finance Ministry and four “ministries of state,” a refreshing or mischievous initiative, depending on one’s perspective, will not change anything.

The reality is that Lebanon’s cabinet is a prize, or gift, not a right. This “national unity” government will not see the light of day until the Saudis are satisfied with the Syrians, and vice-a-versa; until the United States and Iran flesh out their October negotiations; and, perhaps, until every regional actor has come to grips with the shifting strategic sands.

This is not to say that the Lebanese people should remove themselves from the political process, or that individuals on either side of the divide cannot hold convictions despite the ineptitude, fear, and imprudence that surround them.

Quite the contrary, for the shortcomings of others should not taint the genuine political and social sentiments felt by any citizen. That being said, one thing is clear…

Good boys, these leaders are.

A team of doctors at the American University of Beirut Medical Center has successfully completed Lebanon’s first artificial heart transplant (not to be confused with regular transplants or the installation of ventricular assist devices). Admirably, the team saved the life of a 37-year-old man, who can now return to his family, friends, and the banana republic that is Lebanon.

Forgive the Lebanese if they wonder whether any procedure can jumpstart efforts to form a government. Nearly ten weeks after peaceful and free elections, a caretaker cabinet – endowed, constitutionally speaking, with minimal authority – continues to govern.

The patient lies motionless on the table, and the doctors are arguing amongst themselves.

With summer winding down, tourists packing their bags, and the end of Ramadan approaching, it remains to be seen whether rival factions can break this ‘Gordian Knot’  before the United Nations General Assembly in September. 

Lebanon, of course, lacks a coherent foreign policy, which will doubtlessly embarrass the republic at the international table. Poised to join the Security Council as a rotating member for the 2010-2011 term, the Republic of Lebanon has no government to underpin the state.

In turn, it is the state – and those seeking to build its institutions – that will become a complete mockery if Lebanon’s U.N. representatives cannot at least pretend to make decisions on behalf of their country and the rest of the divided Arab region.

Alas, Lebanon is the country of total political paralysis, six-month-long presidential vacuums, abandoned legislatures, caretaker governments, and factional feuding. It’s enough to make anyone’s heart stop.