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“You need a gun.”

It was February 14, 2005. Hours earlier, in a massive blast that shook Beirut to its core, assassins had taken the life of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri and dozens more. Between bouts of shock and rage, many Lebanese pointed the finger at Syria, but others focused their attention on Israel or – yes, even then – on Hizbullah. All were stunned by the brazen killing.

Somehow, though, my grandfather had other concerns. Beirut’s demons.

“Beirut can slide out of control quickly,” he said. “And then you’ll see the beasts underneath those pretty faces. Calmly walk to your car and drive away… Now.”

If I thought the old man was crazy then, the years have changed that. A string of assassinations, extended periods of political paralysis, and two noteworthy conflicts have pushed the Lebanese to the brink several times, revealing glimpses of a darkness lurking beneath Beirut’s Levantine cosmopolitanism.

Through it all, the controversial Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a source of conflict in itself, has gradually led aggrieved Lebanese to their neighbors’ doorsteps. Now unsealed, the STL indictment has named four men affiliated with Hizbullah as its suspects, thereby confirming some of the leaks, speculation, and half-truths that have surrounded the investigation since the beginning.

And so, the Tribunal will try four people affiliated with Hizbullah, a Shiite militia and political party, for the murder of Hariri, a Sunni political giant. The consequences of a public trial may be damning for the Party of God. Despite Hizbullah’s deep support among Lebanese Shiites, its future also depends on the perception of others.

In 2006, Hizbullah electrified the mostly Sunni Arab world by surviving – hence, “winning” – a war with Israel. Despite the ire of Sunni regimes, who blasted Hizbullah’s “adventurism” for their own reasons, Hizbullah was king for a moment.

That’s no longer true. The party has bled support for five years, has found itself mired in successive controversies, and now faces a few serious immediate challenges. Where regional popularity was once a source of strength for Hizbullah, emerging regional hostility may soon be a new weakness.

Faced with serious interrelated challenges, Hizbullah cannot be pleased with the indictment’s timing. First, due to worsening tensions with Israel, Hizbullah continues to prepare for another war, which analysts predict will involve large swathes of both Lebanon and Israel (as opposed to the usual border skirmishes and aerial campaigns).

Second, most Lebanese want to disarm Hizbullah sooner rather than later. Even members of the Free Patriotic Movement, Hizbullah’s most important ally, seek to integrate the party’s arsenal and cadres into legitimate state institutions at some point. There is no easy answer, but the Hizbullah question continues to dominate the Lebanese discourse.

Third, as local Sunnis seethe over past insults and injuries, prospects for renewed strife remain significant. Unresolved quarrels – the controversy surrounding the Hariri assassination; the May 2008 clashes; and the communal balance of power – have unraveled decades of painstaking work by Hizbullah to avoid ostracizing Lebanon’s Sunnis.  

Fourth, unrest in Syria threatens the Asad regime, a pivotal regional patron and ally. Regime change or even prolonged instability could reduce Hizbullah’s strategic depth, eliminate many training centers, hinder supply routes, and neuter political cover from Damascus.

Against this backdrop, a public international trial can only taint Hizbullah’s image and further constrain its room for maneuver. In the past, as with the July War and the May 2008 clashes, Hizbullah has used force to create political space for itself. Faced with mounting pressure, Hizbullah or its Iranian patrons are that much more likely to use force – by design, or as a rash reaction.

The deeper problem, however, has little to do with the party’s behavior in the short term. Its mere presence as an armed militia, under the shadow of past transgressions, will invite domestic and external challenges that will strain the Lebanese system for years to come.

Hizbullah itself will suffer just as much, maybe more. In Lebanon – part libertarian paradise, part Hobbesian jungle – many overly ambitious projects have failed crushingly. From the Druze emirs of the Modern Period and Ottomans of the late 19th century, to the Lebanese militias, Israelis, and Syrians of more recent vintage, life has quickly turned nasty and brutish.

Without seriously reinventing itself, Hizbullah will be next. Or was my grandfather alone in cleaning out his gun?

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After six years of delay and anticipation, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has issued the first of a series of indictments relating to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. According to an STL press release, Pre-Trial Judge Daniel Fransen has determined that Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare’s first indictment presents “prima facie evidence for this case to proceed to trial.”

Next Steps

The indictment’s contents will remain confidential for now – as confidential as possible in this day and age – to give Lebanese authorities the time and space to arrest the accused parties. Under U.N. Security Council 1757 (and its annexes), Lebanese authorities must now serve the suspects with the indictments, arrest and detain them, and finally transfer them into STL custody.

Lebanon has 30 days to “report to the STL” what measures it has taken. If the authorities fail to arrest anyone within that time frame, the STL can order a “public advertisement” demanding that the individuals appear before the court. At that point, the suspects would officially be known to all.

Clouds of Controversy

Of course, media leaks and public speculation will reveal quite a bit before then. Sources have already told The Daily Star that the indictment names four suspects - Mustafa Badreddine, Salim al-Ayyash, Hasan Aineysseh, and Asad Sabra – affiliated with Hizbullah.

Badreddine, the reported mastermind behind the attack, is a cousin and a brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyeh, a notorious Hizbullah commander who had disappeared for years before his assassination in 2008. According to The Daily Star, “Badreddine eventually replaced Mughniyeh as Hezbollah’s chief operations officer.” The connection is particularly interesting given speculation that Mughniyeh himself had been involved in the plot to kill Hariri.

Meanwhile, operating below Badreddine, it appears Ayyash ran the cell that executed the assassination in 2005. Aineysseh and Sabra’s roles have not received as much attention, but their alleged involvement was probably in the rank-and-file.

Speculation is not Adjudication… But What About Syria?

After all this time, and after all that has happened in Lebanon, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that speculative tid-bits do not make an indictment, an indictment does not make a trial, and a trial does not make a verdict.
 
Politicians will exploit the judicial process to cull together support or pressure their rivals. The Lebanese are no strangers to grand-standing. Commentators – on this blog, at Qifa Nabki, at The Daily Star, and elsewhere – will continue to weigh in as well.
 
It will be difficult to maintain the perception of judicial integrity with all the leaks and debates, but allowing the indictments and trials to speak for themselves is the best cure over the long term. After all, the STL draws its judges and staff from across the international arena; as with other international tribunals, their work will not be nearly as politicized as the commentary that surrounds it.
 
That said, resisting the urge to speculate about Syria’s role is all but impossible. Under pressure at home, the Asad regime retains much influence in Beirut. As long as it remains in power, the regime will influence events in Lebanon and in relation to the STL.
 
First, although Hizbullah will certainly have its say, Syrian behavior can frustrate or facilitate efforts to track down Lebanese suspects. Second, depending on the content of subsequent indictments, the regime might have to deal with another cut against it (Syrian officials are expected to be named). Third, at the broader level, given the current Lebanese government’s composition, Syria has a proxy in Beirut that may give lip-service to the notion of cooperating with international investigators while dragging its heels as long as possible.
 
Will the Asad regime play ball in hopes of easing international pressure? Or will it conclude that now, more than ever, it needs the support of Iran and Hizbullah? How will the Lebanese themselves, particularly Sunnis and Shiites, react to the indictment? One thing is certain: however these events play out, passions will flair as the STL paints the past and shapes the future of Lebanon and the Levant.

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March 14 partisans across the country, particularly Sunni supporters of former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, have been protesting what they believe is a political coup by Hizbullah. Earlier today, Najib Mikati, a billionaire Sunni politician from the northern city of Tripoli, secured enough votes to head Lebanon’s  next government. Although Mikati had emerged as the Hizbullah-led March 8 coalition’s candidate for the premiership, he has denied being “Hizbullah’s man.”

In any case, the March 14 coalition and its Western backers fear that a Hizbullah-controlled government, even under the guise of a “national-unity” cabinet, could distance or even isolate Lebanon from the West and from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), a U.N. judicial body established to investigate the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and other Lebanese politicians and citizens.

March 14 has called for protests in support of Hariri and the STL. Meanwhile, Sunni law-makers have called for a “Day of Rage” across Lebanon. Protesters have assembled peacefully in some places, but have burned tires, closed roads, and fired shots in others. All in all, fears of Sunni reactions against yet another embarrassment of Hariri only complicate the future of a country already bracing itself for a Hizbullah reaction to the imminent publicization of an STL indictment.

Here are some pictures and videos of Lebanon’s “Day of Rage.”

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This past weekend saw Lebanon’s political stand-off heat up. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea and Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah both laid out their respective camp’s positions (I’ll be reacting to these speeches later this week).

Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt, who had until now vacillated between the March 14 and March 8 coalitions, finally threw in his lot with Hizbullah. Notwithstanding Jumblatt’s rather loose understanding of the word “conviction,” his latest gambit – to publicly announce his adherence to the Syrian line while allowing members of his bloc to formulate their own positions – is the latest consequence of the pressure Syria and Hizbullah have managed to exert on him since May 2008.

The most important development was Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s emergence as the March 8 candidate for the premiership. Mikati is the billionaire owner of a communications conglomerate that does business across the developing world, and has often presented himself as a compromise candidate for the premiership. In 2005, when popular protests led to former Prime Minister Omar Karami’s resignation, Mikati stepped in and ably led a caretaker cabinet that oversaw Lebanon’s first free and fair elections in some thirty years (for those wondering, the elections of 1992, 1996, and 2000 took place under Syrian occupation, political tutelage, and blatant “electioneering”).

Mikati is both accomplished and capable. This is precisely why his candidacy could be dangerous from March 14′s point of view. As once source put it, Mikati “could lend some semblence of credibility to [March 8's] so-called agenda, which is clearly aimed at one thing: the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.”

To be sure, it is hard to imagine Mikati condeming the Tribunal outright. Yet, his acquiesence in the face of other condemnations could have the same effect. Much will depend on who controlls key portfolios – like the Justice and Interior ministries – and the overall composition of the cabinet, so it is difficult to envision how any future government will react when the Tribunal’s indictment goes public.

Even so, it is clear that the next prime minister will face renewed pressures to open the cabinet debate to issues like “false witnesses,” the STL-Lebanon treaty, and the Lebanese government’s cooperation with U.N. investigators. Without the security of a Hariri-led cabinet, March 14 exposes itself to the risk that Mikati could allow the cabinet to debate these issues. Similarly, thanks to Jumblatt’s gymnastics and President Michel Sleiman’s need to remain above the fray, March 14 cannot hope to outvote its adversaries in the cabinet.

There is also a communal element to these tensions. In 2005 and 2009, March 8 managed to secure the election of Amal Movement leader Nabih Berri as Speaker of Parliament by arguing, in part, that the Shiite post should go to an individual who represented that community’s sentiment. Many March 14 supporters, and Sunnis in particular, feel that should apply here. The vast majority of Lebanese Sunnis support Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in the same manner the vast majority of Lebanese Shiites support the Hizbullah-Amal alignment.

With that in mind, March 14′s supporters are understandably frustrated. ”Anti-Mikati protests” have erupted across the country (more accurately, these are pro-Hariri demonstrations). But if it is wrong for Hizbullah supporters to burn tires and block roads, what justifies these actions? Nothing.

Tire-burning and the practice of blocking roads are neither desireable nor useful. Impeding the day-to-day affairs of citizens is unlikely to exert any pressure on Hizbullah; this is the same organization that went to war in 2006, obstructed government in 2007, assaulted the capital in 2008, and toppled the cabinet just this month.

If these protests are mere expressions of anger, rather than a calculated (but futile) attempt to pressure Hizbullah, the dangers are even greater. Lebanon’s various “Streets” are already volatile, and have been on edge for about five years now. Sunni-Shiite tensions continue to simmer, and intra-Christian rivalries have not yet been put to rest. Constant provocations and responses will only edge the country closer to the precipice of renewed strife.

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Admittedly, Lebanon does not live up to its liberal mythology. But, for all its warts, and despite periodic failures, coexistence among Lebanon’s communities reflects, and in turn promotes, a pluralism that is absent throughout much of the Middle East. Since the mid-19th century, when European intervention in Ottoman-era Mount Lebanon helped consolidate communalism, political pluralism has distinguished Lebanon from the rest of the region in three positive ways.

First, Lebanon benefits from a dynamism that is due, in part, to its people’s intimate contact with “the Other.” From cosmopolitan Beirut to the most insular of mountain villages, the Lebanese interact with, or are at least exposed to, other groups. This diversity manifests on street corners, in classrooms, in the workplace, and in the political arena – and helps breed cultural awareness, lateral thinking, and tact. Wired for the world, members of the far-flung Lebanese diaspora owe part of their success to this nurturing process. In turn, Lebanon benefits from its diaspora’s ideas, remittances, investments, and other initiatives, which offset the negative impact of “brain drain.”

Second, Lebanon has managed to avoid the authoritarianism that has plagued much of the Middle East. From Morocco to the Persian Gulf, theocracies, monarchies, hereditary presidencies, and military cabals have clung to power for decades. While not exactly a liberal bunch, Lebanon’s politicians, military leaders, and clerics must operate within a context that restricts their power. Because few Lebanese leaders have been able to cull together serious support outside of their communities, power has remained diffused.

Occasionally, a Lebanese leader manages to transcend the communal context. But those instances are both rare and fleeting. The vanished Imam Mousa al-Sadr, the assassinated president-elect Bashir Gemayel, the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, former General Michel Aoun, or Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah have at one time or another emerged as political giants with cross-communal support. But, time and again, Lebanon’s system has met these figures head on, frustrating and inhibiting their ambitions (note that most of these leaders met, or are likely to meet, indecorous ends).

Clearly, the interplay of various leaders and groups has sometimes led to discord. Lebanon’s most recent government crisis, due to a Hizbullah-led withdrawal that owed much of its bite to Lebanon’s power-sharing system, is a stark reminder of the negative aspects of consociationalism. However, as Lebanese-American journalist Michael Young suggests “The Ghosts of Martyrs Square,” it may be better to live under the rule of “a forest of fathers,” than under the watch of a single “father” who holds all the strings.

Third, Lebanon’s state-society relations differ significantly from the regional norm. In one form or another, a culture of dissent prevails in the media, the academia, cafes, and the halls of power. By contrast, the state lurks almost everywhere else in the Arab world. Irrespective of the political inclinations or geostrategic relevance of their regimes, these states stifle expression, suppress political opposition, and constrain free thought.

So, while Lebanon falls short on liberalism, it is very much pluralistic. But the underpinnings of this pluralism are under attack. Coexistence in Lebanon is eroding.

During the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1991), a militia order gradually took root. As a consequence of prolonged hostilities, and a militia logic that demanded ethnic and ideological consolidation, Lebanon became more cantonized than it had been before the war.

Christians receded into an enclave stretching from East Beirut to northern Lebanon. The Druze took shelter in the heart of Mount Lebanon, where much of Lebanon’s contemporary system is derived from. Sunnis remained in their coastal dwellings or patches of the Bekaa Valley. Shiites clustered around Beirut, in the northern Bekaa Valley, and in South Lebanon.

Now, two decades after the civil war, coexistence faces new threats. First, poor and unbalanced economic development continues to drive people from Lebanon’s outer provinces towards Beirut, where communal neighborhoods and ghettos, rather than inter-mixed villages, are the norm.

Second, massive land transfers taking place throughout Lebanon also threaten coexistence. The pattern of transfers reflects and perpetuates Christian detachment and apathy, as well as aggressive and possibly orchestrated purchase of properties by parties, organizations, and individuals at above-market prices. True, natural demographic and economic forces are at play; but it is also clear that something else is happening.

Coexistence has long rested upon two geo-demographic pillars: a Christian presence in the far reaches Lebanon, such as the Hermel region and Lebanese border villages in the South; and a concurrent Muslim presence in what are now perceived to be Christian areas like Batroun, Jbeil, the Metn, and Zahle.

Migration – existing alongside the problem of large-scale land transfers – threatens to deepen Lebanon’s de facto segregation. While it may be unrealistic to expect an immediate reversal of civil war-era dislocations, it is not too late to raise awareness of more gradual, contemporary threats to coexistence.

Recently, MP Boutros Harb (Batroun, March 14) proposed a draft law proposal that would freeze the sale of land between Lebanon’s Christian and Muslim populations for a period of 15 years. Although such a law would probably survive constitutional scrutiny, the proposal suffers from three serious problems. 

First, the draft law reinforces the communal impulse, and thereby further subjugates individuals to categories that are, in a sense, rooted in accidents of birth. Second, the law offends social sensibilities, particularly as it has come off as a narrow reassertion of Christian interests in Lebanon. Third, the law is a temporary stop-gap measure that does not adequately address the social and economic reasons behind Lebanon’s cantonization. 

But, if Harb’s approach is too stringent, too broad, and off the mark, its faults must not obscure the need for action. “Federalism” was once a dirty word in Lebanon. Without striving towards (and sacrificing for) elusive unity, the partition or devolution of a country whose “founding myth” was tolerance may soon become inevitable.

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