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The Big Cat’s Out of the Bag: A Moment of Truth, a Lifetime of Duplicity from Bashar al-Assad

Posted in Israel, Lebanon, Levant, Syria, tagged , , , , on December 13, 2011 | 1 Comment »

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad keeps making all the wrong moves. In a recent interview with ABC’s Barbara Walters, the former doctor sounded more like a butcher – and a heartless one at that. He lied and deflected questions. He made light of a dire situation. He rejected international conventions and global standards on news reporting, fact verification, human rights baselines, and political legitimacy. He refused to accept responsibility for any of the bloodshed, citing a lack of control over the military and other state institutions, but inconsistently claimed that his stewardship would be an indispensable part of tomorrow’s Syria.

At one point, with a slip of the tongue, Assad told the truth. That was his greatest blunder of all.

“It’s just a game we play,” Assad said, trying to explain why Syria participates in the United Nations when his regime believes the organization lacks credibility. Assad unwittingly revealed much more: the duplicity that is – and always has been – at the heart of his fragile regime’s world-view.

Of course, all policy involves some level of duplicity (certainly at the United Nations). Leaders around the world use misinformation, diplomatic gymnastics, rhetorical techniques, and outright lies. In theory, duplicity is a tool that sometimes allows leaders to pursue broader, ostensibly noble, objectives. For example, a leader might lie or conceal truths while preventing a terrorist attack, deploying armed forces, or preserving the integrity of the financial system or banking sector. When the livelihood of millions hangs in the balance, and regardless of policy choices, duplicity may be necessary.

In Assad’s Syria, however, duplicity is the essential – and, sometimes, only – aspect of an insular cabal’s survival strategy. The ends are not noble; the means are not varied. Time and again, in various settings, the Assad regime’s games have had destructive consequences for millions of people, not least of all in Syria itself.

Most tragically, the Assad regime has duped its own people and “informed observers” by portraying Bashar as a young reformer held hostage by a corrupt and stifling old system. How absurd. The man inherited an entire country and has killed thousands to keep it. He rose through the ranks because of nepotism, maintained a support base because of corruption and an unseemly marriage of political and business interests, and trumpeted secularism as a cloak for Alawite rule.

Glaringly, for a regime that sells itself as a laboratory of Arab nationalism, military resistance, and rejectionism, Syrian duplicity has resulted in a peculiar relationship with Israel. In Syria’s parliament and in front of the domestic press, Assad has routinely blasted the “Zionist entity,” touted outdated notions of “strategic parity,” and proclaimed his country’s desire to liberate the Golan Heights “by force if necessary.” All the while, of course, Syria has engaged in peace talks with the Israelis, knowing full well that diplomacy is the only path forward.

In short, Assad is unable to confront Israel and unwilling to commit to peace. Why? Because war would expose Syria’s weakness abroad and peace would expose its weakness at home. In truth, the Assad regime has benefited greatly from Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights. With nothing to offer in terms of innovation, economic development, or political reform, the regime has cultivated fear of an Israeli bogeyman, made periodic noises about the Golan, and staved off dissent under the banner of resistance.

Syria has been especially duplicitous with its neighbors, Lebanon and Iraq. In Lebanon, the Assad regime used assassinations, beatings, jailings, and “disappearances” to intimidate the Lebanese people. With tens of thousands of troops and intelligence operatives in the country, the regime monopolized Lebanese foreign policy, exploited lucrative real estate, banking, and “semi-formal” sectors, and put a lid on political pluralism that it viewed as a potential source of dissent in Damascus.

After of decades of occupying the place, Syria was forced out of Lebanon in 2005. Since then, while promising to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty, the Assad regime has continued to facilitate Iran’s arming of Hizbullah, refused to delineate any borders, interfered in local politics as a matter of right, and done nothing to reassure the Lebanese that it no longer views their country as “the alleged entity.”

The Assad “games” in Iraq have been just as harmful. This is not to ignore the devastating consequences of the U.S. invasion of 2003, but to say that the Syrian response was disingenuous and equally damaging. Professing a desire to cooperate on borders, insurgents, and the Lebanon file, the Assad regime actively derailed progress on those issues. The regime blatantly did nothing to secure any of its borders, may have allowed guerillas and terrorists to train in Syria, and certainly granted insurgents passage through the country to Iraq. (Conveniently, Iraq and northern Lebanon provided Syria with avenues to rid itself of many Islamists it saw as threatening to the regime.)

On the international stage, as Assad basically admitted, Syria has been thoroughly two-faced. Trumpeting its participation in international organizations, the Assad regime has disrupted and dodged two ongoing probes into suspected behavior in clear violation of established international law. First, the Assad regime has repeatedly stiff-armed a judicial investigation into its suspected involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. (Hizbullah, too, may be involved.) Second, the Syrians have dragged their feet on an International Atomic Energy Agency investigation of a covert nuclear reactor project in northern Syria. (Incidentally, the Israelis bombed the facility, which they allege was a nuclear reactor, without so much as a peep from the Assad regime.)

At present, the regime must contend with the reality that most Syrians have rejected the status quo. To be sure, the Assad regime may cling to power for a while by crushing the opposition, persisting amid local and regional challenges, or emerging as a key actor after a protracted conflict. Be that as it may, the illusions are gone.

After decades of playing with house money, the regime appears to be losing. But at what price?

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My Grandfather, Hizbullah, and the Hobbesian Jungle

Posted in Christians, Druze, Hizbullah, Israel, Levant, Shiites, Sunnis, tagged , , , , , , on August 20, 2011 | 1 Comment »

“You need a gun.”

It was February 14, 2005. Hours earlier, in a massive blast that shook Beirut to its core, assassins had taken the life of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri and dozens more. Between bouts of shock and rage, many Lebanese pointed the finger at Syria, but others focused their attention on Israel or – yes, even then – on Hizbullah. All were stunned by the brazen killing.

Somehow, though, my grandfather had other concerns. Beirut’s demons.

“Beirut can slide out of control quickly,” he said. “And then you’ll see the beasts underneath those pretty faces. Calmly walk to your car and drive away… Now.”

If I thought the old man was crazy then, the years have changed that. A string of assassinations, extended periods of political paralysis, and two noteworthy conflicts have pushed the Lebanese to the brink several times, revealing glimpses of a darkness lurking beneath Beirut’s Levantine cosmopolitanism.

Through it all, the controversial Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a source of conflict in itself, has gradually led aggrieved Lebanese to their neighbors’ doorsteps. Now unsealed, the STL indictment has named four men affiliated with Hizbullah as its suspects, thereby confirming some of the leaks, speculation, and half-truths that have surrounded the investigation since the beginning.

And so, the Tribunal will try four people affiliated with Hizbullah, a Shiite militia and political party, for the murder of Hariri, a Sunni political giant. The consequences of a public trial may be damning for the Party of God. Despite Hizbullah’s deep support among Lebanese Shiites, its future also depends on the perception of others.

In 2006, Hizbullah electrified the mostly Sunni Arab world by surviving – hence, “winning” – a war with Israel. Despite the ire of Sunni regimes, who blasted Hizbullah’s “adventurism” for their own reasons, Hizbullah was king for a moment.

That’s no longer true. The party has bled support for five years, has found itself mired in successive controversies, and now faces a few serious immediate challenges. Where regional popularity was once a source of strength for Hizbullah, emerging regional hostility may soon be a new weakness.

Faced with serious interrelated challenges, Hizbullah cannot be pleased with the indictment’s timing. First, due to worsening tensions with Israel, Hizbullah continues to prepare for another war, which analysts predict will involve large swathes of both Lebanon and Israel (as opposed to the usual border skirmishes and aerial campaigns).

Second, most Lebanese want to disarm Hizbullah sooner rather than later. Even members of the Free Patriotic Movement, Hizbullah’s most important ally, seek to integrate the party’s arsenal and cadres into legitimate state institutions at some point. There is no easy answer, but the Hizbullah question continues to dominate the Lebanese discourse.

Third, as local Sunnis seethe over past insults and injuries, prospects for renewed strife remain significant. Unresolved quarrels – the controversy surrounding the Hariri assassination; the May 2008 clashes; and the communal balance of power – have unraveled decades of painstaking work by Hizbullah to avoid ostracizing Lebanon’s Sunnis.  

Fourth, unrest in Syria threatens the Asad regime, a pivotal regional patron and ally. Regime change or even prolonged instability could reduce Hizbullah’s strategic depth, eliminate many training centers, hinder supply routes, and neuter political cover from Damascus.

Against this backdrop, a public international trial can only taint Hizbullah’s image and further constrain its room for maneuver. In the past, as with the July War and the May 2008 clashes, Hizbullah has used force to create political space for itself. Faced with mounting pressure, Hizbullah or its Iranian patrons are that much more likely to use force – by design, or as a rash reaction.

The deeper problem, however, has little to do with the party’s behavior in the short term. Its mere presence as an armed militia, under the shadow of past transgressions, will invite domestic and external challenges that will strain the Lebanese system for years to come.

Hizbullah itself will suffer just as much, maybe more. In Lebanon – part libertarian paradise, part Hobbesian jungle – many overly ambitious projects have failed crushingly. From the Druze emirs of the Modern Period and Ottomans of the late 19th century, to the Lebanese militias, Israelis, and Syrians of more recent vintage, life has quickly turned nasty and brutish.

Without seriously reinventing itself, Hizbullah will be next. Or was my grandfather alone in cleaning out his gun?

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Partying with God? Issues to Consider in the Hizbullah Debate

Posted in Israel, Lebanon, United States, tagged , , , , , on March 24, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

According to The Washington Post’s David Ignatius, an upcoming National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Hizbullah has led the Obama administration to consider whether the U.S. should initiate contacts with the “Party of God.” Although National Security Council Spokesman Tommy Vietor has since said that “U.S. policy toward Hizbullah has not changed and is not changing,” Washington analysts believe that a debate could be underway “at the analyst levels” of the administration.

The U.S. continues to officially designate Hizbullah as a “foreign terrorist organization,” making certain contacts with the group illegal or contrary to American policy. Apparently the anticipated NIE assesses Hezbollah within its political and social contexts, as well as profiling the militia and operational capabilities that have led to the group’s terrorist designation. In that sense, bearing in mind that the NIE will contain varying perspectives on the party, the report will certainly confront the establishment view on Hizbullah.

Whether Hizbullah is still a terrorist organization, retains terrorist capabilities, or has renounced terror tactics altogether, it is a powerful political and social force in Lebanon and elsewhere. How, then, should Washington deal with the “Party of God?”

The Obama administration has certainly displayed a strong impulse to engage in the past. To be sure, parallels made with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) are not entirely misplaced. Like the IRA and PLO, Hizbullah operates in several realms. The party has a powerful militia, has participated in Lebanese politics since 1992, and retains a network of operatives and supporters in West Africa, Latin America, and the United States.

But Hizbullah presents challenges that caution against engagement, particularly loose advances without clear parameters.  

First, unlike the IRA and the PLO, Hizbullah’s ideology transcends the nationalistic aspects of its struggle. Although Israel’s occupation of Lebanon between 1982 and 2000 triggered the emergence of Hizbullah, deeper influences originated in Iran’s efforts to secure and expand the nascent Islamic Revolution.

For decades, ideological subordination to Iran, as well as billions of dollars of funding, training, and social support, have wed Hizbullah to an external patron. Ties with Iran are hierarchical, not lateral, and far exceed any comparable patronage enjoyed by the IRA or PLO before those parties chose moderation. Without significant Iranian involvement, the U.S. will face great difficulty in engaging Hizbullah or even elements within the party.  

Second, attempts to lure the party into trading its arsenal for political influence are misguided. Unlike the IRA before 1997 and unlike Islamist parties in Egypt, Jordan, or Syria, Hizbullah has long enjoyed the fruits of politics. In fact, Hizbullah has had it both ways. The party holds a large stake in Lebanon’s parliament and effectively controls key cabinet portfolios, but operates outside of the political process when it sees fit: to build ties with Iran, fight Israel, protect its militia prerogatives, and secure its logistics and communications lines throughout Lebanon.   

Third, American allies in Lebanon – democrats, unlike despots elsewhere in the region – are locked in a confrontation with Hizbullah over their country’s identity and regional role. Washington must coordinate with its allies in Lebanon to ensure that the Lebanese state does not suffer the consequences of engagement again.

Recent efforts to engage with Damascus rattled Lebanon’s pro-Western factions, as Syria reclaimed influence in Lebanon while using the guise of engagement to ease international pressure against it. To avoid repeating this dance, Washington might consider parameters, or perhaps benchmarks, for engagement, as its allies have demanded in the past. At a minimum, coordination will assuage concerns beforehand and provide valuable avenues for home-grown policy ideas.

Finally, the entire Middle East is now in flux. The regimes in Tehran and Damascus will have to conduct foreign policy while addressing their most serious domestic controversies in decades. On the one hand, the regimes may moderate their foreign policy to ease international pressure as they deal with domestic unrest. Syria, for instance, has already sought to open its doors for peace talks with Israel.

On the other hand, the regimes may become more bellicose in hopes of rallying their publics against American and Israeli bogeymen. If the regimes gamble that a strong stance against Israel or the West will once again bolster their stability, then poorly timed engagement could fuel propaganda efforts that the regimes will doubtlessly use to redirect domestic dissent.

Of course, mere contacts with Hizbullah, Syria, or Iran may seem unproblematic from the administration’s perch in Washington. But a simple American step can seem like an earthquake in Beirut. Engagement can yield results, but the U.S. should tread carefully.

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Get Real: Hizbullah Won’t Let an Adverse Indictment Slide

Posted in Hizbullah, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Levant, tagged , , , , , on December 11, 2010 | Leave a Comment »

The Lebanese never learn.

For years, Hizbullah convinced many Lebanese that it would not turn its weapons against them. Shiites, Sunnis, Druze, and Christians all bought into that myth. Some believed wholeheartedly that Hizbullah would remain focused on Israel, while others saw no other choice but to acquiesce to realities on the ground. After all, the Lebanese had seemingly tired of conflict after decades of war and political bickering - and confronting Hizbullah would risk returning the country to a past that haunts almost every family in Lebanon.

Whether Hizbullah was genuine, or was simply catering to the fanciful views of others, does not matter. External motives - namely, acting as a forward base of Iran, protecting convergent Syrian-Iranian interests in Lebanon, and confronting Israel – drive Hizbullah’s actions. This is not to say that the party’s domestic goals, like increasing the Shiite voice in Lebanon’s system or providing social services and utilities, are irrelevant or even secondary; but only to stress that these goals are part of a broader project.

In that vein, the much-lauded “Lebanonization” of Hizbullah was driven by a Syrian regime intent on directing Lebanese political theater and an Iranian regime willing to accept that Lebanon’s demographic balance would not allow for a junior Islamic Republic on the Mediterranean. But make no mistake: the confrontation with Israel and with Israel’s Western backers remains the party’s foremost concern.

Importantly, this means that Hizbullah’s internal actions must be understood within its broader vision for Lebanon and the region. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Syrian tutelage and Israeli occupation contributed, albeit differently, to relative consensus in support of Hizbullah. Benefiting from Syrian control over Lebanese politics and Israel’s inflammatory presence, Hizbullah found it relatively easy to consolidate support within Lebanon.

After Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hizbullah put its head down and began to fortify South Lebanon. Back in Beirut, a class of politicians – now scattered among various factions - depended on Syria for their continued relevance, and thus did not challenge Damascus on matters of importance, including the security sector and Hizbullah’s special status.

In 2005, as is well-known by now, assassins took the life of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. The killing was the straw that broke the camel’s back (or, perhaps, the snowflake that broke the Cedar tree). A colossal uprising drove Syria out of Lebanon, and sent Hizbullah scrambling to preserve its special prerogatives.

After months of dodging discussions on its arsenal, Hizbullah conducted a border raid and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers. The “Party of God” probably did this to orchestrate another prisoner exchange, further solidify its credibility, and demonstrate its utility in post-Syria Lebanon. But Hizbullah had miscalculated.

No longer content with the “tit-for-tat” game it had played with Hizbullah since the mid-1990s, and notwithstanding Hizbullah’s proclamation of a “Divine Victory,” Israel simply pummeled Lebanon for more than a month, killing thousands of civilians and causing billions of dollars in direct damage.

Hizbullah fighters, as Israeli troops repeatedly acknowledged, fought valiantly. But to what end? Despite their prowess in the South Lebanon’s villages and nature reserves, Hizbullah fighters could only watch (alongside millions of other Lebanese) as the Israeli air force wrought destruction from the skies.

Since the July War of 2006, Lebanon has unraveled. Israel’s brutish response may have failed to achieve its publicly declared objectives, but it exposed Lebanon’s latent divisions and has since forced Hizbullah to work hard to protect its rear in Lebanon.

First, Hizbullah had to restore its nerve center and launch a massive rebuilding project to help Shiites return to their homes (never mind the billions collected by the Lebanese government in an international donor’s conference). Second, Hizbullah had to maintain its aura of resistance while alleviating Shiite fears of another war and dealing with increasingly assertive opposition to its weapons. Third, to protect either Syria or itself, Hizbullah had to paralyze Lebanon’s institutions to stave off the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In doing so, the party found itself further mired in Lebanon’s complex political web.

Finally, after years of burdening the Lebanese with the consequences of its arsenal, Hizbullah directly used its weapons against them in 2008. In response to a government attempt to curb its illegal use of a party-owned telecom network,  gunmen affiliated with Hizbullah and its allies took to the streets of Beirut and the Chouf Mountains, kicking off three weeks of unrest that ended with the Doha Accord, an agreement to basically “punt on” Lebanon’s disputes until parliamentary elections in 2009. After those elections yielded yet another majority for the March 14 coalition, Hizbullah and its allies managed to force through an uneasy coalition government anyway.

If U.N. prosecutors indict members of Hizbullah, and if the Tribunal’s trial chamber finds them guilty, Hizbullah will feel threatened in its ability to confront Israel and provide Iran with a strong presence in the Levant. That said, an indictment may not trigger a war or coup in 2011; indeed, the entire effort to try those responsible for a string of political assassinations in Lebanon may fizzle harmlessly if a political solution is somehow cooked up. Alternatively, Iran and Syria may prevail on Hizbullah to swallow the pill, pin the killing on “rogues” or party members that are no longer alive, and live to fight another day. In another possible scenario, Hizbullah’s patrons may decide to wait it out for another few months or years.

At this point, however, this is all speculation. If the Lebanese do not accept trading justice for peace, Hizbullah will add this latest “offense” to its already-raging fire of memory. Maybe not in 2011, but someday, somehow, Hizbullah will settle scores.

Hizbullah has offered its guarantees before; rather, it has offered the safety of silence. Having spoken up in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, the Lebanese were met with a crisis at every turn. It’s time to get real.

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Beirut ’09: Dancing in the Eye of the Storm

Posted in Hizbullah, Israel, Lebanon, Levant on August 26, 2009 | Leave a Comment »

Beirut is alive. Lebanon’s capital – with its rehabilitated business center, lively party districts, enthralling historical sites, and pockets of Levantine charm – is in the news again. Bullets and bombs have long defined this city, and this country, in the Western eye, but Lebanon seems to have returned to its ‘Golden Age.’ 

Once littered with stories of a fifteen-year-long civil war, periodic violence between Lebanon and Israel, and the resurgent political unrest that has plagued Lebanon since 2005, newspapers, wire services, and websites now breathlessly fawn over Beirut’s revival as a regional – indeed, global – tourist destination.

Lebanon has already seen more than one million tourists this year and, though the number is dominated by expatriates and inflated by a number of Syrian transients, the Ministry of Tourism hopes to double that number by the end of the year.

Yet, as the Lebanese dance, their leaders continue to gamble.

Two months after peaceful and free elections saw the March 14 coalition expand its parliamentary majority (Walid Jumblatt has since complicated things, but the elections stand alone for our purposes here), a caretaker cabinet continues to govern. Whatever the local reasons for this delay – some blame the Free Patriotic Movement, while others blame the majority – it is clear that the regional situation favors, or at least tolerates, this stalemate in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, Israel and Hizbullah continue to trade jabs. Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon has stated that Israel will hold Hizbullah responsible if ‘an Israeli diplomat or Israeli citizen is harmed abroad.’ The Israeli government has also warned that the next war will see strikes against all of Lebanon, without regard to which communities or areas support Hizbullah. 

In turn, Hizbullah’s Secretary General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, upped the ante at a massive rally marking the end the 2006 war, stating that the Shiite party would strike at Tel Aviv if Israel bombs either Beirut or Dahiyeh (the capital’s Hizbullah-dominated southern suburb) during the course of another war.

Perhaps the Lebanese are partying because they know that trouble looms ahead. After all, as the Japanese say, ’we’re fools whether we dance or not, so we might as well dance.’

Having survived the first brutal winds battering their nascent independence – political assassinations in 2005; war in 2006, paralysis in 2007; and internal strife in 2008 – the people of Lebanon may be dancing in the eye of the storm. One can only wonder how long they have before the next wave hits.

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