Earlier this week, NOW Lebanon published an op-ed that Firas Maksad, a Middle East analyst, and I, a humble law student, wrote. The piece basically argued that the Marine Barracks Bombing on October 23, 1983 was an opening salvo in Iran’s bid for expanded power in the Middle East.
On the other hand, Foreign Policy published a piece by Nir Rosen, a fellow at New York University’s Center on Law and Security, who argues that the United States’ participation in Lebanon’s complicated civil war was the impetus behind the attacks. Rosen’s piece, though perhaps mistaken in its ultimate conclusions, makes several important points regarding the complexity of the issues involved here.
Specifically, Rosen argues that the United States, by shelling the Suk al-Gharb area to aid the Lebanese Army (then dominated by remnant Christian elements after the fragmentation of the army during an earlier stage of conflict, but not a “sectarian Christian militia,” as Rosen argues), acted against Muslim factions in Lebanon and behaved as a militia itself. As such, U.S. troops were fair game just like the Lebanese, Israelis, Syrians, Palestinians, and a host of other actors were.
There is truth in this view, but it is important to appreciate the disconnect between perceptions in Washington and Beirut. At the time, perhaps simplistically, the U.S. believed it was helping the Lebanese state reestablish control over a fragmented national territory. Many Lebanese circles, perhaps reflecting their narrower ambitions, saw this as an attempt to restore Maronite Christian ascendancy in Lebanon.
The fact is, Christians were (and still are) prominent in Lebanon’s state institutions – Maronites controlled the presidency, the top post in the army (fractured as it may have been), and the highest position in Lebanon’s Central Bank. Any attempt to help the state would necessarily help the Christians, barring a drastic change in Lebanon’s political system, though it would also be fair to note that a functioning state should be viewed as a benefit to all, especially compared to the chaos of the civil war. Whether that means the U.S. actually intended to participate as a “militia” backing the Christian factions is open to debate, and there is evidence to support both views.
Assuming that the U.S. did indeed participate - what matters more is that it was perceived to have done so - in an imbalanced manner, and that several locally based factors contributed to the attack, does not exclude the possibility that Iran used the attack as part of a wider strategy.
The question is not entirely one of fault, but also of consequences. The U.S. may have failed to completely appreciate the complexity of Lebanon’s war and may have failed to fully consider the security environment (both points arise from Rosen’s argument), but that does not mean that Iran did not harness local frustration and American complacency to strike.
The Silent