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My Grandfather, Hizbullah, and the Hobbesian Jungle

Posted in Christians, Druze, Hizbullah, Israel, Levant, Shiites, Sunnis, tagged , , , , , , on August 20, 2011 | 1 Comment »

“You need a gun.”

It was February 14, 2005. Hours earlier, in a massive blast that shook Beirut to its core, assassins had taken the life of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri and dozens more. Between bouts of shock and rage, many Lebanese pointed the finger at Syria, but others focused their attention on Israel or – yes, even then – on Hizbullah. All were stunned by the brazen killing.

Somehow, though, my grandfather had other concerns. Beirut’s demons.

“Beirut can slide out of control quickly,” he said. “And then you’ll see the beasts underneath those pretty faces. Calmly walk to your car and drive away… Now.”

If I thought the old man was crazy then, the years have changed that. A string of assassinations, extended periods of political paralysis, and two noteworthy conflicts have pushed the Lebanese to the brink several times, revealing glimpses of a darkness lurking beneath Beirut’s Levantine cosmopolitanism.

Through it all, the controversial Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a source of conflict in itself, has gradually led aggrieved Lebanese to their neighbors’ doorsteps. Now unsealed, the STL indictment has named four men affiliated with Hizbullah as its suspects, thereby confirming some of the leaks, speculation, and half-truths that have surrounded the investigation since the beginning.

And so, the Tribunal will try four people affiliated with Hizbullah, a Shiite militia and political party, for the murder of Hariri, a Sunni political giant. The consequences of a public trial may be damning for the Party of God. Despite Hizbullah’s deep support among Lebanese Shiites, its future also depends on the perception of others.

In 2006, Hizbullah electrified the mostly Sunni Arab world by surviving – hence, “winning” – a war with Israel. Despite the ire of Sunni regimes, who blasted Hizbullah’s “adventurism” for their own reasons, Hizbullah was king for a moment.

That’s no longer true. The party has bled support for five years, has found itself mired in successive controversies, and now faces a few serious immediate challenges. Where regional popularity was once a source of strength for Hizbullah, emerging regional hostility may soon be a new weakness.

Faced with serious interrelated challenges, Hizbullah cannot be pleased with the indictment’s timing. First, due to worsening tensions with Israel, Hizbullah continues to prepare for another war, which analysts predict will involve large swathes of both Lebanon and Israel (as opposed to the usual border skirmishes and aerial campaigns).

Second, most Lebanese want to disarm Hizbullah sooner rather than later. Even members of the Free Patriotic Movement, Hizbullah’s most important ally, seek to integrate the party’s arsenal and cadres into legitimate state institutions at some point. There is no easy answer, but the Hizbullah question continues to dominate the Lebanese discourse.

Third, as local Sunnis seethe over past insults and injuries, prospects for renewed strife remain significant. Unresolved quarrels – the controversy surrounding the Hariri assassination; the May 2008 clashes; and the communal balance of power – have unraveled decades of painstaking work by Hizbullah to avoid ostracizing Lebanon’s Sunnis.  

Fourth, unrest in Syria threatens the Asad regime, a pivotal regional patron and ally. Regime change or even prolonged instability could reduce Hizbullah’s strategic depth, eliminate many training centers, hinder supply routes, and neuter political cover from Damascus.

Against this backdrop, a public international trial can only taint Hizbullah’s image and further constrain its room for maneuver. In the past, as with the July War and the May 2008 clashes, Hizbullah has used force to create political space for itself. Faced with mounting pressure, Hizbullah or its Iranian patrons are that much more likely to use force – by design, or as a rash reaction.

The deeper problem, however, has little to do with the party’s behavior in the short term. Its mere presence as an armed militia, under the shadow of past transgressions, will invite domestic and external challenges that will strain the Lebanese system for years to come.

Hizbullah itself will suffer just as much, maybe more. In Lebanon – part libertarian paradise, part Hobbesian jungle – many overly ambitious projects have failed crushingly. From the Druze emirs of the Modern Period and Ottomans of the late 19th century, to the Lebanese militias, Israelis, and Syrians of more recent vintage, life has quickly turned nasty and brutish.

Without seriously reinventing itself, Hizbullah will be next. Or was my grandfather alone in cleaning out his gun?

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The Druze Question: Why Lebanese Sovereignists Must Reach Out

Posted in Christians, Druze, Hizbullah, Lebanon, Levant, March 14 on March 18, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

Once again, the Druze of Lebanon have a pivotal role to play in their country’s destiny.

The Druze in Lebanon’s Emergence

Alongside the Maronites, Lebanon’s Druze community can claim a thousand-year presence in Mount Lebanon.  In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Druze Emir Fakhr el-Din managed to harness Druze and Maronite support and carve out a “Lebanese” principality that included parts of modern-day Syria and Israel. Fakhr el-Din’s grab for power and alliance with the Italian Duchy of Tuscany ulimately led the Ottomans to kill him and his family, but he set a precedent for Lebanese autonomists throughout the modern period.

Until the 19th century, the Druze dominated a feudal system that ruled over the Maronite-majority peasantry of Mount Lebanon. Social unrest and geopolitical change, including an internal struggle between the Sublime Porte and the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, disrupted the old feudal order. The mobilization of the peasantry against the feudal lords eventually acquired a sectarian dimension – particularly during clashes in 1841 and 1860. Influenced by their increasingly powerful Church, Maronite peasants, merchants, and elites came to view themselves as part of a “nation.”

Faced with demographic and economic decline, the Druze were eventually pushed aside – and centuries of tumultuous partnership gave way to the dominance of one community. As the Maronites secured international and local elite support for their nationalist drive, their territorial ambitions resulted in the expansion of Lebanon’s borders in 1920.

The creation of “Greater Lebanon” set into motion political and demographic patterns that still impact Lebanon today. A Maronite-Sunni partnership guided Lebanon through the independence period and the First Republic (1943-1975). From 1975 to 1990, Lebanon fell prey to violence between various communal militias and foreign militaries. Maronite-Druze fighting during the “War of the Mountain” was particularly fierce, and resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands Christians from southern Mount Lebanon. 

Although the Druze were able to carve out an autonomous enclave in the late 1980s, much like their Christian counterparts to the north, their milita might could not mask continuing demographic and political decline. Indeed, during the war, previously-acquiescent Lebanese Shiites emerged as a political actor in their own right. As such, in a reality formalized by Lebanon’s Taif Accord, three main communities came to hold sway over state institutions: the Maronites, the Sunnis, and the Shiites. Having gone to war under the leadership of a man – Kamal Beik Jumblatt – who sought to magnify his community’s role in Lebanon, particularly by seeking to eliminate political communalism, the Druze were now even further on the fringes.

Jumblatt the Younger and the Druze since 1990

Walid Jumblatt, who inherited leadership of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Druze from his father Kamal, has operated within this context. Survival is his only imperative; morals, ideals, and political convictions matter, but are secondary concerns. During the 1980s, Jumblatt’s PSP cooperated with Israeli troops who had grown disenchanted with Christian dithering.

Throughout the 1990s, Jumblatt helped prop up a Syrian-Lebanese regime, benefiting himself and his community by holding sway over the Ministry of the Displaced, among others. As the new millenium approached, Jumblatt grew frustrated with the Syrian regime’s increasing reliance on a joint Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus, which exluded him and his political allies and sometimes actively cut against his interests.

After Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, Lebanese calls for an end to Syrian occupation intensified. The Maronite Council of Bishops issued a formal statement calling for Syrian withdrawal. With the “Reconciliation of the Mount,” an agreement that has yet to result in the return of many Christians to their homes in the Chouf, Jumblatt joined the Maronites in their political quest to remove Syria from Lebanon. In 2005, the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri catalyzed the Sunni street to join ranks with the nascent Maronite-Druze opposition.

That moment was pivotal. Never before had the Lebanese streets converged alongside their elites with such force. Between the Maronites, Sunnis, and Druze, the Lebanese opposition to Syrian tutelage was able to mobilize over one million people on March 14, 2005. Since that moment, “realities on the ground” – that is, Hizbullah’s 2008 assault on Beirut and the Chouf – have convinced Jumblatt that the politics have changed.

In short, Jumblatt has danced back to Damascus. But this time, at least for now, his community seems uneasy with his decision. The past decade’s pivotal moments – 2000; 2005; 2008 – have illustrated how relevant the Druze still are. Their relevance now arises from the broader polarization that has afflicted Lebanon. Sunnis and Shiites continue to seeth at one another; the Christians are perpetually divided; the Druze have been able to use their weight to swing elections, determine cabinet compositions, and even oust a prime minister.

A National Appeal: March 14 Must Call on the Druze Once More

Earlier this week, outgoing Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri appealed to Lebanese Shiites to “stand with us [March 14?], next to the state.” Correctly noting that over-assertiveness has cost Lebanese communities in the past, Hariri continued his campaign against Hizbullah’s arsenal. The merits of such an overt approach may be debatable, but the attempt to win over Shiites is necessary. Lebanon has no future without them.

Hariri and his allies in March 14 – even, or perhaps especially, the Lebanese Forces – must reach out to the Druze of Lebanon. If Hizbullah does not represent the Shiites of Lebanon, then shouldn’t self-proclaimed Lebanese sovereignists seek to expose the false monopoly that Jumblatt claims over the Druze?

Many Druze have expressed their discontent with this latest of Jumblatt’s gambits. It’s time for March 14 to offer them a serious alternative.

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A Shepard Emerges: The New Maronite Patriarch and the Way Forward

Posted in Christians, Lebanon, Middle East on March 17, 2011 | 1 Comment »

After a quarter-century under Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, the Maronite Church has found a new leader. On Tuesday, a Maronite Synod of 38 bishops elected Bechara Rai as the community’s 77th patriarch. Rai, who had served as Archbishop of Jbeil (Byblos), was one of the favorites and may have had the tacit support of the Vatican.

Situating the Church

The Maronite Church has long played an active role in Lebanese politics. In the 19th century, the Church used its vast land resources, its educational institutions, contacts with the West, and the power of the pulpit to mobilize peasants in Mount Lebanon against feudal leaders. Civil unrest in Mount Lebanon eventually acquired a sectarian dimension. The ensuing violence between the Maronites and the Druze, a heterodox offshoot of Shiite Islam, drew European intervention and resulted in the creation of the mutassarifiya, an autonomous Ottoman district that was a Lebanese proto-state of sorts.

After World War I, the Maronite Church supported the formation of an independent Lebanese state, and exerted considerable influence over the shaping of Lebanon’s present boundaries. Memories of famine and blockade that killed more than one-third of Mount Lebanon’s population had convinced the Church that the new Lebanese state would require a breadbasket, namely the Bekaa Valley, to ensure its viability. While other considerations were at play, the Church’s role at that stage was important.

More recently, under Sfeir, the Church spearheaded opposition to Syria’s 15-year-long occupation of Lebanon. With Lebanon’s main Christian political factions in disarray, the Church called for the withdawal of Syrian troops in 2000 and facilitated the “Reconciliation of the Mount,” which purported to put Maronite-Druze tensions to rest.

The Church’s actions in the late 1990s and early 2000s helped the nascent opposition to Syria coalesce, thereby laying the foundations for Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution of 2005. Since that illustrious moment, however, the Church has had to deal with a continuing sense of Christian decline, Christian in-fighting, and an increasingly out-of-touch clergy.

Rai’s Moment

Rai’s election comes at a pivotal moment. Although Christian leaders, including Aoun and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, are back on the scene, the community remains divided. Steeped in Maronite history, with a keen sense of communal, national, and regional politics, Rai has the potential to revitalize the Church and the community.

The new patriarch will have to attend to institutional matters. The bishops are old and divided amongst themselves. Beyond the mere task of filling an evident void, created by the retirement of several bishops over the past few years, Rai will have to cultivate and select the next generation of Church leaders. As many commentators have noted, Rai will also have to shield the Church hierarchy from the divisive influence of politics even as the Church remains engaged in Lebanese political issues.

At the broader level, Rai should promote Christian reconciliation as part of ongoing efforts to put to rest Lebanon’s old war demons. As Rai himself noted in a recent interview, Lebanese Christians continue to share a vision for an independent Lebanese state. Their disagreements are rooted in factionalism and in a false vision that their continuing relevance depends on throwing their lot in with Sunnis in Shiites.

Within this context, Rai will have to recapture Christian initiative. Since the late 1980s, the community has suffered many wounds. Intracommunal fighting, demographic decline, emigration, and fifteen years of Syrian tutelage in Lebanon have all contributed to a sense of irrelevance. 

The community clings to formulaic guarantees, including those which have long been abandoned in actual administrative practice, rather than driving for change. While the pluralistic benefits of Lebanon’s system are undeniable, the divisive and discrimatory consequences are real too. For all their creative talents, which they have deployed at home and in a far-flung diaspora, Lebanese Christians have exhibited little political initiative since the Cedar Revolution of 2005. Perhaps Rai, whose name translates into “shepard,” can once more deploy the power of the Church to lead this flock to a different tomorrow.

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Restoring a Floundering Myth: It’s Time to Stop the Erosion of Coexistence and Pluralism in Lebanon

Posted in Christians, Druze, Lebanon, Levant, Shiites, Sunnis, tagged , , , , on January 18, 2011 | 4 Comments »

Admittedly, Lebanon does not live up to its liberal mythology. But, for all its warts, and despite periodic failures, coexistence among Lebanon’s communities reflects, and in turn promotes, a pluralism that is absent throughout much of the Middle East. Since the mid-19th century, when European intervention in Ottoman-era Mount Lebanon helped consolidate communalism, political pluralism has distinguished Lebanon from the rest of the region in three positive ways.

First, Lebanon benefits from a dynamism that is due, in part, to its people’s intimate contact with “the Other.” From cosmopolitan Beirut to the most insular of mountain villages, the Lebanese interact with, or are at least exposed to, other groups. This diversity manifests on street corners, in classrooms, in the workplace, and in the political arena – and helps breed cultural awareness, lateral thinking, and tact. Wired for the world, members of the far-flung Lebanese diaspora owe part of their success to this nurturing process. In turn, Lebanon benefits from its diaspora’s ideas, remittances, investments, and other initiatives, which offset the negative impact of “brain drain.”

Second, Lebanon has managed to avoid the authoritarianism that has plagued much of the Middle East. From Morocco to the Persian Gulf, theocracies, monarchies, hereditary presidencies, and military cabals have clung to power for decades. While not exactly a liberal bunch, Lebanon’s politicians, military leaders, and clerics must operate within a context that restricts their power. Because few Lebanese leaders have been able to cull together serious support outside of their communities, power has remained diffused.

Occasionally, a Lebanese leader manages to transcend the communal context. But those instances are both rare and fleeting. The vanished Imam Mousa al-Sadr, the assassinated president-elect Bashir Gemayel, the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, former General Michel Aoun, or Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah have at one time or another emerged as political giants with cross-communal support. But, time and again, Lebanon’s system has met these figures head on, frustrating and inhibiting their ambitions (note that most of these leaders met, or are likely to meet, indecorous ends).

Clearly, the interplay of various leaders and groups has sometimes led to discord. Lebanon’s most recent government crisis, due to a Hizbullah-led withdrawal that owed much of its bite to Lebanon’s power-sharing system, is a stark reminder of the negative aspects of consociationalism. However, as Lebanese-American journalist Michael Young suggests “The Ghosts of Martyrs Square,” it may be better to live under the rule of “a forest of fathers,” than under the watch of a single “father” who holds all the strings.

Third, Lebanon’s state-society relations differ significantly from the regional norm. In one form or another, a culture of dissent prevails in the media, the academia, cafes, and the halls of power. By contrast, the state lurks almost everywhere else in the Arab world. Irrespective of the political inclinations or geostrategic relevance of their regimes, these states stifle expression, suppress political opposition, and constrain free thought.

So, while Lebanon falls short on liberalism, it is very much pluralistic. But the underpinnings of this pluralism are under attack. Coexistence in Lebanon is eroding.

During the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1991), a militia order gradually took root. As a consequence of prolonged hostilities, and a militia logic that demanded ethnic and ideological consolidation, Lebanon became more cantonized than it had been before the war.

Christians receded into an enclave stretching from East Beirut to northern Lebanon. The Druze took shelter in the heart of Mount Lebanon, where much of Lebanon’s contemporary system is derived from. Sunnis remained in their coastal dwellings or patches of the Bekaa Valley. Shiites clustered around Beirut, in the northern Bekaa Valley, and in South Lebanon.

Now, two decades after the civil war, coexistence faces new threats. First, poor and unbalanced economic development continues to drive people from Lebanon’s outer provinces towards Beirut, where communal neighborhoods and ghettos, rather than inter-mixed villages, are the norm.

Second, massive land transfers taking place throughout Lebanon also threaten coexistence. The pattern of transfers reflects and perpetuates Christian detachment and apathy, as well as aggressive and possibly orchestrated purchase of properties by parties, organizations, and individuals at above-market prices. True, natural demographic and economic forces are at play; but it is also clear that something else is happening.

Coexistence has long rested upon two geo-demographic pillars: a Christian presence in the far reaches Lebanon, such as the Hermel region and Lebanese border villages in the South; and a concurrent Muslim presence in what are now perceived to be Christian areas like Batroun, Jbeil, the Metn, and Zahle.

Migration – existing alongside the problem of large-scale land transfers – threatens to deepen Lebanon’s de facto segregation. While it may be unrealistic to expect an immediate reversal of civil war-era dislocations, it is not too late to raise awareness of more gradual, contemporary threats to coexistence.

Recently, MP Boutros Harb (Batroun, March 14) proposed a draft law proposal that would freeze the sale of land between Lebanon’s Christian and Muslim populations for a period of 15 years. Although such a law would probably survive constitutional scrutiny, the proposal suffers from three serious problems. 

First, the draft law reinforces the communal impulse, and thereby further subjugates individuals to categories that are, in a sense, rooted in accidents of birth. Second, the law offends social sensibilities, particularly as it has come off as a narrow reassertion of Christian interests in Lebanon. Third, the law is a temporary stop-gap measure that does not adequately address the social and economic reasons behind Lebanon’s cantonization. 

But, if Harb’s approach is too stringent, too broad, and off the mark, its faults must not obscure the need for action. “Federalism” was once a dirty word in Lebanon. Without striving towards (and sacrificing for) elusive unity, the partition or devolution of a country whose “founding myth” was tolerance may soon become inevitable.

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Christmas Conversations (Part II): “At Least We Still Have Tabbouleh”

Posted in Christians, Hizbullah, Iran, Lebanon, Middle East, Syria, tagged , , , , , , on December 28, 2010 | Leave a Comment »

Another premium selection from 2010′s Christmas Conversations…

Family Member 1

“Fuck politics. Lebanon is good for arak and kibbeh nayyieh. [The Lebanese] have been killing each other for generations. We’ve had a damn crisis every ten years or so. But we’ve still got our kibbeh nayyieh, arak – and tabbouleh and hummus – and that’s just fine by me.”

(No comment, except to say that I agree in a roundabout way.)

“Hizbullah might have killed Hariri, but it is ridiculous to argue that the Syria did not play a central role. The Syrian regime or elements of the security services probably arrange d for the attack, with Iranian approval probably being needed for Hizbullah’s possible involvement.”

(It is my view that the Syrian regime orchestrated Hariri’s assassination. Over the past few months, speculation of Hizbullah’s involvement has grown. While the involvement of members of Hizbullah may not be surprising, given how Syria operates in Lebanon, there is no publicly available evidence pointing in either direction. Once the STL indictment comes out, it will be possible to assess possible liability.)

“Geagea won’t be president unless Lebanon goes to war again. Or unless there’s some sort of plan to move against Hizbullah. He might have a shot then, but there’s no way he’ll be a peacetime president anytime soon.”

(I agree that Geagea will have difficulty ascending to the presidency anytime soon. I understand why people think Geagea might find his way to the presidency if Lebanon returns to war, but I have never fully grasped how this would happen. Does this rest on resurrecting the Lebanese Forces militia? Would this be part of a “regional project” or would local actors take matters into their own hands and bank on drawing foreign support in?)

“Michel Aoun? The man was a nobody – a complete unknown – in 1988. [Former President and Phalange Party leader] Amine Gemayel put him in government to screw Geagea and the Lebanese Forces. People were just tired of the militia order, he was an army commander, and he confronted Syria. Let’s not make him out to be a hero.”

(Aoun was commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the mid-1980s. He was not really a “nobody,” but was definitely “unknown.” When Lebanese factions could not agree on electing a new President, Gemayel made Aoun the head of a caretaker cabinet at the eleventh hour. Gemayel and Geagea were engaged in a struggle over the Christian community, the Phalange party leadership, and the way forward in Lebanon. Aoun was a volatile actor whose presence alongside Geagea made for a combustible mix.)

“Gemayel and Aoun left Lebanon; Geagea went to jail; twenty years later, it’s like someone pressed play and we’re reliving the same bullshit! Here are you choices: a delusional general, a warlord, and a crusty old former president.”

(No comment.)

“Rafic Hariri might have thought he was bigger than Lebanon and [assassinated Lebanese journalist and MP] Gebran Tueni probably thought he was the voice of Lebanon. Both were too ambitious in their own way, so I was not too fond of either. But these men did not deserve to die the way they did.”

(No comment.)

“Hizbullah? Here’s the problem with Hizbullah: they’re working with the wrong model. Hizbullah criticizes people for looking to the West, as if that is some sort of tragedy, but Iran can’t even refine its own oil! And that’s what we’re supposed to strive towards? This is bigger than the fight with Israel ; Hizbullah is working with a social model that is doomed.”

(No comment.)

“Let me tell you something about Stuxnet [a computer virus rumored to have been unleashed by the U.S government]. Stuxnet attacked Siemens programmable logic controllers used for the Iranian nuclear program. Over 60% of computers targeted by the virus were in Iran. [The Iranians] don’t know who they’re playing with here. The U.S. has just given them a taste.”

(I did not know much about Stuxnet before this conversation. In reading up on the virus, I continue to be confused. The conversation also touched upon the recently-created U.S. Cyber Command. The consensus seemed to be that American cyber-warfare abilities would be too much for Iran to handle. The point seems plausible, but I have no idea whether this is actually true.)

“How many of you would send your kids to study or work in Iran or Syria? What about the U.S.? OK, why is that? America attracts the best, even from [Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and other Middle Eastern states].”

(No comment.)

“American decline? It is inevitable and might be underway already, but let’s not fool ourselves. We live in the here and now, and the U.S. will be a powerhouse for a long time to come! Let’s not rush to jump on the wrong wagon, OK?”

(In general terms, I think this is spot on. Of course, History surprises. The U.S. will face many internal constraints on its power, owing to its pluralistic political system and tenuous financial situation. But in general terms, the bases of American power – its economic, political, military, and cultural strength – are still robust and dynamic.)

“They’re all bastards. All of them.”

(It remains unclear who “they” are. What is clear, apparently, is that “they” are bastards… Don’t let them get you down.)

Family Member 1 has little patience for Iran and Syria – not because of political or religious inclinations, but because he/she “thinks in terms of economic, scientific, cultural, and military prowess.” This person emigrated from Lebanon to the U.S. in the late 1970s and returned in 2000. He/she sees a lot wrong with Western society, but thinks it far more dynamic than Iranian and Arab alternatives. Needless to say, Family Member 1 detests the “bastards” who run the show in Lebanon.

Take heart neo-feudal overlords, everybody’s a critic.

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Christmas Conversations (Part I): “There’s a Plan in the Works”

Posted in Christians, Hizbullah, Lebanon, March 14, Middle East, tagged , , , , , , on December 27, 2010 | 4 Comments »

Christmas Eve rarely provides a respite from intense political debate in Lebanon. Indeed, with members of the family back in town, the holiday resembles a political brawl more than a religious celebration – or maybe, in the words of D.L. Hughley, “that’s just my house.”

For the past decade, members of my mother’s family, their family and friends, and a revolving group of guests have gathered in Achrafieh. The birth of Christ and Santa’s generosity are practically afterthoughts. Save for a few carols and token attendance of Mass, the family spends its time debating the intricate disputes (read: petulant behavior) of Lebanese political leaders. Since 2005, when the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri opened up the Lebanese political arena, a single conversation has literally stretched over five years continuous conversation the winter season. 

Conversation ranges between sophisticated and calm analyses to incendiary outbursts that would make a sailor blush. Discussion has revolved around intra-Christian divisions, the Sunni-Shiite divide, the broader regional configuration, America’s place in the world, the “Hizbullah question,” and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). This year, of course, WikiLeaks provided some fresh conversational points. Despite the available fodder, and underneath an ever-changing surface, the conversation has been the same for the past five years.

The next couple posts on Page Lebanon will provide some entertaining and controversial selections from 2010′s political brawl. Because I did not ask my family and friends if I could publicize their views, I’ll be concealing their identities (Julian Assange, take note). Comments are in italics…

 

“The Guest”

“Hizbullah killed Hariri. [Hariri] was part of some regional project – one that included naturalizing the [Palestinian refugees], but was also aimed at the Shiites across the Middle East. That’s why Hizbullah killed him, under orders from [Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah] Khamenei.”

(Here, the ever-present “regional project” rears its head. Of course, states have their policies, and do much to pursue their interests under the table, but it is also quite possible that Hariri was killed, quite simply, because the Syrian regime and its allies in Lebanon thought he had “grown too big for his britches.”)

“[Lebanese Forces leader] Samir Geagea will be Lebanon’s next president. What are you laughing at? He [Geagea] is in Saudi Arabia right now to begin resolving his issues with Syria. The Saudis, Egyptians, French, and Americans would rather have Geagea in Baabda [the seat of Lebanon's presidency].”

(I didn’t buy this argument. It’s not about morals, but politics – and Geagea has a credibility problem. Like many other war-time leaders, Geagea has his sins. The difference is that many Lebanese – including, importantly, members of his own Christian community – perceive his crimes to be more serious. As one observer remarked, “Geagea has ‘pulled the trigger’ himself, while others were more removed from the atrocities of war.” Perhaps these problems will grow smaller as Lebanon’s younger generation – one with few Civil War-era memories – becomes increasingly relevant. Perhaps Geagea will manage to capture much of the Christian vote in 2013. But the next president should take office in 2014, and this might be too soon for Geagea.)

“What do you mean Iranian and Syrian interests? Anthony, you’re a young man, listen to me… If the Americans want Geagea [as president], it will happen. Geagea’s history does not matter. Tell me where he’s made a mistake since 2005. The key is to begin laying the groundwork with Syria… What? No, that doesn’t suggest that Syria matters!”

(My point to “Guest” was that the past few years have demonstrated that Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, and pro-Syrian factions in Lebanon have the ability to frustrate the ambitions of the U.S. and the conservative Arab regimes. Aside from his credibility problem among many Lebanese, Geagea has been stridently (and often correctly) critical of Syria. As of yet, his post-2005 political revival has not involved rapprochement with Syria or pro-Syrian factions in Lebanon. Iran is no fan of Geagea either, particularly as it accuses the Lebanese Forces of kidnapping four of its diplomats in the 1980s. It is difficult to envision a regional consensus on someone like Geagea.)

“[Free Patriotic Movement leader] Michel Aoun is insane. Anyways, the man is finished.”

(I do believe Aoun reacted rashly in response to March 14′s early missteps in 2005, but this hyperbole is a little much for my taste. That said, I wonder about his political future. In contrast with 2005 and 2006, when Hizbullah was adjusting to a rapidly changing Lebanon and dealing with a war with Israel, the Party of God may not need as much “Christian cover.”)

“OK, maybe Syria matters. Hillou aaneh!”

(No comment.)

“The Americans should kill or “disappear” Assange to make an example of him.”

(No comment.)

“The region is in turmoil. It’s still early now, but wait and see how Sunnis and Shiites will turn against each other. The Sunnis are running to Turkey and the Shiites have been running to Iran. Just look at Iraq and Lebanon…”

(Over the past year or so, Turkey has begun to aggressively cultivate ties with the Arab world. Milking their dispute with Israel for all of its worth, the Turks have succeeded in carving out a renewed presence in the Arab Street. The Arab regimes might view Turkey as a possible counterweight against Shiite Iran, but are probably not thrilled with Ankara’s growing influence in the streets of Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut. Sunni and Shiite tensions continue to simmer, but for now a regional conflagration seems unlikely.)

“Imad Mughniyeh [a high-ranking Hizbullah commander killed in 2008] was not killed. The whole thing was cooked up to get the Mossad off his back.”

(And the Vatican, with Geagea’s help, killed Kennedy because he wasn’t Catholic enough.)

“The [Palestinian refugees] will be naturalized in Lebanon. Does anyone here really believe otherwise? Get over it!”

(In essence, I agree. It is difficult to imagine a Middle East resolution that does not involve accomodating the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon number between 200,000 and 500,000. For most, formative experiences occurred in Lebanon, not the Palestinian territories or Israel. Does this mean that Palestinian refugees will become Lebanese citizens? Not necessarily. But, despite the fears of Christians and Shiites, normalization is in order.)

Clearly, “Guest” was the party’s resident Conspiracy Brother. This older gentleman has seen the world twice-over, and always provides unique insight into the bigger picture. He thinks creatively and puts forward his own theories on quite a few things. But he’s also rather fond of behind-the-scenes drama, regional and local “projects,” and reducing complex issues into one-liners.

I’m sure your family, especially if you’re Middle Eastern, has one of these guys or gals.

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Truth in Conflicting Views: Brief Comments on U.S. and Iranian Involvement in War-Time Lebanon

Posted in Christians, Iran, Lebanon, Levant, United States on October 31, 2009 | Leave a Comment »

Earlier this week, NOW Lebanon published an op-ed that Firas Maksad, a Middle East analyst, and I, a humble law student, wrote. The piece basically argued that the Marine Barracks Bombing on October 23, 1983 was an opening salvo in Iran’s bid for expanded power in the Middle East.

On the other hand, Foreign Policy published a piece by Nir Rosen, a fellow at New York University’s Center on Law and Security, who argues that the United States’ participation in Lebanon’s complicated civil war was the impetus behind the attacks. Rosen’s piece, though perhaps mistaken in its ultimate conclusions, makes several important points regarding the complexity of the issues involved here.

Specifically, Rosen argues that the United States, by shelling the Suk al-Gharb area to aid the Lebanese Army (then dominated by remnant Christian elements after the fragmentation of the army during an earlier stage of conflict, but not a “sectarian Christian militia,” as Rosen argues), acted against Muslim factions in Lebanon and behaved as a militia itself. As such, U.S. troops were fair game just like the Lebanese, Israelis, Syrians, Palestinians, and a host of other actors were.

There is truth in this view, but it is important to appreciate the disconnect between perceptions in Washington and Beirut. At the time, perhaps simplistically, the U.S. believed it was helping the Lebanese state reestablish control over a fragmented national territory. Many Lebanese circles, perhaps reflecting their narrower ambitions, saw this as an attempt to restore Maronite Christian ascendancy in Lebanon.

The fact is, Christians were (and still are) prominent in Lebanon’s state institutions – Maronites controlled the presidency, the top post in the army (fractured as it may have been), and the highest position in Lebanon’s Central Bank. Any attempt to help the state would necessarily help the Christians, barring a drastic change in Lebanon’s political system, though it would also be fair to note that a functioning state should be viewed as a benefit to all, especially compared to the chaos of the civil war. Whether that means the U.S. actually intended to participate as a “militia” backing the Christian factions is open to debate, and there is evidence to support both views.

Assuming that the U.S. did indeed participate - what matters more is that it was perceived to have done so - in an imbalanced manner, and that several locally based factors contributed to the attack, does not exclude the possibility that Iran used the attack as part of a wider strategy.

The question is not entirely one of fault, but also of consequences. The U.S. may have failed to completely appreciate the complexity of Lebanon’s war and may have failed to fully consider the security environment (both points arise from Rosen’s argument), but that does not mean that Iran did not harness local frustration and American complacency to strike.

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A Thorn Among Roses: Christian Disarray in Lebanon

Posted in Christians, Lebanon, Levant, Middle East, tagged , , , , , on June 19, 2009 | 3 Comments »

Christian Concerns
“Three things matter to the Christians of Lebanon, and those of Zahle in particular: the Presidency, the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF], and the Church,” said Okab Sakr, a Shiite MP from the Zahle district, during a Thursday airing of Kalam al-Nass. These words are as true as ever, but the Christian community seems hell-bent on undermining the last pillars of its significance.

The Presidency
The President of the Republic is traditionally a Maronite Christian. Although the Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese Civil War transferred most executive power from the presidency to the Cabinet (headed by a Sunni Prime Minister), the president retains considerable esteem as the “head of state and the symbol of the nation’s unity.”

As modified by the Taif Amendments, the Constitution states that the president “shall safeguard the constitution and Lebanon’s independence, unity, and territorial integrity.” As a Christian leader, the president also retains influence grounded in the communal nature of Lebanese politics.

All in all, the presidency is imbued with a great deal of symbolic importance and a potential for great influence over politics in Lebanon. But translating potential into effectiveness requires communal support – in the form of a parliamentary coalition or a share in cabinet – for the president.

Over the past two decades Christian bickering has stripped the presidency of such support. In the 1990s, Syria exploited intra-Christian and inter-communal divisions to install two docile presidents. From 2005 until 2008, Christian political leaders failed to reach a consensus on who would replace the inept President Emile Lahoud. Discord led to a six-month-long presidential vaccuum and allowed other local and regional players to determine the course of the presidency.

President Michel Suleiman, former commander of the LAF, has not been able (he may not be willing, either) to carve out an autonomous popular base for himself. With no parliamentary coalition aligned with him, Suleiman will need to retain a ‘swing bloc’ of cabinet ministers if he is to play the role of internal arbiter envisioned in the Taif Accord. Unfortunately, the consensus president has come under attack.

Leading the charge is Free Patriotic Movement leader and former General Michel Aoun. After the 2005 parliamentary elections, Aoun found himself at the head of a coalition of 22 lawmakers. Other Christian figures like Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Phalange boss and former President Amin Gemayel did not want to see Aoun ascend to the presidency, especially because of his alliance with Hizbullah. The March 14 Sunni and Druze factions also feared or resented Aoun, and preferred a presidential void to Aoun as president.

For his part, Aoun allowed his lust for the power to cloud his political vision: rather than act as kingmaker and facilitate the election of a consensus president, Aoun clung to his delusions. Like his Christian counterparts in the March 14 coalition, Aoun eventually saw himself sidelined within his political alliance when Hizbullah’s interests favored electing a consensus president. The President was delivered over the heads of rival Christian factions.

Thus, despite his best efforts, Sleiman lacks institutional or popular bases for playing an effective role in the country.

A March 14 victory at the polls has only thrown the president’s role into question. First, the March 14-March 8 divide polarized the elections and prevented a third bloc from emerging in support of Sleiman. Second, the March 14 victory means that the international community will not have to engage with the president as an alternative to a Hizbullah-led cabinet.

Of course, the president commands the respect of the army and has increasingly turned to the United States to strengthen the state institutions that he embodies. Strangely enough, a Lebanese President lacking an autonomous Christian base has strong support from the international community and Lebanese Muslims. Negotiations over the next cabinet will determine to what extent Sleiman can use this support to bolster his domestic role, but the presidency remains relatively marginalized within the Christian community for now, and this in turn has marginalized the community in Lebanon’s system.

The Lebanese Armed Forces
The commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces is also traditionally Maronite, although decisions of war and peace do not rest with either with the commander or the president (the cabinet, collectively, must decide such matters).

The army is the most compelling example of cross-communal national unity in Lebanon. The institution draws members from all sects and regions, and Lebanon’s various political bosses – despite several moments of dissatisfaction with particular actions – have yet to openly challenge its role in Lebanon since the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005.

Within the Christian community, the army receives almost exalted treatment. As a national institution, the LAF stands as a symbol the state of Lebanon, the “final homeland for all its citizens.” On the other hand, as an institution commanded by a Christian, the LAF symbolizes the “enduring presence of Christians in Lebanon.”

In doing so, the LAF somehow manages to satisfy two traditional – and sometimes conflicting – currents of Christian political thought: the narrow Christian desire for relevance in Lebanese political life and the broader Christian ambition of a Lebanese nation-state set apart from the region.

Brigadier-General Jean Kahwaji has replaced Suleiman as LAF commander, and has moved to preserve the international relationships built by Suleiman and Defense Minister Elias Murr, while attempting to retain the military’s trust that Suleiman earned as a commander not too prone to either Western or Syrian interference.

Seeking training and material support from the West while maintaining a nationalist posture is a delicate task, but the LAF and its command staff have thus far managed to walk that line. As of yet, the LAF is a strong source of Christian unity and of Lebanese national sentiment.

Fortunately, no Christian leader appears set to consciously derail progress on this front. Unfortunately, political division continues to shackle the LAF’s ability to make progress on strategic and operational fronts. Lacking a comprehensive defense policy or any sort of political cohesion regarding threats to the state, Lebanese military commanders have refrained from developing a strategic vision or tactical implementation.

The Christian rift in Lebanon has, on the one hand, weakened decision-making in the cabinet and, on the other hand, lent cross-communal support for Hizbullah. The consequences of this domestic division will continue to hold back the LAF, irrespective of international efforts to support the army’s capabilities.

The Church
The Maronite Church is a Uniate Church, which means that the it is Catholic with regard to dogma and follows the Vatican, but retains an Eastern Syriac (Aramaic) liturgy and some institutional autonomy. The Maronite Patriarch is actually elected by a Conclave of Maronite Bishops and is “recognized” – rather than “appointed” – by the Pope.

The Church has played an important role in the history of Mount Lebanon and, since 1920, the successor Grand Liban and Republic of Lebanon. The Church was active in establishing an autonomous Lebanese state; nurturing “Lebanism” (Lebanese nationalism, rather than pan-Syrianism or Arabism) since the mid-19th century, and in expressing Lebanese Christian concerns in the absence of effective political leadership.

During the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, with Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun in exile and Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea imprisoned, Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir led domestic opposition to Syria’s post-war occupation of Lebanon. Other Lebanese figures and factions – particularly Hizbullah – have criticized the Patriarch for not adopting a more hostile stance towards Israel’s of South Lebanon, which ended in 2000.

Nevertheless, the Patriarch commands the respect of broad swathes of Lebanese society, and stands as a symbol of the Christian conscience. After the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri triggered mass demonstrations calling for Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon, the Patriarch’s stances have seemed congruent with the March 14 coalition.

Most recently, Sfeir has come under fire from Nasrallah and Aoun for issuing an election-eve statement cautioning the Lebanese against “mistakes” that would likely ensue in the event of a Hizbullah victory, which would threaten “Lebanon’s existence and its Arab identity.”

Anyone – a patriarch, priest, or pundit – who makes a political statement should be ready to accept the reactions and criticisms of others. Furthermore, the Patriarch must be careful not to further alienate Aoun and Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh, as they will be necessary to any intra-Christian reconciliation.

That being said, few religious clerics in Lebanon are subject to the same criticism from within or without their communities. For example, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah does not draw the same ire for his relatively moderate stances regarding politics, society in Lebanon, or the role and rights of women.

More relevantly, Sayyed Nasrallah himself seems to be above criticism. For example, two years ago, Hizbullah supporters took to the streets to voice their rage at a satire show’s depiction of Nasrallah. The Sayyed then announced to the rest of the Lebanese that, in Lebanon’s pluralistic framework, people must be aware that “certain communities and cultures do not accept what others view as permissible.”

A religious cleric who heads an Islamist party may thus use his cloak to place himself above questioning, while a Catholic cardinal and Patriarch must answer to others for his political commentary. This is not to say that the Patriarch should be immune from criticism (all individuals should bear the consequences of their speech and actions), but only to highlight the double standard that applies to Hizbullah.

Nevertheless, the fault here is not Hizbullah’s. Other communities have shielded their religious leaders from mudslinging, but Christian politicians more readily criticize and even attack their own. In some regards, this is healthy: members of the Christian community can and often readily disagree with political leaders, spiritual guides, and each other. In the communal game, however, pluralism often leads to counterproductive fragmentation. A proper balance between criticism and respect is simply lacking in the Christian community.

Thorn Among Roses
In 1510, Pope Leo X addressed a papal bull to the Maronite Patriarch, Peter of Hadath, and described the Maronites as a “rose among thorns.” Divided amongst themselves despite common trials and tribulations, Christians continue to leverage and undermine the presidency and patriarchate whilst bemoaning the “communal immunity” of their Lebanese counterparts. Alas, the Christians of Lebanon seem determined to become thorns among roses.

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