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“You need a gun.”

It was February 14, 2005. Hours earlier, in a massive blast that shook Beirut to its core, assassins had taken the life of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri and dozens more. Between bouts of shock and rage, many Lebanese pointed the finger at Syria, but others focused their attention on Israel or – yes, even then – on Hizbullah. All were stunned by the brazen killing.

Somehow, though, my grandfather had other concerns. Beirut’s demons.

“Beirut can slide out of control quickly,” he said. “And then you’ll see the beasts underneath those pretty faces. Calmly walk to your car and drive away… Now.”

If I thought the old man was crazy then, the years have changed that. A string of assassinations, extended periods of political paralysis, and two noteworthy conflicts have pushed the Lebanese to the brink several times, revealing glimpses of a darkness lurking beneath Beirut’s Levantine cosmopolitanism.

Through it all, the controversial Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a source of conflict in itself, has gradually led aggrieved Lebanese to their neighbors’ doorsteps. Now unsealed, the STL indictment has named four men affiliated with Hizbullah as its suspects, thereby confirming some of the leaks, speculation, and half-truths that have surrounded the investigation since the beginning.

And so, the Tribunal will try four people affiliated with Hizbullah, a Shiite militia and political party, for the murder of Hariri, a Sunni political giant. The consequences of a public trial may be damning for the Party of God. Despite Hizbullah’s deep support among Lebanese Shiites, its future also depends on the perception of others.

In 2006, Hizbullah electrified the mostly Sunni Arab world by surviving – hence, “winning” – a war with Israel. Despite the ire of Sunni regimes, who blasted Hizbullah’s “adventurism” for their own reasons, Hizbullah was king for a moment.

That’s no longer true. The party has bled support for five years, has found itself mired in successive controversies, and now faces a few serious immediate challenges. Where regional popularity was once a source of strength for Hizbullah, emerging regional hostility may soon be a new weakness.

Faced with serious interrelated challenges, Hizbullah cannot be pleased with the indictment’s timing. First, due to worsening tensions with Israel, Hizbullah continues to prepare for another war, which analysts predict will involve large swathes of both Lebanon and Israel (as opposed to the usual border skirmishes and aerial campaigns).

Second, most Lebanese want to disarm Hizbullah sooner rather than later. Even members of the Free Patriotic Movement, Hizbullah’s most important ally, seek to integrate the party’s arsenal and cadres into legitimate state institutions at some point. There is no easy answer, but the Hizbullah question continues to dominate the Lebanese discourse.

Third, as local Sunnis seethe over past insults and injuries, prospects for renewed strife remain significant. Unresolved quarrels – the controversy surrounding the Hariri assassination; the May 2008 clashes; and the communal balance of power – have unraveled decades of painstaking work by Hizbullah to avoid ostracizing Lebanon’s Sunnis.  

Fourth, unrest in Syria threatens the Asad regime, a pivotal regional patron and ally. Regime change or even prolonged instability could reduce Hizbullah’s strategic depth, eliminate many training centers, hinder supply routes, and neuter political cover from Damascus.

Against this backdrop, a public international trial can only taint Hizbullah’s image and further constrain its room for maneuver. In the past, as with the July War and the May 2008 clashes, Hizbullah has used force to create political space for itself. Faced with mounting pressure, Hizbullah or its Iranian patrons are that much more likely to use force – by design, or as a rash reaction.

The deeper problem, however, has little to do with the party’s behavior in the short term. Its mere presence as an armed militia, under the shadow of past transgressions, will invite domestic and external challenges that will strain the Lebanese system for years to come.

Hizbullah itself will suffer just as much, maybe more. In Lebanon – part libertarian paradise, part Hobbesian jungle – many overly ambitious projects have failed crushingly. From the Druze emirs of the Modern Period and Ottomans of the late 19th century, to the Lebanese militias, Israelis, and Syrians of more recent vintage, life has quickly turned nasty and brutish.

Without seriously reinventing itself, Hizbullah will be next. Or was my grandfather alone in cleaning out his gun?

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Once again, the Druze of Lebanon have a pivotal role to play in their country’s destiny.

The Druze in Lebanon’s Emergence

Alongside the Maronites, Lebanon’s Druze community can claim a thousand-year presence in Mount Lebanon.  In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Druze Emir Fakhr el-Din managed to harness Druze and Maronite support and carve out a “Lebanese” principality that included parts of modern-day Syria and Israel. Fakhr el-Din’s grab for power and alliance with the Italian Duchy of Tuscany ulimately led the Ottomans to kill him and his family, but he set a precedent for Lebanese autonomists throughout the modern period.

Until the 19th century, the Druze dominated a feudal system that ruled over the Maronite-majority peasantry of Mount Lebanon. Social unrest and geopolitical change, including an internal struggle between the Sublime Porte and the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, disrupted the old feudal order. The mobilization of the peasantry against the feudal lords eventually acquired a sectarian dimension – particularly during clashes in 1841 and 1860. Influenced by their increasingly powerful Church, Maronite peasants, merchants, and elites came to view themselves as part of a “nation.”

Faced with demographic and economic decline, the Druze were eventually pushed aside – and centuries of tumultuous partnership gave way to the dominance of one community. As the Maronites secured international and local elite support for their nationalist drive, their territorial ambitions resulted in the expansion of Lebanon’s borders in 1920.

The creation of “Greater Lebanon” set into motion political and demographic patterns that still impact Lebanon today. A Maronite-Sunni partnership guided Lebanon through the independence period and the First Republic (1943-1975). From 1975 to 1990, Lebanon fell prey to violence between various communal militias and foreign militaries. Maronite-Druze fighting during the “War of the Mountain” was particularly fierce, and resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands Christians from southern Mount Lebanon. 

Although the Druze were able to carve out an autonomous enclave in the late 1980s, much like their Christian counterparts to the north, their milita might could not mask continuing demographic and political decline. Indeed, during the war, previously-acquiescent Lebanese Shiites emerged as a political actor in their own right. As such, in a reality formalized by Lebanon’s Taif Accord, three main communities came to hold sway over state institutions: the Maronites, the Sunnis, and the Shiites. Having gone to war under the leadership of a man – Kamal Beik Jumblatt – who sought to magnify his community’s role in Lebanon, particularly by seeking to eliminate political communalism, the Druze were now even further on the fringes.

Jumblatt the Younger and the Druze since 1990

Walid Jumblatt, who inherited leadership of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Druze from his father Kamal, has operated within this context. Survival is his only imperative; morals, ideals, and political convictions matter, but are secondary concerns. During the 1980s, Jumblatt’s PSP cooperated with Israeli troops who had grown disenchanted with Christian dithering.

Throughout the 1990s, Jumblatt helped prop up a Syrian-Lebanese regime, benefiting himself and his community by holding sway over the Ministry of the Displaced, among others. As the new millenium approached, Jumblatt grew frustrated with the Syrian regime’s increasing reliance on a joint Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus, which exluded him and his political allies and sometimes actively cut against his interests.

After Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, Lebanese calls for an end to Syrian occupation intensified. The Maronite Council of Bishops issued a formal statement calling for Syrian withdrawal. With the “Reconciliation of the Mount,” an agreement that has yet to result in the return of many Christians to their homes in the Chouf, Jumblatt joined the Maronites in their political quest to remove Syria from Lebanon. In 2005, the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri catalyzed the Sunni street to join ranks with the nascent Maronite-Druze opposition.

That moment was pivotal. Never before had the Lebanese streets converged alongside their elites with such force. Between the Maronites, Sunnis, and Druze, the Lebanese opposition to Syrian tutelage was able to mobilize over one million people on March 14, 2005. Since that moment, “realities on the ground” – that is, Hizbullah’s 2008 assault on Beirut and the Chouf – have convinced Jumblatt that the politics have changed.

In short, Jumblatt has danced back to Damascus. But this time, at least for now, his community seems uneasy with his decision. The past decade’s pivotal moments – 2000; 2005; 2008 – have illustrated how relevant the Druze still are. Their relevance now arises from the broader polarization that has afflicted Lebanon. Sunnis and Shiites continue to seeth at one another; the Christians are perpetually divided; the Druze have been able to use their weight to swing elections, determine cabinet compositions, and even oust a prime minister.

A National Appeal: March 14 Must Call on the Druze Once More

Earlier this week, outgoing Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri appealed to Lebanese Shiites to “stand with us [March 14?], next to the state.” Correctly noting that over-assertiveness has cost Lebanese communities in the past, Hariri continued his campaign against Hizbullah’s arsenal. The merits of such an overt approach may be debatable, but the attempt to win over Shiites is necessary. Lebanon has no future without them.

Hariri and his allies in March 14 – even, or perhaps especially, the Lebanese Forces – must reach out to the Druze of Lebanon. If Hizbullah does not represent the Shiites of Lebanon, then shouldn’t self-proclaimed Lebanese sovereignists seek to expose the false monopoly that Jumblatt claims over the Druze?

Many Druze have expressed their discontent with this latest of Jumblatt’s gambits. It’s time for March 14 to offer them a serious alternative.

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Admittedly, Lebanon does not live up to its liberal mythology. But, for all its warts, and despite periodic failures, coexistence among Lebanon’s communities reflects, and in turn promotes, a pluralism that is absent throughout much of the Middle East. Since the mid-19th century, when European intervention in Ottoman-era Mount Lebanon helped consolidate communalism, political pluralism has distinguished Lebanon from the rest of the region in three positive ways.

First, Lebanon benefits from a dynamism that is due, in part, to its people’s intimate contact with “the Other.” From cosmopolitan Beirut to the most insular of mountain villages, the Lebanese interact with, or are at least exposed to, other groups. This diversity manifests on street corners, in classrooms, in the workplace, and in the political arena – and helps breed cultural awareness, lateral thinking, and tact. Wired for the world, members of the far-flung Lebanese diaspora owe part of their success to this nurturing process. In turn, Lebanon benefits from its diaspora’s ideas, remittances, investments, and other initiatives, which offset the negative impact of “brain drain.”

Second, Lebanon has managed to avoid the authoritarianism that has plagued much of the Middle East. From Morocco to the Persian Gulf, theocracies, monarchies, hereditary presidencies, and military cabals have clung to power for decades. While not exactly a liberal bunch, Lebanon’s politicians, military leaders, and clerics must operate within a context that restricts their power. Because few Lebanese leaders have been able to cull together serious support outside of their communities, power has remained diffused.

Occasionally, a Lebanese leader manages to transcend the communal context. But those instances are both rare and fleeting. The vanished Imam Mousa al-Sadr, the assassinated president-elect Bashir Gemayel, the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, former General Michel Aoun, or Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah have at one time or another emerged as political giants with cross-communal support. But, time and again, Lebanon’s system has met these figures head on, frustrating and inhibiting their ambitions (note that most of these leaders met, or are likely to meet, indecorous ends).

Clearly, the interplay of various leaders and groups has sometimes led to discord. Lebanon’s most recent government crisis, due to a Hizbullah-led withdrawal that owed much of its bite to Lebanon’s power-sharing system, is a stark reminder of the negative aspects of consociationalism. However, as Lebanese-American journalist Michael Young suggests “The Ghosts of Martyrs Square,” it may be better to live under the rule of “a forest of fathers,” than under the watch of a single “father” who holds all the strings.

Third, Lebanon’s state-society relations differ significantly from the regional norm. In one form or another, a culture of dissent prevails in the media, the academia, cafes, and the halls of power. By contrast, the state lurks almost everywhere else in the Arab world. Irrespective of the political inclinations or geostrategic relevance of their regimes, these states stifle expression, suppress political opposition, and constrain free thought.

So, while Lebanon falls short on liberalism, it is very much pluralistic. But the underpinnings of this pluralism are under attack. Coexistence in Lebanon is eroding.

During the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1991), a militia order gradually took root. As a consequence of prolonged hostilities, and a militia logic that demanded ethnic and ideological consolidation, Lebanon became more cantonized than it had been before the war.

Christians receded into an enclave stretching from East Beirut to northern Lebanon. The Druze took shelter in the heart of Mount Lebanon, where much of Lebanon’s contemporary system is derived from. Sunnis remained in their coastal dwellings or patches of the Bekaa Valley. Shiites clustered around Beirut, in the northern Bekaa Valley, and in South Lebanon.

Now, two decades after the civil war, coexistence faces new threats. First, poor and unbalanced economic development continues to drive people from Lebanon’s outer provinces towards Beirut, where communal neighborhoods and ghettos, rather than inter-mixed villages, are the norm.

Second, massive land transfers taking place throughout Lebanon also threaten coexistence. The pattern of transfers reflects and perpetuates Christian detachment and apathy, as well as aggressive and possibly orchestrated purchase of properties by parties, organizations, and individuals at above-market prices. True, natural demographic and economic forces are at play; but it is also clear that something else is happening.

Coexistence has long rested upon two geo-demographic pillars: a Christian presence in the far reaches Lebanon, such as the Hermel region and Lebanese border villages in the South; and a concurrent Muslim presence in what are now perceived to be Christian areas like Batroun, Jbeil, the Metn, and Zahle.

Migration – existing alongside the problem of large-scale land transfers – threatens to deepen Lebanon’s de facto segregation. While it may be unrealistic to expect an immediate reversal of civil war-era dislocations, it is not too late to raise awareness of more gradual, contemporary threats to coexistence.

Recently, MP Boutros Harb (Batroun, March 14) proposed a draft law proposal that would freeze the sale of land between Lebanon’s Christian and Muslim populations for a period of 15 years. Although such a law would probably survive constitutional scrutiny, the proposal suffers from three serious problems. 

First, the draft law reinforces the communal impulse, and thereby further subjugates individuals to categories that are, in a sense, rooted in accidents of birth. Second, the law offends social sensibilities, particularly as it has come off as a narrow reassertion of Christian interests in Lebanon. Third, the law is a temporary stop-gap measure that does not adequately address the social and economic reasons behind Lebanon’s cantonization. 

But, if Harb’s approach is too stringent, too broad, and off the mark, its faults must not obscure the need for action. “Federalism” was once a dirty word in Lebanon. Without striving towards (and sacrificing for) elusive unity, the partition or devolution of a country whose “founding myth” was tolerance may soon become inevitable.

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He’s done it again.

Walid Jumblatt has left the March 14 coalition – or maybe not.

Being the leader of the fiercely proud and historically influential Druze minority, “Walid Beik” operates to keep his community secure and his dynasty relevant. With that said, it appears that three trends have led Jumblatt to move away from the March 14 coalition.

First, the Druze leader believes the regional winds are blowing in a new direction.

At the very least, he is unsure how Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Syria, and America’s attempt to follow suit, will affect politics in Lebanon. Uncertainty led the chieftain to mend fences with Damascus and, when met with an immediate domestic and regional backlash, to retreat from the “Beau Rivage declaration” (fittingly, the Beau Rivage Hotel was long a center of Syrian intelligence activity in Lebanon).

Second, Jumblatt fears a conflict that would threaten his community’s fragile presence in the Levant.

A repeat of Hizbullah’s 2008 assault on Beirut and the Chouf certainly qualifies as such a hazard. While the Druze repelled the attack, the community cannot afford sustained conflict with the Shiite party, which dominates areas that surround the Druze heartland.

Jumblatt is also wary of a Sunni-Shiite conflict that could ensnare the Druze. Mistrust prevails in the wake of last year’s fighting, and a controversial Der Spiegel report linking Hizbullah officials to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri has only magnified the potential for strife.

Additionally, in reconciling with Hizbullah, Jumblatt may be shielding his community from internal maneuvers designed to protect supply lines and communications networks in the event of another Israel-Hizbullah war. Hizbullah’s channels, linking the Bekaa Valley with South Lebanon, traverse areas near Jumblatt’s own mountain stronghold and the party will certainly go to great lengths – as it did in May 2008 – to protect its infrastructure.

Third, Jumblatt had taken a backseat in the March 14 coalition and has acted to increase his political autonomy and influence.

Since inheriting his father’s political mantle in 2005, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri has gradually (and, at times, frustratingly) found his bearings. Quite simply, Hariri has not had to lean on Jumblatt for a while, and the latter ceased being the coalition’s driving force.

Nor was Jumblatt the coalition’s spearhead. March 14 Christians, particularly Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, have increasingly assumed that role and gained Hariri’s ear over the past year. Of course, Jumblatt’s political gymnastics made his allies trust him less and decreased his sway within the movement.

In short, Jumblatt sees more value as a wild card. But what does his shift mean for others?

As it stands now, Lebanese leaders have coalesced around three alignments: a pro-Western camp; a pro-Iranian camp; and a “centrist” camp influenced by Syria. These groups are not mutually exclusive and their relationship, mirroring the regional dynamic, will ebb and flow.

The United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to back Hariri, who leads the pro-Western camp, even if their relations with Syria thaw. Similarly, Iran will continue to support and bankroll the Hizbullah-led opposition. The “centrist” bloc’s actions will presumably depend on how the Asad regime positions itself in the region.

If Syria is serious about playing a constructive role in the Middle East, the situation in Lebanon might improve. Conversely, if Syria merely aims to buy time and extract concessions from the United States, then Lebanon will pay the price.

At the local level, Jumblatt’s move may encourage opposition figures to join the pro-Syrian bloc on some issues. For instance, Marada chief Suleiman Franjieh and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri both have an interest in opposing privatization, stalling anti-corruption measures, and crafting a pro-Syrian foreign policy.

Such a shift, if it occurs, will not diminish the March 8 bloc’s power. Most Shiites support Hizbullah, which Iran supplies and funds; and former General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement retains much support within the Christian community.

Even so, Jumblatt’s departure is not a disaster for the March 14 movement. Whatever happens, Hariri can still count on Jumblatt’s support. Realistically, the Druze leader cannot afford to alienate Sunnis any more than Shiites. After all, Sunnis are a dominant majority in the Middle East and Jumblatt’s own electoral survival depends on good relations with Sunnis in the Chouf.

Moreover, Hariri’s Future Movement may move closer to the Lebanese Forces and Phalange, at least in the near term. These parties embrace Lebanon’s liberal economic tradition, oppose Syrian interference in Lebanon, and are comfortable in calling for serious talks on Hizbullah’s arms. Though smaller, the surviving coalition is more cohesive than its predecessor.

As always, the Beik fascinates and exasperates. An opportunist with a flair for making extravagant and contradictory declarations, the man is neither consistent nor accountable.

In some regard, however, he must be thanked. Unabashedly committed to his own survival, and that of his community, Walid Jumblatt has revealed – once more – the truth at the heart of politics in Lebanon.

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“Stability in Lebanon should never be taken for granted,” concludes a recent article on Lebanon in The Economist. Though the respected British weekly eloquently states the obvious – that the Lebanese state of affairs is as precarious as ever – Lebanon’s rival factions continue to trade jabs over everything from political vision to the proper pronunciation of their respective names.

The venomous political discourse is not new, but this is precisely the problem: the Lebanese have become accustomed to vitriol – many even delight in it – and have failed themselves by not demanding more restraint from their leaders. In a recent interview on Kalam al-Nass, an influential political talk show, Walid Jumblatt said the following:

“Do you know what the most dangerous weapon is? Along with nuclear weapons, microphones are the most dangerous of all. People – particularly in our East [that is, the Middle East] – throw caution to the wind when speaking in front of a microphone, as they play to their host or their audience.”

Coming from Jumblatt, a controversial figure who has often spoken and acted recklessly, this statement contains a powerful truth despite – or perhaps because of – its messenger: since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, particularly since the July 2006 War completely exposed the fundamental differences within Lebanese society, careless words and irresponsible political acts have pushed Lebanon to the brink of another civil war time and again.

Of course, international and regional political considerations have contributed greatly to the instability in Lebanon. Because of its pluralistic society, Lebanon has long been open to the interests of other actors.

Nevertheless, the Lebanese political class has been a willing bedfellow, and its respective members have continued to leverage the interests of international patrons against their domestic rivals – such games are not new to Lebanon.

The Lebanese have yet to tire of their leaders, who are fighting for scraps in a country smaller than Connecticut while expecting the rest of the world to make Lebanon the linchpin of the international system. In all likelihood, the Lebanese have not tired because communal insecurity is a powerful incentive to lend unflinching support to one faction or another.

Yet, neither communal insecurity nor the system it has enshrined necessitates irresponsible leadership. Over the past few years, millions have taken to the streets in Lebanon. Peaceful, spontaneous protests have gradually made way to staged rallies, political posturing, and an incessant war of words that borders on the insane.

It should be stressed that the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly positively set Lebanon apart from many other countries in the region. It should also be stressed that the Syrian regime often stoked fears of instability in Lebanon to justify maintaining control over the country.

But, as the cliche goes, rights come with responsibilities. It is one thing to embrace honest, hard-fought political debate. It is quite another to accept reckless rhetoric that risks unleashing forces beyond the control of even the most capable of men.

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