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Archive for December, 2010

Another premium selection from 2010′s Christmas Conversations…

Family Member 1

“Fuck politics. Lebanon is good for arak and kibbeh nayyieh. [The Lebanese] have been killing each other for generations. We’ve had a damn crisis every ten years or so. But we’ve still got our kibbeh nayyieh, arak – and tabbouleh and hummus – and that’s just fine by me.”

(No comment, except to say that I agree in a roundabout way.)

“Hizbullah might have killed Hariri, but it is ridiculous to argue that the Syria did not play a central role. The Syrian regime or elements of the security services probably arrange d for the attack, with Iranian approval probably being needed for Hizbullah’s possible involvement.”

(It is my view that the Syrian regime orchestrated Hariri’s assassination. Over the past few months, speculation of Hizbullah’s involvement has grown. While the involvement of members of Hizbullah may not be surprising, given how Syria operates in Lebanon, there is no publicly available evidence pointing in either direction. Once the STL indictment comes out, it will be possible to assess possible liability.)

“Geagea won’t be president unless Lebanon goes to war again. Or unless there’s some sort of plan to move against Hizbullah. He might have a shot then, but there’s no way he’ll be a peacetime president anytime soon.”

(I agree that Geagea will have difficulty ascending to the presidency anytime soon. I understand why people think Geagea might find his way to the presidency if Lebanon returns to war, but I have never fully grasped how this would happen. Does this rest on resurrecting the Lebanese Forces militia? Would this be part of a “regional project” or would local actors take matters into their own hands and bank on drawing foreign support in?)

“Michel Aoun? The man was a nobody – a complete unknown – in 1988. [Former President and Phalange Party leader] Amine Gemayel put him in government to screw Geagea and the Lebanese Forces. People were just tired of the militia order, he was an army commander, and he confronted Syria. Let’s not make him out to be a hero.”

(Aoun was commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the mid-1980s. He was not really a “nobody,” but was definitely “unknown.” When Lebanese factions could not agree on electing a new President, Gemayel made Aoun the head of a caretaker cabinet at the eleventh hour. Gemayel and Geagea were engaged in a struggle over the Christian community, the Phalange party leadership, and the way forward in Lebanon. Aoun was a volatile actor whose presence alongside Geagea made for a combustible mix.)

“Gemayel and Aoun left Lebanon; Geagea went to jail; twenty years later, it’s like someone pressed play and we’re reliving the same bullshit! Here are you choices: a delusional general, a warlord, and a crusty old former president.”

(No comment.)

“Rafic Hariri might have thought he was bigger than Lebanon and [assassinated Lebanese journalist and MP] Gebran Tueni probably thought he was the voice of Lebanon. Both were too ambitious in their own way, so I was not too fond of either. But these men did not deserve to die the way they did.”

(No comment.)

“Hizbullah? Here’s the problem with Hizbullah: they’re working with the wrong model. Hizbullah criticizes people for looking to the West, as if that is some sort of tragedy, but Iran can’t even refine its own oil! And that’s what we’re supposed to strive towards? This is bigger than the fight with Israel ; Hizbullah is working with a social model that is doomed.”

(No comment.)

“Let me tell you something about Stuxnet [a computer virus rumored to have been unleashed by the U.S government]. Stuxnet attacked Siemens programmable logic controllers used for the Iranian nuclear program. Over 60% of computers targeted by the virus were in Iran. [The Iranians] don’t know who they’re playing with here. The U.S. has just given them a taste.”

(I did not know much about Stuxnet before this conversation. In reading up on the virus, I continue to be confused. The conversation also touched upon the recently-created U.S. Cyber Command. The consensus seemed to be that American cyber-warfare abilities would be too much for Iran to handle. The point seems plausible, but I have no idea whether this is actually true.)

“How many of you would send your kids to study or work in Iran or Syria? What about the U.S.? OK, why is that? America attracts the best, even from [Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and other Middle Eastern states].”

(No comment.)

“American decline? It is inevitable and might be underway already, but let’s not fool ourselves. We live in the here and now, and the U.S. will be a powerhouse for a long time to come! Let’s not rush to jump on the wrong wagon, OK?”

(In general terms, I think this is spot on. Of course, History surprises. The U.S. will face many internal constraints on its power, owing to its pluralistic political system and tenuous financial situation. But in general terms, the bases of American power – its economic, political, military, and cultural strength – are still robust and dynamic.)

“They’re all bastards. All of them.”

(It remains unclear who “they” are. What is clear, apparently, is that “they” are bastards… Don’t let them get you down.)

Family Member 1 has little patience for Iran and Syria – not because of political or religious inclinations, but because he/she “thinks in terms of economic, scientific, cultural, and military prowess.” This person emigrated from Lebanon to the U.S. in the late 1970s and returned in 2000. He/she sees a lot wrong with Western society, but thinks it far more dynamic than Iranian and Arab alternatives. Needless to say, Family Member 1 detests the “bastards” who run the show in Lebanon.

Take heart neo-feudal overlords, everybody’s a critic.

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Christmas Eve rarely provides a respite from intense political debate in Lebanon. Indeed, with members of the family back in town, the holiday resembles a political brawl more than a religious celebration – or maybe, in the words of D.L. Hughley, “that’s just my house.”

For the past decade, members of my mother’s family, their family and friends, and a revolving group of guests have gathered in Achrafieh. The birth of Christ and Santa’s generosity are practically afterthoughts. Save for a few carols and token attendance of Mass, the family spends its time debating the intricate disputes (read: petulant behavior) of Lebanese political leaders. Since 2005, when the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri opened up the Lebanese political arena, a single conversation has literally stretched over five years continuous conversation the winter season. 

Conversation ranges between sophisticated and calm analyses to incendiary outbursts that would make a sailor blush. Discussion has revolved around intra-Christian divisions, the Sunni-Shiite divide, the broader regional configuration, America’s place in the world, the “Hizbullah question,” and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). This year, of course, WikiLeaks provided some fresh conversational points. Despite the available fodder, and underneath an ever-changing surface, the conversation has been the same for the past five years.

The next couple posts on Page Lebanon will provide some entertaining and controversial selections from 2010′s political brawl. Because I did not ask my family and friends if I could publicize their views, I’ll be concealing their identities (Julian Assange, take note). Comments are in italics…

 

“The Guest”

“Hizbullah killed Hariri. [Hariri] was part of some regional project – one that included naturalizing the [Palestinian refugees], but was also aimed at the Shiites across the Middle East. That’s why Hizbullah killed him, under orders from [Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah] Khamenei.”

(Here, the ever-present “regional project” rears its head. Of course, states have their policies, and do much to pursue their interests under the table, but it is also quite possible that Hariri was killed, quite simply, because the Syrian regime and its allies in Lebanon thought he had “grown too big for his britches.”)

“[Lebanese Forces leader] Samir Geagea will be Lebanon’s next president. What are you laughing at? He [Geagea] is in Saudi Arabia right now to begin resolving his issues with Syria. The Saudis, Egyptians, French, and Americans would rather have Geagea in Baabda [the seat of Lebanon's presidency].”

(I didn’t buy this argument. It’s not about morals, but politics – and Geagea has a credibility problem. Like many other war-time leaders, Geagea has his sins. The difference is that many Lebanese – including, importantly, members of his own Christian community – perceive his crimes to be more serious. As one observer remarked, “Geagea has ‘pulled the trigger’ himself, while others were more removed from the atrocities of war.” Perhaps these problems will grow smaller as Lebanon’s younger generation – one with few Civil War-era memories – becomes increasingly relevant. Perhaps Geagea will manage to capture much of the Christian vote in 2013. But the next president should take office in 2014, and this might be too soon for Geagea.)

“What do you mean Iranian and Syrian interests? Anthony, you’re a young man, listen to me… If the Americans want Geagea [as president], it will happen. Geagea’s history does not matter. Tell me where he’s made a mistake since 2005. The key is to begin laying the groundwork with Syria… What? No, that doesn’t suggest that Syria matters!”

(My point to “Guest” was that the past few years have demonstrated that Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, and pro-Syrian factions in Lebanon have the ability to frustrate the ambitions of the U.S. and the conservative Arab regimes. Aside from his credibility problem among many Lebanese, Geagea has been stridently (and often correctly) critical of Syria. As of yet, his post-2005 political revival has not involved rapprochement with Syria or pro-Syrian factions in Lebanon. Iran is no fan of Geagea either, particularly as it accuses the Lebanese Forces of kidnapping four of its diplomats in the 1980s. It is difficult to envision a regional consensus on someone like Geagea.)

“[Free Patriotic Movement leader] Michel Aoun is insane. Anyways, the man is finished.”

(I do believe Aoun reacted rashly in response to March 14′s early missteps in 2005, but this hyperbole is a little much for my taste. That said, I wonder about his political future. In contrast with 2005 and 2006, when Hizbullah was adjusting to a rapidly changing Lebanon and dealing with a war with Israel, the Party of God may not need as much “Christian cover.”)

“OK, maybe Syria matters. Hillou aaneh!”

(No comment.)

“The Americans should kill or “disappear” Assange to make an example of him.”

(No comment.)

“The region is in turmoil. It’s still early now, but wait and see how Sunnis and Shiites will turn against each other. The Sunnis are running to Turkey and the Shiites have been running to Iran. Just look at Iraq and Lebanon…”

(Over the past year or so, Turkey has begun to aggressively cultivate ties with the Arab world. Milking their dispute with Israel for all of its worth, the Turks have succeeded in carving out a renewed presence in the Arab Street. The Arab regimes might view Turkey as a possible counterweight against Shiite Iran, but are probably not thrilled with Ankara’s growing influence in the streets of Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. Sunni and Shiite tensions continue to simmer, but for now a regional conflagration seems unlikely.)

“Imad Mughniyeh [a high-ranking Hizbullah commander killed in 2008] was not killed. The whole thing was cooked up to get the Mossad off his back.”

(And the Vatican, with Geagea’s help, killed Kennedy because he wasn’t Catholic enough.)

“The [Palestinian refugees] will be naturalized in Lebanon. Does anyone here really believe otherwise? Get over it!”

(In essence, I agree. It is difficult to imagine a Middle East resolution that does not involve accomodating the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon number between 200,000 and 500,000. For most, formative experiences occurred in Lebanon, not the Palestinian territories or Israel. Does this mean that Palestinian refugees will become Lebanese citizens? Not necessarily. But, despite the fears of Christians and Shiites, normalization is in order.)

Clearly, “Guest” was the party’s resident Conspiracy Brother. This older gentleman has seen the world twice-over, and always provides unique insight into the bigger picture. He thinks creatively and puts forward his own theories on quite a few things. But he’s also rather fond of behind-the-scenes drama, regional and local “projects,” and reducing complex issues into one-liners.

I’m sure your family, especially if you’re Middle Eastern, has one of these guys or gals.

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I’m locked up for exams right now, and was not able to catch Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s speech. His views, and those of Hizbullah, on the STL are obviously important. Here’s the only English translation I could find; I assume it contains the entire speech.

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A central part of post-apartheid South Africa’s journey in from the wilderness involved the creation of a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” a non-judicial body empowered to bear witness to and remedy the crimes of the preceding era. Because of Lebanon’s blanket amnesty measures, which have held strong despite less-than-equitable implementation, such an open process of reconciliation seems doubtful.

Perhaps that’s for the best considering that twenty years have passed since the Lebanese Civil War ended. But in the interest of transparency and, as a step towards a better tomorrow, it might be useful if each Lebanese person offered a list of confessions:

Here’s my list (for U.S. law enforcement officials, I only note that all these confessions relate to sentiments, actions, and omissions that occurred in the Republic of Lebanon.):

  1. I did not take a driving test to obtain my license;
  2. I have driven dangerously – too fast, too drunk, too angry – and have allowed others to do the same;
  3. I have (probably) insulted you in traffic;
  4. I have repeatedly taken the Lord’s name in vain, and have also invoked:
    • Your Lord’s name in vain;
    • Your “family;”
    • Your “village;”
    • “The road that leads to your village;”
    • “Your ancestors;”
    • “Your harem;”
    • “The person who gave you your driver’s license;”
    • And so on and so forth (I’m from Zahle, give me a break);
  5. I voted blank during all student elections, except one, at the American University of Beirut:
    • (Note 1: I still resent some of my friends’ blatant political jockeying.);
    • (Note 2: to the attractive young lady of my sophomore year, your smiles and sass did not actually convince me to vote for anyone. I did appreciate the attention, however, and thank you for that. Stay classy.);
  6. I occasionally enjoy electronic music (it took about 10 years in Beirut, but it’s happened);
  7. I have not visited my family as often as I should;
  8. I believe Hizbullah should be disarmed, and do not share its vision for Lebanon;
  9. I believe the Future Movement has botched things up time and again, and must learn to accept criticism of the late former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and his son, current Prime Minister Saad Hariri;
  10. I believe Walid Jumblatt is a man of many regrets, but probably does not regret enough;
  11. I believe Lebanon’s various Christian parties are stuck in the past, have no present, and fear the future;
  12. I do not believe money should be spent on a “National Dialogue” that is nothing but a glorified sham;
  13. I do not believe that secularism is a cure for Lebanon, but I’m not sure there is one;
  14. I would kill to defend my country, village, family, and friends, but sometimes question whether I am willing to die;
  15. Women often annoy me;
  16. I fail to understand how Lebanese men wish to enjoy their twenties, but insist on marrying virgins;
  17. I unabashedly support the hummus war between Lebanon and Israel (food fights never killed anyone. That said, I think we can all agree that Lebanese hummus is better!);
  18. I do not like baba ghannoush and think falafel are overrated;
  19. I have never partied at BO18 (see Confession #7);
  20. I have judged Francophone Lebanese based on the mere hint of their voice;
  21. I never focused in French class, but still list French as a language on my resume;
  22. I learned Arabic by listening to Melhem Barakat, my father’s Zahle twang, and my mother’s refined Beiruti accent, which explains my failure to communicate with 99.7% of the general public;
  23. I love watching Don’t Mess With the Zohan;
  24. I do not like being called an “Arab,” but I do not know how to navigate, sail a boat, write without vowels, work with glass, or dye cloth. As such, “Phoenician” doesn’t exactly fit either. If you insist on a label, “Lebanese” will do just fine. Fill in the blanks as you see fit;
  25. I wonder, sometimes, whether Lebanon is worth the pain;

Put a pen to paper. I’m sure your list will have a lot in common with this one, but if not… “You have your Lebanon, and I have mine.”

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Perhaps the Lebanese – and for that matter, their neighbors – have it right in bickering among themselves. After months of drought turned the already-parched Levant into a tinderbox, and not just in the figurative sense, Lebanese priests and sheikhs prayed for rain. Their counterparts in Israel and the Palestinian territories did the same.

In a sense, the religious leadership of the Christians, Muslims, and Jews of the region united for something more than their state-protected privileges. But that might have been a problem.

These well-intentioned people may have inadvertently caused another weather crisis of sorts. Having not seen a drop of rain in more than two months, to go on top of the Eastern Mediterranean’s typically lengthy summer dry spell, Lebanon has seen a torrent of rain, snow, sleet, and hail. Even Baalbeck – antiquity’s Heliopolis, the city of the sun – was covered in snow.

Maybe unity is overrated.

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A good hot dog is an underrated delicacy. Every city worth the label should have at least a couple decent hot dog stands. In the middle of exam period, like many other law students, I’ve taken to studying late (to be frank, I’m not what one would call an early bird). This matters because Foggy Bottom shuts down at 6:00 pm. Aside from the overpriced Starbucks fare, a few hot dog stands are the only available places to eat after 2:00 a.m.

This weekend, I twice braved a minefield of drunk fratboys, scantily clad ladies, and the usual assortment of clubbers (read: Middle Easterners and South Asians), and decided to check out a rather famous hot dog stand near my law school. I still don’t know what the place is called, but it’s run by an Iranian man by the name of “Manoush” (I think).

On my second successive night there, “Manoush” asked my name. “Anthony,” I replied. Nice simple exchange – or so I thought.

As he prepared my three hot dogs – I will not be shamed by my eating habits – Manoush hit me with the classic, “so, where are you from?” Having spent considerable time in Lebanon, where the name-and-place game is a gateway into your entire family history, political orientation, and intellectual development, I immediately employed an “evasive verbal maneuver” and told Manoush that I was from “Florida,” and prayed he would think I was Italian.

Apparently, that wasn’t enough. “And your family? You look Middle Eastern or Latin.”

“Lebanese,” I said, keeping my eyes on the condiments and bracing myself for the inevitable, but always friendly, dialogue:

Manoush:“OH! Lebanon… BEAUTIFUL women,” said Manoush. “The men? Not so much…”

Me (laughing): “Yeah, thanks. Nose-jobs and implants help the talent pool along nicely. Persian women are lovely too.”

Manoush: “They are. But all I know is that Lebanese women are pretty – and they have wonderful eyes (at this point the fratboys, blissfully unaware of my desire to just eat a hot dog, voice their agreement). And Lebanese food is so delicious, and the weather is always nice!”

Me: “Yep. Can’t complain, except that floods and blizzards have followed a couple months of drought.”

Manoush (smiling): “But your politics are so frustrating. It’s a shame. What do you think about the situation?”

Me: ”Can’t have it all, right? Hopefully, it’ll calm down there and everywhere else in the region” (resisting the urge to yell, “Really, this coming from the Iranian?”)

Manoush: “The problem, I think, is that there are too many communities in such a small piece of real estate. Too many hostile neighbors. And too much outside interference.”

Me: “True, but…”

Manoush (clearly fishing): “… and they say there might be another war soon. Maybe a civil war over the case on the Prime Minister’s killing. What’s his name?”

Me: “Hariri… he was a former Prime Minister.”

Manoush: “Yes! Hariri… or maybe another war with Israel and the Hizbullah.”

Me (employing another evasive maneuver): “I don’t follow the politics there much [Editor: uh huh]. But since we’re talking, I have one question that’s always bothered me.”

Manoush: “Sure, but I have to get to other customers…”

Me: “Can you tell me why hot dogs come in packs of 10 and buns come in packs of 8?

Manoush (visibly amused):“No. That’ll be $9.00.”

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In criticizing Hizbullah, it is still important to acknowledge that the “Party of God” is more than an extension of the Iranian Revolution or a cabal of Lebanese Shiite clerics and like-minded politicians. Hizbullah has deep roots in the contemporary psyche of Lebanese Shiites, represents the lion’s share of that community, and is the dominant actor in the Lebanese political arena today.

But Hizbullah is not the Shiite community; is certainly not Lebanon; and cannot claim special sufferings.

Has Hizbullah continued Imam Musa Sadr’s legacy and awoken Lebanon’s long-dormant and acquiescent Shiite community? Yes.

Has Hizbullah stepped into a vacuum created by years of state neglect and war to provide Lebanese Shiites with housing, schools, utilities, health care, and a powerful political narrative? Yes.

Has Hizbullah, more than any other party, organization, or state in recent Middle Eastern history, managed to stick it to Israel? Yes.

Has Hizbullah managed to electrify the region and cultivate a culture of resistance that threatens to shatter Israel’s sense of security? Yes.

Lebanon’s Shiites have legitimate gripes, especially regarding socio-economic development. The community has long been marginalized. Anyone disputing this fact is either a bigot or is living in fantasy. Yet, this marginalization is a product of Lebanon’s geography, not just its communal tradition, and has manifested elsewhere.

The fact is, Lebanese development, with all its warts, has historically focused on Beirut and its immediate environs. Rural Sunnis and Christians in Lebanon’s far North, the Bekaa, and Mount Lebanon itself – which is often mischaracterized as some sort of wealthy oasis – also face economic hardship, underdeveloped services, and foreign interference.

The Bekaa and Mount Lebanon are dotted with small, neglected villages home to Sunnis, Druze, and Christians alike. One only need to look at how fires and floods have burnt and battered Lebanon over the past few weeks to see that the impact of terrible roads, inadequate utilities, and poor public services is indiscriminate.

Even the capital is no different. The slums just south of Beirut – Hizbullah’s Dahiyeh stronghold – are only part of a dilapidated concrete jungle surrounding the revitalized city center. Run-down Sunni neighborhoods, Armenian ghettos, and shattered Christian shanties exist too.

Across the board, down-trodden areas and once-glorious neighborhoods continue to crumble, as an influx of foreign and expatriate money selectively rebuilds parts of the capital with little regard for the city’s Levantine and Ottoman heritage.

These internal frustrations, to say nothing of rampant corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, frustrate citizens from all of Lebanon’s communities and areas.

Externally, these communities have suffered at the hands of Syria like the Shiites have suffered at the hands of Israel. From the late 1980s well into the earlier part of this decade, Syrian troops killed, tortured, and “disappeared” Lebanese citizens. On a personal note, Syrian troops shot members of my family some decades ago, and the post-war Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus beat and jailed some of my friends and acquaintances for protesting an ongoing occupation (in 2002, most notably, and at other points in time).

Would Hizbullah – or any other Lebanese parties or persons – welcome a resurrected Christian militia designated with the task of defending Lebanon’s eastern front? Would the Lebanese welcome a Sunni militia tasked with avenging the slaying of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri?

Perhaps not.

If understanding the causes of Shiite marginalization does not justify decades of neglect, and understanding the plights of Lebanon’s other communities does not justify a revived militancy, then understanding the impetus behind Hizbullah’s formation surely does not justify the development of a state-within-a-state.

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The Lebanese never learn.

For years, Hizbullah convinced many Lebanese that it would not turn its weapons against them. Shiites, Sunnis, Druze, and Christians all bought into that myth. Some believed wholeheartedly that Hizbullah would remain focused on Israel, while others saw no other choice but to acquiesce to realities on the ground. After all, the Lebanese had seemingly tired of conflict after decades of war and political bickering - and confronting Hizbullah would risk returning the country to a past that haunts almost every family in Lebanon.

Whether Hizbullah was genuine, or was simply catering to the fanciful views of others, does not matter. External motives - namely, acting as a forward base of Iran, protecting convergent Syrian-Iranian interests in Lebanon, and confronting Israel – drive Hizbullah’s actions. This is not to say that the party’s domestic goals, like increasing the Shiite voice in Lebanon’s system or providing social services and utilities, are irrelevant or even secondary; but only to stress that these goals are part of a broader project.

In that vein, the much-lauded “Lebanonization” of Hizbullah was driven by a Syrian regime intent on directing Lebanese political theater and an Iranian regime willing to accept that Lebanon’s demographic balance would not allow for a junior Islamic Republic on the Mediterranean. But make no mistake: the confrontation with Israel and with Israel’s Western backers remains the party’s foremost concern.

Importantly, this means that Hizbullah’s internal actions must be understood within its broader vision for Lebanon and the region. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Syrian tutelage and Israeli occupation contributed, albeit differently, to relative consensus in support of Hizbullah. Benefiting from Syrian control over Lebanese politics and Israel’s inflammatory presence, Hizbullah found it relatively easy to consolidate support within Lebanon.

After Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hizbullah put its head down and began to fortify South Lebanon. Back in Beirut, a class of politicians – now scattered among various factions - depended on Syria for their continued relevance, and thus did not challenge Damascus on matters of importance, including the security sector and Hizbullah’s special status.

In 2005, as is well-known by now, assassins took the life of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The killing was the straw that broke the camel’s back (or, perhaps, the snowflake that broke the Cedar tree). A colossal uprising drove Syria out of Lebanon, and sent Hizbullah scrambling to preserve its special prerogatives.

After months of dodging discussions on its arsenal, Hizbullah conducted a border raid and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers. The “Party of God” probably did this to orchestrate another prisoner exchange, further solidify its credibility, and demonstrate its utility in post-Syria Lebanon. But Hizbullah had miscalculated.

No longer content with the “tit-for-tat” game it had played with Hizbullah since the mid-1990s, and notwithstanding Hizbullah’s proclamation of a “Divine Victory,” Israel simply pummeled Lebanon for more than a month, killing thousands of civilians and causing billions of dollars in direct damage.

Hizbullah fighters, as Israeli troops repeatedly acknowledged, fought valiantly. But to what end? Despite their prowess in the South Lebanon’s villages and nature reserves, Hizbullah fighters could only watch (alongside millions of other Lebanese) as the Israeli air force wrought destruction from the skies.

Since the July War of 2006, Lebanon has unraveled. Israel’s brutish response may have failed to achieve its publicly declared objectives, but it exposed Lebanon’s latent divisions and has since forced Hizbullah to work hard to protect its rear in Lebanon.

First, Hizbullah had to restore its nerve center and launch a massive rebuilding project to help Shiites return to their homes (never mind the billions collected by the Lebanese government in an international donor’s conference). Second, Hizbullah had to maintain its aura of resistance while alleviating Shiite fears of another war and dealing with increasingly assertive opposition to its weapons. Third, to protect either Syria or itself, Hizbullah had to paralyze Lebanon’s institutions to stave off the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In doing so, the party found itself further mired in Lebanon’s complex political web.

Finally, after years of burdening the Lebanese with the consequences of its arsenal, Hizbullah directly used its weapons against them in 2008. In response to a government attempt to curb its illegal use of a party-owned telecom network,  gunmen affiliated with Hizbullah and its allies took to the streets of Beirut and the Chouf Mountains, kicking off three weeks of unrest that ended with the Doha Accord, an agreement to basically “punt on” Lebanon’s disputes until parliamentary elections in 2009. After those elections yielded yet another majority for the March 14 coalition, Hizbullah and its allies managed to force through an uneasy coalition government anyway.

If U.N. prosecutors indict members of Hizbullah, and if the Tribunal’s trial chamber finds them guilty, Hizbullah will feel threatened in its ability to confront Israel and provide Iran with a strong presence in the Levant. That said, an indictment may not trigger a war or coup in 2011; indeed, the entire effort to try those responsible for a string of political assassinations in Lebanon may fizzle harmlessly if a political solution is somehow cooked up. Alternatively, Iran and Syria may prevail on Hizbullah to swallow the pill, pin the killing on “rogues” or party members that are no longer alive, and live to fight another day. In another possible scenario, Hizbullah’s patrons may decide to wait it out for another few months or years.

At this point, however, this is all speculation. If the Lebanese do not accept trading justice for peace, Hizbullah will add this latest “offense” to its already-raging fire of memory. Maybe not in 2011, but someday, somehow, Hizbullah will settle scores.

Hizbullah has offered its guarantees before; rather, it has offered the safety of silence. Having spoken up in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, the Lebanese were met with a crisis at every turn. It’s time to get real.

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There are three problems with Raad’s attack on the STL Agreement.

First, Raad paints over several important facts, which hit at the consistency of his otherwise impressive challenge of the STL Agreement. Raad conceals that Lebanon’s institutional paralysis had much to do with the strategy of negation adopted by Hizbullah and Amal to prevent, and then derail, the STL’s establishment. Lahoud, the Shiite ministers in cabinet, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri basically stonewalled for three years. Of course, Lahoud was well within his right as President to participate in or resist international treaty negotiations. At first glance, there appears to be no answer to Raad’s point on the presidency. However, Raad is mistaken in asserting that Shiites lacked representation in cabinet. In fact, there were five Shiite ministers – and they boycotted cabinet sessions, but did not resign. Furthermore, Berri’s closure of Parliament, an act that Raad and other Hizbullah MP’s backed, blatantly disregarded Article 32 of the Lebanese Constitution, which sets out “ordinary [parliamentary] sessions.”

Second, Raad misunderstands the “rules of the game” within Lebanon’s domestic constitutional framework. In arguing that the principles of “coexistence” require a Shiite veto power (and corresponding Maronite and Sunni veto power), Raad assumes that the transient balance of power shapes Lebanon’s rules. While this is true to a certain extent, cabinet and parliament are based on Christian-Muslim parity rather than on narrower communal imperatives. It is one thing to argue that the law should reflect a new communal equation; it is an entirely different question to assert that it already does. But even if “coexistence” pointed towards a tri-polar balance, the principle is meant to protect communities instead of political parties or foreign participants. Conflating Hizbullah with the Shiite community distorts the rules, and so too does conflating the Future Movement with the Sunni community or the Lebanese Forces with the Maronite community. That other Lebanese parties, like the Phalange, sometimes agree with Hizbullah’s approach, though perhaps not its conclusions, only demonstrates how these parties lay claim to their communities and further distorts the system

Third, Raad and many other politicians, regardless of their stance, adhere to a caricature view of Lebanon’s constitutional interaction with the international system. International law is part of Lebanese law (to the extent that the latter exists!). The Lebanese Constitution’s preamble states, in part, that Lebanon is “a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its covenants […]” Besides this explicit constitutional incorporation of international law, membership in the U.N. generally requires ceding sovereignty in exchange for some measure of collective security. Within that context, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter empowers the Security Council to adopt measures necessary to maintaining international peace and security: in addition to the use of armed force (Article 42) and other provisional measures (Article 40), Article 41 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council to adopt measures “not involving the use of armed force.”

Special courts and tribunals are within the Security Council’s authority. Resolution 1757 invokes Chapter VII authority, as do several preceding resolutions relating to crimes against Lebanon. All other considerations are secondary from a legal point of view, including the charge that Lahoud did not participate in the STL Agreement’s negotiation. In essence, Resolution 1757 expressly overrode Lebanon’s stalled domestic process, and effectively stated that the STL would come into existence by June 10, 2007 (with or without the Lebanese state’s notification or approval).

Ultimately, given the content of the Lebanese Constitution’s preamble and the general requirements of U.N. membership, it is simply nonsensical to argue that the international process in question unduly transcended Lebanon’s constitutional framework. In any case, despite these holes in Hizbullah’s argument, it is certainly a positive sign that the party’s members (and Raad in particular) have engaged their opponents on the battlefield of ideas, rather than taking to the streets. Whether debate will give way to war remains to be seen.

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At a press conference earlier this week, Hizbullah MP Mohammad Raad basically argued that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is unconstitutional, from a Lebanese perspective, and thus cannot pursue justice in the name of the Lebanese. To be precise, Raad and a retired Lebanese judge, Salim Jreisati, assailed the “Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon” (STL Agreement).

To be brief, alongside U.N. Security Council Resolution 1757, the STL Agreement gave rise to the STL. The domestic impetus for the STL came on December 13, 2005, when former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora requested that the U.N. “establish a tribunal of an international character [...] to try all those who are found responsible for the terrorist crime perpetrated against [Hariri].” At that time, Lebanon’s cabinet – including the Hizbullah-led opposition coalition – was fully functioning. Both these points are beyond dispute.

But Raad and Jreisati contest subsequent developments, pointing out four main flaws in the process leading up to the STL’s formation:

  • First, the negotiations on the STL Agreement were unconstitutional in form. In particular, these negotiations were unconstitutional because they took place without former Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s participation (by late 2006, when these negotiations were ongoing, Lahoud’s presence in Baabda Palace had all but paralyzed the presidency). Article 52 of the Lebanese Constitution states that the “President of the Republic negotiates international agreements in coordination with the Prime Minister.” Clearly, then, the President should have had a role. Raad’s view is strongest here.
  • Second, the government that signed and pushed through the agreement was illegitimate. Raad sees this as a crucial point: when the Siniora-led cabinet signed the STL Agreement in 2007, none of the Shiite ministers were participating in government sessions. Although Lebanon’s constitutional quorum was met by March 14′s grouping, Raad believes that the constitutional norm of “coexistence” precludes such important decisions absent Shiite representation in cabinet. Under Article 52 of the Lebanese Constitution, treaties and agreements do not enter into force without cabinet’s approval. If the cabinet was illegitimate, then its approval of the STL Agreement is invalid.
  • Third, March 14 partisans and the international community disregarded a host of constitutional processes in their rush to form the Tribunal. The STL Agreement – either because of its impact on the budget or because it cannot be withdrawn from annually – falls within a class of agreements that requires parliamentary approval. Parliament did not convene to ratify the agreement, so the agreement did not enter into force.
  • Fourth, the international mechanisms that overrode Lebanon’s political deadlock are themselves illegitimate, because they “transcend” the common framework that governs all Lebanese parties and communities. Here, Raad is referring to the fact that the STL Agreement took force despite Lebanon’s institutional inability to ratify it somehow.

As one would expect from Hizbullah’s sophisticated party machine – particularly from Raad, doubtlessly a man of great intellect – these arguments are serious attacks on the Tribunal and tie in nicely with one another. But his views are ultimately incorrect.

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As of late, and as usual, Lebanon observers may be suffering from typical side-effects: loss of focus, mood swings, frustration, despair, rage, and insanity. For a brief respite check out the Wall Street Journal‘s “Where to Go in Beirut” article and photogallery.

While tried-and-true “Comeback Special” pieces do little to ameliorate the reality that Lebanon is in quite a mess, the article is a nice break from the daily grind of Lebanon-related political commentary. Hopefully, tourists and Lebanese expats – in the Americas, Europe, and elsewhere – will continue to channel their inner Bourdain and “rediscover” Lebanon.

A visit is certainly worth the time – and Lebanon is incapable of being dull. As you read this from your desks or phones, just take a moment to think of the last time you truly enjoyed a couple of days or weeks. Now ask yourself why. Was it food, drink, weather, ancient ruins, “edgy” neighborhoods,” or glitz and glamor? Or was it simply the night?

Make the trip.

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A Step Closer… (To What?)

Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare has presented Daniel Fransen, the pre-trial magistrate, with an indictment in the Hariri case (according to Georges Malbrunot of the French daily Le Figaro). If true, this report would mean tha Bellemare has managed to present Fransen an indictment before the U.N. shuts down for the holidays on December 15. That said, citing the ever-present chance of a political resolution, Malbrunot’s source has apparently indicated that Fransen will take his time with the indictment.

Will there be a resolution? Perhaps, but what makes Lebanon so special, and so deserving of all this attention? All the publicly available evidence - which, to be fair, is circumstantial – points towards Damascus or Hizbullah, or both. True, prospects for enforcement look dismal; but a judgment will have its own political effect that these parties would rather not deal with. For that reason, the entire region is bending over backwards to find a way out.

With the world watching, it will be interesting to see whether the Saudis and Syrians can cook up a solution acceptable to Iran and Hizbullah. It will also be interesting to see how any “political solution” will play out near The Hague.

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… and what it is ain’t exactly clear.

The Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar has released a series of purported State Department cables that it claims were provided to it by WikiLeaks (including cables from Beirut). The most controversial cable has Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr basically telling American diplomats that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will stay out of Israel’s way if it again tries to eradicate Hizbullah through force of arms. Not only that, but Murr and Lebanese President Michel Sleiman supposedly crafted a plan to sequester Lebanese troops on base to avoid having them drawn into the conflict.

Based on the military’s prior history, this is not a bombshell. The Lebanese army did precisely that in 2006, not because it is unpatriotic or cowardly, but because it would be folly from an institutional standpoint to get into the mix as Hizbullah and Israel battle it out. Similarly, the LAF stood aside in 2008 as Hizbullah and its allies assaulted Beirut, controversially choosing to contain fighting instead of stepping in to quell it.

Politically, however, the cable could hurt the Defense Minister. Murr comes off as rather hostile and snooty vis-a-vis Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement. He also seems preoccupied with Hizbullah-backed Shiite purchasing of land and apartments in traditionally Christian areas of Lebanon and with sticking it to FPM leader Michel Aoun, who in Murr’s view is “going insane” and basically not acting “Christian” enough. As commentators have noted, this could ultimately hurt Sleiman, because Murr is viewed as one of his ministers in cabinet.

But hold on. As of yet, only one cable from the U.S. Embassy in Beirut has appeared on the “Cablegate” page. Also, WikiLeaks did not list Al-Akhbar as one of the papers it would release cables to. This brings up the problem of authenticity. Finally, even if the cables are essentially real – and that remains to be seen – parts of the reported conversation could be forged or tinkered with. 

Others have already noticed the discrepancies, which the paper claims are due to clerical errors (Elias Muhanna on Qifa Nabki picked up on this). But whose errors are these? Al-Akhbar ‘s or the diplomat’s? Furthermore, Mustapha at Beirut Spring has raised the possibility of false cables and notes that Al-Akhbar may be publishing purported cables that are not from WikiLeaks (he cites The Atlantic on this story).

The cables may be real, but caution is in order until they’re at least up on WikiLeaks itself. This is especially true in a country with a long and robust tradition of sensationalist and sometimes blatantly dishonest journalism. Not to accuse Al-Akhbar of anything, or to target it as opposed to other papers, but it’s worth taking in these “reports” with a grain of salt.

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Lebanon (Wiki-)Leaked

Like other recent exposes, “Cablegate” seems overhyped and overdone. Of course, the phased release of over two-hundred thousand State Department cables is significant in terms of diplomatic secrecy (WikiLeaks has released 607 cables to date). Furthermore, the documents do provide a “raw look” at U.S. foreign policy and allow important insight into the motives and concerns of world leaders doing business with America. However, the whole affair has yet to surprise or astonish in terms of substance.

Middle East ”revelations” include some duplicity, heightened Arab fears of Iran, Israeli efforts to maintain their “qualitative military edge,” and overlapping Arab and Israeli efforts to leverage American power against Iran. Nothing new, though some candid statements made behind closed doors have added color to an 0ften-stale regional discourse. 

So far, WikiLeaks has released only one cable from the U.S. Embassy in Beirut (SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA TO PETRAEUS: PUSH SYRIA TO GET BACK IN ARAB FOLD). In that brief correspondence, former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Michele Sison relays to Washington a discussion between former Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and General David Petraeus, the then-CENTCOM Commander. Here are some of the basic points (Page Lebanon‘s comments in parentheses):

  • Siniora apparently told Petraeus that March 14 was “quite satisfied” with the June 2009 parliamentary elections, which revealed that its majority was decisive rather than “fictitious.” (March 14 has since seen the departure of the Progressive Socialist Party, led by Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt. Lebanon’s parliament no longer divides into a clear majority and minority. But the people’s sentiments in two successive elections are clear.)
  • Siniora also thanked the U.S. for its sustained support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and asserted that such support had contributed to March 14′s victory at the polls. (Earlier this year, the U.S. Congress placed a hold on assistance to the LAF. Congress was – and is – concerned that military assistance to Lebanon could hurt Israel’s security. Although Congress has since lifted the hold, it has already ignited doubts in Lebanon over American commitment to its allies and opened the door for Iran to make a play)
  • Despite his optimism, Siniora told Petraeus that he expected the government formation to take considerable time. (Government formation took nearly half-a-year and basically undid the election results in the interest of stability.)
  • “Siniora commented on the signs of increased U.S. engagement with Syria, but he advised the United States to be careful not to give any rewards to Syria without Syria taking action first.” (From a Lebanese standpoint, U.S. engagement with Syria has been a mixed, but mostly unpleasant, bag. On the one hand, American and regional overtures towards Syria have contributed to stability in Lebanon. On the other hand, however, Syria has used the mantra of order to bludgeon advocates of liberty and justice. Syria holds most of the cards in Lebanon and Iran has Hizbullah, the ace up the Tehran-Damascus alignment’s sleeve.)
  • Siniora insisted that a peace deal with Israel not infringe upon the Palestinians’ “right of return” and reaffirmed the Lebanese government’s opposition to the permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (These views may not ultimately translate into policy, given the realities on the ground, but Siniora’s statement runs counter to accusations made by some of March 14′s critics, like the Free Patriotic Movement, who slam what they perceive as its pandering to the Sunni street.)
  • Siniora agreed with Petraeus that Iran’s armor was cracking thanks to internal unrest, but warned that Israeli strikes against Iran would destabilize the region (Siniora’s opinion may not matter to the Israelis on this issue, but his statement hardly sounds like an endorsement of military action against Iran. As such, insinuations to the contrary, made by Hizbullah and others over the past five years, may be without merit.)

Again, there are no big surprises; but the leak provides some interesting documentation to throw into the largely speculative Lebanese theater. More awaits.

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