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Archive for January, 2011

On this blog, I’ve repeatedly outlined why the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which the U.N. Security Council established under its Chapter VII authority, is legally binding in terms of international law and Lebanese constitutional law. As such, efforts to impede the STL’s progress may succeed in slowing down the investigative and trial processes, but cannot but the genie back in the bottle.

For a similar take on things, please read this short report by The Daily Star-Lebanon, which asked legal experts to weigh in on the question. In essence, the consensus reflects what I’ve been arguing here.

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In 2005, millions of Lebanese marched for their freedom. The streets of Beirut captured the world’s attention and seemed likely to trigger a wave of Arab democratization and reform. But despite glimmers of hope in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, the much-lauded “Arab Spring” soon fizzled out.

In some countries, homegrown activism was absent or fell short of a critical mass. In other places, foreign support was inadequate or insincere. Even the Bush Administration, which publicly adhered to a “freedom agenda,” could ill-afford widespread democracy promotion. After all, authoritarian regimes of one stripe or another governed – and still govern – strong American allies like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. In not-so-friendly countries like Syria or Libya, fears of an Islamist wave or civil strife kept Western democracy promotion at bay.

Now, six years after that fleeting spring, is the “Arab Summer” here?

In the span of a few weeks, protests have unfolded across the Arab world. In Tunisia, a string of protests toppled a decades-old regime, forced President Ben Ali to flee the country, and triggered military measures to re-impose order. In Egypt, a bombing of a Coptic Christian church sparked riots that have exacerbated Christian-Muslim and state-society tensions. After months of turmoil, thousands of Egyptians have now begun demonstrating in the heart of Cairo, presenting the Mubarak regime with the most serious and organized threat to its rule in years.

In Jordan, protests over food prices form part of a growing pattern of clashes. Kuwait’s crisis arose when security forces attacked on a group of academics and lawmakers. While the Jordanian government managed to quell unrest, and while Kuwait silenced dissent by announcing that it would distribute $4 billion to its citizens, dissenters may find their voice if regimes across the region continue to crumble.

These events may appear different on the surface, but their underlying causes are the same. Arabs are increasingly dissatisfied with oppressive regimes that have failed to deliver economic growth, political representation, or social freedom. In a sense, these protests are bound by fortune too. Each success or failure in a given Arab capital, and every image or word that flickers on Al-Jazeera or Twitter, affects the prospects of change elsewhere. 

Of course, the “Revolutions” of 2005 and the “revolts” of 2011 differ significantly. First, democracy advocates – in Washington and in Arab capitals – have yet to brand, promote, and support the latest waves of dissent. In contrast, for instance, the “Cedar Revolution” of 2005 emerged under polished steering and marketing, which harnessed the Lebanese people’s free-minded impulses, made the case for international support, and ultimately secured change.

Second, the hope of 2005 has given way to rage. During the “Arab Spring,” millions of Lebanese marched engaged in peaceful protests against Syrian occupation. In nearby Damascus, academics and other dissidents issued a declaration calling for democratic reform in Syria itself. Although Lebanon’s fortunes have soured, Syrian dissidents continue to languish behind bars, and Iraq’s future remains unknown, the hope of 2005 was real.

This time, protesters are venting their anger. Left unharnessed, such anger – and the violence it engenders – may reinforce fears of instability that have long driven Western support for decrepit Arab regimes. If so, the prospects of change will suffer. Indeed, aside from the stunning developments in Tunisia, the regional status quo has survived (for now).

The “Twitter effect” is another difference. Social media tools have had a paradoxical impact thus far. On the one hand, demonstrators have used social media to communicate with each other and with the broader world. On the other hand, social media have diffused leadership of these potential movements. Without direction, prospective revolutions could die out, run into more organized state security apparatuses, or descend into mayhem.

Despite these cautions, the “Arab Summer” offers a second chance. Arabs must stop blaming oppressive rulers or American foreign policy for their problems. By taking ownership of their futures, Arabs can challenge their regimes and present the U.S. with a moment of choice.

If that moment comes, the U.S. must not fall on the wrong side of history. The Obama Administration should truly embrace the message it has tried to impart on friends and foes alike. False choices – between bread and freedom; between justice and stability; between democracy and security – lead only to empty stomachs and shackled hands.

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March 14 partisans across the country, particularly Sunni supporters of former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, have been protesting what they believe is a political coup by Hizbullah. Earlier today, Najib Mikati, a billionaire Sunni politician from the northern city of Tripoli, secured enough votes to head Lebanon’s  next government. Although Mikati had emerged as the Hizbullah-led March 8 coalition’s candidate for the premiership, he has denied being “Hizbullah’s man.”

In any case, the March 14 coalition and its Western backers fear that a Hizbullah-controlled government, even under the guise of a “national-unity” cabinet, could distance or even isolate Lebanon from the West and from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), a U.N. judicial body established to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and other Lebanese politicians and citizens.

March 14 has called for protests in support of Hariri and the STL. Meanwhile, Sunni law-makers have called for a “Day of Rage” across Lebanon. Protesters have assembled peacefully in some places, but have burned tires, closed roads, and fired shots in others. All in all, fears of Sunni reactions against yet another embarrassment of Hariri only complicate the future of a country already bracing itself for a Hizbullah reaction to the imminent publicization of an STL indictment.

Here are some pictures and videos of Lebanon’s “Day of Rage.”

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This past weekend saw Lebanon’s political stand-off heat up. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah both laid out their respective camp’s positions (I’ll be reacting to these speeches later this week).

Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt, who had until now vacillated between the March 14 and March 8 coalitions, finally threw in his lot with Hizbullah. Notwithstanding Jumblatt’s rather loose understanding of the word “conviction,” his latest gambit – to publicly announce his adherence to the Syrian line while allowing members of his bloc to formulate their own positions – is the latest consequence of the pressure Syria and Hizbullah have managed to exert on him since May 2008.

The most important development was Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s emergence as the March 8 candidate for the premiership. Mikati is the billionaire owner of a communications conglomerate that does business across the developing world, and has often presented himself as a compromise candidate for the premiership. In 2005, when popular protests led to former Prime Minister Omar Karami’s resignation, Mikati stepped in and ably led a caretaker cabinet that oversaw Lebanon’s first free and fair elections in some thirty years (for those wondering, the elections of 1992, 1996, and 2000 took place under Syrian occupation, political tutelage, and blatant “electioneering”).

Mikati is both accomplished and capable. This is precisely why his candidacy could be dangerous from March 14′s point of view. As once source put it, Mikati “could lend some semblence of credibility to [March 8's] so-called agenda, which is clearly aimed at one thing: the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.”

To be sure, it is hard to imagine Mikati condeming the Tribunal outright. Yet, his acquiesence in the face of other condemnations could have the same effect. Much will depend on who controlls key portfolios – like the Justice and Interior ministries – and the overall composition of the cabinet, so it is difficult to envision how any future government will react when the Tribunal’s indictment goes public.

Even so, it is clear that the next prime minister will face renewed pressures to open the cabinet debate to issues like “false witnesses,” the STL-Lebanon treaty, and the Lebanese government’s cooperation with U.N. investigators. Without the security of a Hariri-led cabinet, March 14 exposes itself to the risk that Mikati could allow the cabinet to debate these issues. Similarly, thanks to Jumblatt’s gymnastics and President Michel Sleiman’s need to remain above the fray, March 14 cannot hope to outvote its adversaries in the cabinet.

There is also a communal element to these tensions. In 2005 and 2009, March 8 managed to secure the election of Amal Movement leader Nabih Berri as Speaker of Parliament by arguing, in part, that the Shiite post should go to an individual who represented that community’s sentiment. Many March 14 supporters, and Sunnis in particular, feel that should apply here. The vast majority of Lebanese Sunnis support Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in the same manner the vast majority of Lebanese Shiites support the Hizbullah-Amal alignment.

With that in mind, March 14′s supporters are understandably frustrated. ”Anti-Mikati protests” have erupted across the country (more accurately, these are pro-Hariri demonstrations). But if it is wrong for Hizbullah supporters to burn tires and block roads, what justifies these actions? Nothing.

Tire-burning and the practice of blocking roads are neither desireable nor useful. Impeding the day-to-day affairs of citizens is unlikely to exert any pressure on Hizbullah; this is the same organization that went to war in 2006, obstructed government in 2007, assaulted the capital in 2008, and toppled the cabinet just this month.

If these protests are mere expressions of anger, rather than a calculated (but futile) attempt to pressure Hizbullah, the dangers are even greater. Lebanon’s various “Streets” are already volatile, and have been on edge for about five years now. Sunni-Shiite tensions continue to simmer, and intra-Christian rivalries have not yet been put to rest. Constant provocations and responses will only edge the country closer to the precipice of renewed strife.

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Admittedly, Lebanon does not live up to its liberal mythology. But, for all its warts, and despite periodic failures, coexistence among Lebanon’s communities reflects, and in turn promotes, a pluralism that is absent throughout much of the Middle East. Since the mid-19th century, when European intervention in Ottoman-era Mount Lebanon helped consolidate communalism, political pluralism has distinguished Lebanon from the rest of the region in three positive ways.

First, Lebanon benefits from a dynamism that is due, in part, to its people’s intimate contact with “the Other.” From cosmopolitan Beirut to the most insular of mountain villages, the Lebanese interact with, or are at least exposed to, other groups. This diversity manifests on street corners, in classrooms, in the workplace, and in the political arena – and helps breed cultural awareness, lateral thinking, and tact. Wired for the world, members of the far-flung Lebanese diaspora owe part of their success to this nurturing process. In turn, Lebanon benefits from its diaspora’s ideas, remittances, investments, and other initiatives, which offset the negative impact of “brain drain.”

Second, Lebanon has managed to avoid the authoritarianism that has plagued much of the Middle East. From Morocco to the Persian Gulf, theocracies, monarchies, hereditary presidencies, and military cabals have clung to power for decades. While not exactly a liberal bunch, Lebanon’s politicians, military leaders, and clerics must operate within a context that restricts their power. Because few Lebanese leaders have been able to cull together serious support outside of their communities, power has remained diffused.

Occasionally, a Lebanese leader manages to transcend the communal context. But those instances are both rare and fleeting. The vanished Imam Mousa al-Sadr, the assassinated president-elect Bashir Gemayel, the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, former General Michel Aoun, or Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah have at one time or another emerged as political giants with cross-communal support. But, time and again, Lebanon’s system has met these figures head on, frustrating and inhibiting their ambitions (note that most of these leaders met, or are likely to meet, indecorous ends).

Clearly, the interplay of various leaders and groups has sometimes led to discord. Lebanon’s most recent government crisis, due to a Hizbullah-led withdrawal that owed much of its bite to Lebanon’s power-sharing system, is a stark reminder of the negative aspects of consociationalism. However, as Lebanese-American journalist Michael Young suggests “The Ghosts of Martyrs Square,” it may be better to live under the rule of “a forest of fathers,” than under the watch of a single “father” who holds all the strings.

Third, Lebanon’s state-society relations differ significantly from the regional norm. In one form or another, a culture of dissent prevails in the media, the academia, cafes, and the halls of power. By contrast, the state lurks almost everywhere else in the Arab world. Irrespective of the political inclinations or geostrategic relevance of their regimes, these states stifle expression, suppress political opposition, and constrain free thought.

So, while Lebanon falls short on liberalism, it is very much pluralistic. But the underpinnings of this pluralism are under attack. Coexistence in Lebanon is eroding.

During the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1991), a militia order gradually took root. As a consequence of prolonged hostilities, and a militia logic that demanded ethnic and ideological consolidation, Lebanon became more cantonized than it had been before the war.

Christians receded into an enclave stretching from East Beirut to northern Lebanon. The Druze took shelter in the heart of Mount Lebanon, where much of Lebanon’s contemporary system is derived from. Sunnis remained in their coastal dwellings or patches of the Bekaa Valley. Shiites clustered around Beirut, in the northern Bekaa Valley, and in South Lebanon.

Now, two decades after the civil war, coexistence faces new threats. First, poor and unbalanced economic development continues to drive people from Lebanon’s outer provinces towards Beirut, where communal neighborhoods and ghettos, rather than inter-mixed villages, are the norm.

Second, massive land transfers taking place throughout Lebanon also threaten coexistence. The pattern of transfers reflects and perpetuates Christian detachment and apathy, as well as aggressive and possibly orchestrated purchase of properties by parties, organizations, and individuals at above-market prices. True, natural demographic and economic forces are at play; but it is also clear that something else is happening.

Coexistence has long rested upon two geo-demographic pillars: a Christian presence in the far reaches Lebanon, such as the Hermel region and Lebanese border villages in the South; and a concurrent Muslim presence in what are now perceived to be Christian areas like Batroun, Jbeil, the Metn, and Zahle.

Migration – existing alongside the problem of large-scale land transfers – threatens to deepen Lebanon’s de facto segregation. While it may be unrealistic to expect an immediate reversal of civil war-era dislocations, it is not too late to raise awareness of more gradual, contemporary threats to coexistence.

Recently, MP Boutros Harb (Batroun, March 14) proposed a draft law proposal that would freeze the sale of land between Lebanon’s Christian and Muslim populations for a period of 15 years. Although such a law would probably survive constitutional scrutiny, the proposal suffers from three serious problems. 

First, the draft law reinforces the communal impulse, and thereby further subjugates individuals to categories that are, in a sense, rooted in accidents of birth. Second, the law offends social sensibilities, particularly as it has come off as a narrow reassertion of Christian interests in Lebanon. Third, the law is a temporary stop-gap measure that does not adequately address the social and economic reasons behind Lebanon’s cantonization. 

But, if Harb’s approach is too stringent, too broad, and off the mark, its faults must not obscure the need for action. “Federalism” was once a dirty word in Lebanon. Without striving towards (and sacrificing for) elusive unity, the partition or devolution of a country whose “founding myth” was tolerance may soon become inevitable.

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The good folks over at Democracy Arsenal, a National Security Network blog, were kind enough to let me guest post a reaction piece to Lebanon’s most recent crisis of government. Please click here for the piece or see below for the text, which they have let me share here.

It’s the Optics, Stupid: Why and How Hizbullah is Spinning the Lebanese Government’s Collapse

After months of parading a purportedly imminent “Saudi-Syrian initiative” aimed at averting a crisis, Hizbullah and its allies have withdrawn from, and thus toppled, Lebanon’s government. Meanwhile, Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, having just concluded private talks with U.S. President Barack Obama, is en route to Paris for a meeting with French President Nicolas Sarkozy to shore up international support for the pro-Western March 14 coalition.

The parties’ inability to resolve their dispute over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is not surprising. After all, any prospective deal would have involved core interests and first principles. It is unlikely, then, that Hizbullah’s toppling of the government was a reaction to a Hariri reversal.

To placate Hizbullah, March 14 would have had to denounce the anticipated STL indictment before its issuance, politically abort the STL. Over the past few months, however, various March 14 figures had made clear that a “resolution” could not come at the expense of justice.

For its part, Hizbullah would have had to accept the risk of an adverse indictment without total political cover from the Hariri camp. Not content with Hariri’s public withdrawal of past “political accusations” against Syria, nor with reassurances that March 14 would disentangle prospectively accused Hizbullah members from the party as a whole, Hizbullah had been pressing Hariri to denounce the indictment outright.

In another vein, these resignations do little to derail the STL (yet). The Tribunal operates under the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority, which means that international expertise, funds, and political cover will ensure progress over the long term. While cooperation from the Lebanese government would certainly ease things, particularly in guaranteeing security for U.N. investigators or assisting in evidence collection, the Tribunal can ultimately move forward with or without such cooperation.

Sources close to the situation have indicated that the “Saudi-Syrian initiative” centered on preparing the ground for “post-indictment stability in Lebanon” and emphasized that “at no point did March 14, or Hariri, consider trading stability for justice.” Having failed to compel Hariri to delegitimize the STL’s indictment, Hizbullah is trying to “up the ante in Lebanon’s long-running stand-off.”

But why now? It’s the optics.

Hizbullah has attributed the government’s collapse to last-minute American pressure on the French, Saudis, and March 14, rather than on irreconcilable differences that precluded a solution in the first place. With Hariri on his way to New York and Washington, Hizbullah issued a 24-hour ultimatum to Lebanese President Michel Sleiman, demanding an “extraordinary” cabinet session to deal with the issue of “false witnesses” that Hizbullah argues have tainted the Tribunal’s credibility.

Of course, the ultimatum was only a gambit. Hariri was not about to shun Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah and Obama only to return to Beirut for a capitulation dressed up as a negotiation. And Sleiman had already made clear his unwillingness to force the issue.

As such, the ultimatum only heralded Hizbullah’s decision to withdraw from government. Having played up a professed “resolution,” the content of which remained unknown to a host of Lebanese leaders across the political spectrum, Hizbullah seized on a recent flurry of American, French, and Saudi activity to blame the U.S. and March 14 for its withdrawal.

But was it American pressure that derailed this mythical resolution? Or was it that the whims of Hizbullah, Hariri, or other Lebanese leaders, cannot dictate the operations of an internationally backed, financed, and staffed judicial body?

In any case, Hizbullah’s gambit has worked thus far. Despite strong diplomatic support from the U.S., France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, March 14 has not effectively framed the early stages of this debate.

The next battle over the STL might unfold in the streets and squares of Beirut. To indicate that public opinion in Lebanon has shifted away from justice and towards stability, Hizbullah may mobilize hundreds of thousands of Lebanese against the STL. But March 14 may mobilize in response, particularly with the commemoration of Hariri’s assassination just weeks away, so the likely outcome of this street fight is unclear.

Alternatively, Lebanon’s leaders may confine their checkers game to the halls of power. Hizbullah and its allies might seek to form a government without Hariri. However, because Hariri is the dominant Sunni actor, much like Hizbullah is the dominant Shiite party, it will be difficult to form a government without him as king or kingmaker.

Either way, Lebanon’s controversies will play out as a battle for credibility. With that in mind, March 14 and its Western backers have fallen behind in the race to spin this latest collapse.

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