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Macho-Sexualism: Understanding the Lebanese Male

Posted in Lebanon, Middle East, tagged , , , , , on October 7, 2011 | 5 Comments »

“I knew the men were Lebanese,” an American friend of mine once said, “because they were well-groomed, slightly overdressed, and just too pretty… but they looked like they had ‘disappeared’ one or two people. I didn’t know what to think, but I just knew they were Lebanese! And I was right.”

That was five years ago. Ever since, I’ve been confronted with growing evidence – some of it self-generated – that the Lebanese male is a unique creature. And it’s certainly true that, in times of peace, he is more obscure than his female counterpart. In the Middle East, and in many other parts of the world, Lebanese women are renowned for their beauty, which isn’t always a “gift from God” (let’s keep that between us). Of course, there’s much more to Lebanese women – well, maybe not all of them – than their pretty faces. It’s also true that the beauty stereotype has many negative consequences for many women. Bottom line, though, is that the stereotype represents a uniform and parsimonious view of the Lebanese Woman.

By contrast, public perception of the Lebanese Man is a fragmented jumble of confusion. Not to fear. This is one of those wonderful situations in which a concise definition can account for complex underlying realities. In essence, the Lebanese male is a Macho-Sexual.

To understand what I mean by “Macho-Sexualism,” it’s important to look at existing typologies of the Lebanese Man, recent personal observations, and extensive field research conducted in various social settings. Here’s a glance:

Identifying Existing Typologies of the Lebanese Male

He-Man of the Arab World

Between the mountaineers, valley tribesmen, and hardy seafarers of Lebanon’s various mythologies, it’s easy to see where a reputation for toughness comes from. Most Lebanese folks have heard tales of how a relative – in my case, my father’s cousin – used to carry timber over Mount Lebanon while fighting off thieves, wolves, and rival villagers. All the while, it seems, this man was eating a labneh sandwiche and drinking arak. Or perhaps you’ve heard of how the men of yesteryear would get drunk and go brawl with Ottoman sentries, leading to their expulsion from the Empire (hello Mississippi Valley, Italy, and Brazil!). No? Maybe that’s just my folks.

I’ve certainly heard a thousand times how my grandfather, in an old mountain tradition, had to lift a mahdali over his head to ask for his bride’s hand in marriage. For those unfamiliar with the term, a “mahdali” is a stone roller that was used to flatten clay roofs or pave roads in inacessible areas. Of course, while mere mortals were content with lifting the mahdali once, as minimally required, my gramps picked the stone up three – or was it five? – times before throwing it about fifteen meters. That’s how manly he was. Booyah!

I’ve broken a sweat just looking at the damn thing. Moving on…

Pretty Boys of the Arab World

In the eyes of many other Arabs, the Lebanese male is alternatively “feminine,” “metrosexual,” or “gay.” Or maybe just “a pretty boy.” Without myself equating toughness and masculinity to sexual orientation, I’ve heard these descriptions from a scattering of people. 

At face value, then, there must be something to it. Right? Or maybe there are a few alternative explanations.

First, most foreigners meet city slickers from Beirut or Jounieh, the jet-set, or what I like to call “diaspora dandies” (Full disclosure: I’d put myself in that category). Compared with the He-Man of yesteryear, who was busy moving mountains and fighting Turks, the contemporary city boy is more concerned with his shirt (button-downs or Lacoste polos, please), jeans (designer, to be sure), cologne (over-utilization is standard), and car (German make, but excluding Volkswagens).

Second, the Lebanese dialect is purportedly softer than others in the Arab world and is infused with a high dose of French and English words. As such, it may sound generally less “masculine.” Now, anyone who’s been to the mountains or the rural periphery might wonder if I’m sniffing glue. But, keeping in mind that most non-Lebanese come into contact with the more urbane men of Achrafieh and Hamra or the even tamer members of the diaspora, it’s a fair linguistic point. My response: Here. What now Saudis-in-Audis?

Third, social attitudes in Lebanon are relatively more liberal than other parts of the region. It’s not as if Beirut is actually a “Paris” or “Provincetown,” as the Ministry of Tourism and The New York Times would have it. The apparent liberalism has more to do with the fact that Beirut’s competition is almost non-existent. Riyadh, Jeddah, Damascus, Amman, Cairo? Please. Beneath the glitz, glamor, and financial ruin, even Dubai isn’t exactly the most tolerant of places.

Finally, although results vary, Lebanese men are very conscious of appearances. They’re often more put together than their Syrian, Egyptian, or Gulfi counterparts. Call it quasi-Italian, pseudo-French, faux-Midwest-on-the-Mediterranean, or just call it Lebanese: button-down shirt, designer jeans, thick belt, shoes, and gold galore. There’s also that rare form of brand mastery that captivated me at the beach some weeks ago.

Crazy Fuckers

“The problem in Lebanon,” at least one self-styled analyst believes, “is that it’s just full of crazy fuckers. It’s that simple.”

That rather unacademic view brings us to our third stereotype: the Angry-Boisterous-Caustic Man. You know him very well. He’s the guy who honks his horn at you while trying to run you off the road, even as he’s driving the wrong way with his lights off at 2:30 a.m. (True story: my neighbor). He’s the guy who hunts birds because “he just needs to kill something” and it’s “illegal to shoot anything else” (never mind that bird hunting is actually illegal too) (True story: family friend). He’s the guy who tells you to lift for mass, so “if anybody says something to you or your girl you can just smack the shit out him” (True story: my cousin).

There isn’t much to say. Even my calmest acquaintances – none of my good friends are calm – have a crazy streak that just pops out of nowhere in response to the slightest irritant. Since returning to Lebanon last month, I’ve almost brawled on account of “traffic,” “the way that guy keeps looking at our table,” “MTC Touch’s shitty Blackberry service,” “and because that fool thinks I’m funny, like I’m some kind of clown and shit.”

And don’t forget those little “discussions” we have from time to time.  So, again, I just can’t think of a counterargument here.

Ego-Trippers: Jacks of All Trades, Perfect Princes, and Fat-Bellied Pimps 

Finally, we have the cab drivers who double as political analysts, the gardeners who double as construction site managers, the athletes who double as energy consultants, and the barbers who double as cell phone distributors. In the past, I’ve attributed the emergence of these dual career opportunists to a general lack of specialization made worse by the need to adapt to perpetual instability.

And while that may be true, I’ve come to appreciate another theory put forth by family and friends alike. Ego. Now, I’m not a shrink and I’m not well-versed in Freudian terms, such as the “id,” “sub-id,” “ego,” and all that. Whatever. All I’m trying to say is that the “Lebanese Man” has a massive goddamn ego, as understood in the “parlance of our times.”

You’ve seen these assholes. Maybe they’re walking into a club like they own the place, paying the valet fifty dollars to park their Ferrari near the door, strolling down the street clutching two cell phones, wearing suits shinier than my kitchen floor, and bitching about how nobody in Lebanon has class anymore.

Maybe it’s the 45-year-old prancing around with a girl literally half his age or obliviously strutting about with company that’s been paid for. Really, son?

Maybe he’s the waiter who feels compelled to offer life lessons on how to “build your career.” Or advice on what women really want, which is apparently an overweight 22-year-old dude who beats his masseuse every Tuesday. Or maybe, if you’re lucky, it’s the complete fucking stranger who is kind enough to manage traffic and guide everyone’s parking activities before exiting stage right before you’ve had time to curse his nosiness.

Lebanon is Krypton. Everyone here is, or thinks he is, a superman. That explains why it can be so annoying here; but, in a way, it also explains why many Lebanese men do well abroad. If Lebanon is Krypton, then everywhere else is Planet Earth, with orderly societies based on trust and the rule of law – the yellow sun, if you will – fueling these men’s power and success.

Macho-Sexualism: A Comprehensive Understanding of the Lebanese Male

On balance, it’s easy to see why my friend took the blend of fashion (though strange) and toughness (though likely contrived) to be a marker for Lebanese manhood. So, while the “Lebanese Man” appears quite complicated, he’s really a simple creature. His personality generally rests on a simple base, which has been built up since his childhood and reinforced by encounters with similar people.

Be strong, look good, behave like a star, and if all else fails… act fucking crazy. It’s really that simple, folks.

Of course, some men are stronger than others, some look better than others, and god knows some are crazier than others. Inevitably, by design or by circumstance, men combine these aspects of their personalities differently. As the old saying goes, you have your manhood and I have mine.

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The End of Evolution and the Last (Lebanese) Man: Four Brands, Three Languages, Two Passports, One City

Posted in Lebanon, tagged , , , , , on September 7, 2011 | 3 Comments »

(NOTE: The following post was the result of a serendipitous encounter at the beach, which pushed a bunch of tangential thoughts into my brain. It overlaps slightly with the forthcoming “Macho-Sexualism: Understanding the Lebanese Male,” which I was writing at the time…)

The other day, at La Plage – everyone’s favorite part pool, part car show, part plastic surgery convention – I met a young Lebanese man that exhibited a level of excellence that most others could only dream about. The only analogies I can think of come from the sports world. For the baseball fans out there, the man basically hit for the cycle… in one at-bat. Football fans, that’s like scoring passing, rushing, receiving, and special teams touchdowns in a single game. Basketball fans, that’s like dropping 80, and topping it off with a game-winning four-point play, coast-to-coast dunk, and off-the-glass fadeaway sequence.

But this “Cyrille” put his energies toward appearances. In sharp contrast to my Porky Pig “Please Don’t Eat Me, I Love You” T-shirt, he effortlessly donned Tommy Hilfiger sandals, Ralph Lauren swim trunks, a Lacoste polo shirt, and Gucci sunglasses. That’s four instantly recognizable brands. At the beach!

As I awkwardly stared at this Frenchie, and listened to conversations “broadcast to the world from the other side of the pool,” I realized that I had uncovered something of greater significance: the epitome of Lebanese manhood, for better or for worse.

In addition to his brand mastery, Cyrille spoke three languages (Arabic, French, and English), held two passports (Lebanese and French), and “could only live in one city” (Beirut… never mind that he actually lived in Paris).

Repeat after me: four brands, three languages, two passports, one city; four brands, three languages, two passports, one city; four brands, three languages, two passports, one city.

Think of it as the Platonic “form,” or ideal, for manhood in our little slice of the Levant. The concept is almost powerful enough to warrant one of those brilliant, but admittedly contrived, pitches-cum-speeches from Donald Draper on Mad Men:

During the day, to boost local industry, he sets up at the St. George Marina or La Plage. After all, someone has to soak up those rays. Afterwards, you might see him at Paul or Casablanca, trying to fill his belly after a hard day at the beach—er, office. When the sun goes down, he’ll be at one of Beirut’s many rooftop lounges, trying his best to impress friends and strangers alike. Finally, with dawn nearing, he drives his new car – a gift from daddy, a purchase well beyond his means, or both – to his home overlooking the city, already pondering tomorrow’s moves.

He eats out, goes to the beach, and clubs until the sun comes up. He then wonders how “people can live in such an expensive country.” He wants money and prestige, but he can’t stomach a desk job. He wants independence, but he can’t break free of his family. He wears shorts to work, but gets suited and booted for a night out.

He speaks bluntly, quick to criticize, but is sensitive to the words of others. He smokes two packs of Kent a day, but never misses the gym. He speaks French or English, when Arabic will do. He speaks Arabic only to reassert his manhood when it is questioned. He wants a trophy wife, a virgin bride, and yet somehow expects the women of his generation to put out.

He wants to drink, play, and fuck - not eat, pray, and love.

He is you. He is me. The Lebanese Man.

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My Grandfather, Hizbullah, and the Hobbesian Jungle

Posted in Christians, Druze, Hizbullah, Israel, Levant, Shiites, Sunnis, tagged , , , , , , on August 20, 2011 | 1 Comment »

“You need a gun.”

It was February 14, 2005. Hours earlier, in a massive blast that shook Beirut to its core, assassins had taken the life of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri and dozens more. Between bouts of shock and rage, many Lebanese pointed the finger at Syria, but others focused their attention on Israel or – yes, even then – on Hizbullah. All were stunned by the brazen killing.

Somehow, though, my grandfather had other concerns. Beirut’s demons.

“Beirut can slide out of control quickly,” he said. “And then you’ll see the beasts underneath those pretty faces. Calmly walk to your car and drive away… Now.”

If I thought the old man was crazy then, the years have changed that. A string of assassinations, extended periods of political paralysis, and two noteworthy conflicts have pushed the Lebanese to the brink several times, revealing glimpses of a darkness lurking beneath Beirut’s Levantine cosmopolitanism.

Through it all, the controversial Special Tribunal for Lebanon, a source of conflict in itself, has gradually led aggrieved Lebanese to their neighbors’ doorsteps. Now unsealed, the STL indictment has named four men affiliated with Hizbullah as its suspects, thereby confirming some of the leaks, speculation, and half-truths that have surrounded the investigation since the beginning.

And so, the Tribunal will try four people affiliated with Hizbullah, a Shiite militia and political party, for the murder of Hariri, a Sunni political giant. The consequences of a public trial may be damning for the Party of God. Despite Hizbullah’s deep support among Lebanese Shiites, its future also depends on the perception of others.

In 2006, Hizbullah electrified the mostly Sunni Arab world by surviving – hence, “winning” – a war with Israel. Despite the ire of Sunni regimes, who blasted Hizbullah’s “adventurism” for their own reasons, Hizbullah was king for a moment.

That’s no longer true. The party has bled support for five years, has found itself mired in successive controversies, and now faces a few serious immediate challenges. Where regional popularity was once a source of strength for Hizbullah, emerging regional hostility may soon be a new weakness.

Faced with serious interrelated challenges, Hizbullah cannot be pleased with the indictment’s timing. First, due to worsening tensions with Israel, Hizbullah continues to prepare for another war, which analysts predict will involve large swathes of both Lebanon and Israel (as opposed to the usual border skirmishes and aerial campaigns).

Second, most Lebanese want to disarm Hizbullah sooner rather than later. Even members of the Free Patriotic Movement, Hizbullah’s most important ally, seek to integrate the party’s arsenal and cadres into legitimate state institutions at some point. There is no easy answer, but the Hizbullah question continues to dominate the Lebanese discourse.

Third, as local Sunnis seethe over past insults and injuries, prospects for renewed strife remain significant. Unresolved quarrels – the controversy surrounding the Hariri assassination; the May 2008 clashes; and the communal balance of power – have unraveled decades of painstaking work by Hizbullah to avoid ostracizing Lebanon’s Sunnis.  

Fourth, unrest in Syria threatens the Asad regime, a pivotal regional patron and ally. Regime change or even prolonged instability could reduce Hizbullah’s strategic depth, eliminate many training centers, hinder supply routes, and neuter political cover from Damascus.

Against this backdrop, a public international trial can only taint Hizbullah’s image and further constrain its room for maneuver. In the past, as with the July War and the May 2008 clashes, Hizbullah has used force to create political space for itself. Faced with mounting pressure, Hizbullah or its Iranian patrons are that much more likely to use force – by design, or as a rash reaction.

The deeper problem, however, has little to do with the party’s behavior in the short term. Its mere presence as an armed militia, under the shadow of past transgressions, will invite domestic and external challenges that will strain the Lebanese system for years to come.

Hizbullah itself will suffer just as much, maybe more. In Lebanon – part libertarian paradise, part Hobbesian jungle – many overly ambitious projects have failed crushingly. From the Druze emirs of the Modern Period and Ottomans of the late 19th century, to the Lebanese militias, Israelis, and Syrians of more recent vintage, life has quickly turned nasty and brutish.

Without seriously reinventing itself, Hizbullah will be next. Or was my grandfather alone in cleaning out his gun?

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Ministries of Tomorrow: Creating a Cabinet for the New Lebanon

Posted in Lebanon, March 14, March 8, tagged , , , , , , , on August 11, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

The unrest that has swept though the Middle East this year, particularly the increasingly vigorous revolt - excuse me, D.C. policy wonks, “transition” - in Syria, has had little actual resonance in the streets and squares of Beirut, at least when compared to Lebanon’s own mass mobilizations of 2005.

What the Problem Is, Baby?

One underexplored element of stagnation in Beirut is the stale, inefficient, and utterly misguided cabinet structure. Mind you, the problem isn’t really the distribution of portfolios in this cabinet, which is less than enticing. The problem lies in the political elite’s failure to think creatively about what portfolios the Lebanese government should or shouldn’t have in the first place.

To help Lebanon cope with the New New New (is it three or four? What the hell? Just to be safe… New) Middle East, I’ve cobbled together some thoughts on Lebanon’s Cabinet of the Future.

For reasons that will become clear, the only two ministries worth keeping are the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All other ministries – like the Ministry of Sophistry and Bullshit – are entirely new creations that fit the skill sets of Lebanese leaders and meet the expectations of the politically sophisticated Lebanese people.

To see who I’ve named as ministers, and for a high dose of ranting, please click on any links that interest you. Enjoy.

The Ministries of Tomorrow

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A User Manual for Lebanon: 10 Resolutions for the Summer Season (2011 ed., Part 2)

Posted in Lebanon, tagged , , , , , , , on July 8, 2011 | 4 Comments »

(CONTINUED…)

6. I Will Not Watch Kalam al-Nass

The news is bad. Political talk shows are just plain stupid. I’m just tired of watching thugs, crooks, politicians masquerading as clerics, illiterate academics, clannish elites, and the seemingly endless stream of “former ambassadors.”

Never again! Well, maybe the occasional show, but I’ll be sure to check the listings first.

7. I Will Resist Xenophobia and Reject the Hierarchy of Races

Saudis in Audis. Syrian laborers. Sri Lankan, Philippian, and Ethiopian maids. Egyptian, Nigerian, and Senegalese men. Russian, Ukranian, Romanian, and Bulgarian women, not all of whom are “artist-entertainers.”

English and Irish bar patrons. American and Canadian journalists. French folks, doing whatever it is they do. Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot “businessmen.”

What do these groups of people have in common? First, to many Lebanese, “they” are simply foreigners (with the first group being held in less esteem). Second, like it or not, “they” contribute to Lebanon’s fragile economy. Foreigners supply vital labor, source and facilitate cash influxes, and allow for many indulgences that would be unaffordable otherwise. Third, “they” are often targets of resentment, ridicule, and even overt racism.

The generally haughty attitude towards Asians and black folks is especially perplexing because many Lebanese are, were, or know people who are or were, trying to make a buck in some distant land.  

On the converse note, why the deference towards Western Europeans and Americans (by Americans, I also mean Canadians!)? And don’t get me started on the French. Seriously.

Sure, the sight of Mr. Petrodollar strolling down a village street high up in Mount Lebanon, or down the corniche in Beirut, can be a little off-putting and even threatening. But it’s time we all move past jingoism, especially considering how the engines of Lebanese economy – banking, tourism, and diaspora remittances – are so dependent on contact with the Other.

8. I Will Not Drive Like a Maniac or Asshole (Unless You Drive Like a Maniac or Asshole First)

“I hate how people living abroad just drive around like maniacs,” a dear friend once told me. “It’s that whole playground mentality… it disrespects this place.” Fair enough. I guess his serial traffic law violations were not as bad, but I digress.  

How fun it is to zig and zag through traffic, splitting cars like your name is Moses? Or to make it from Aoukar to Gemmayze in 16 minutes at night, when the trip takes more than two hours in bad traffic?

Seatbelt itchy? Lose it. Call to make? Sure. Left lane moving slow? Pass on the right, cut back, and make that left turn without braking. Missed your turn? Back it up, son. Pure and unfettered liberty!

However, there’s a cost. Car-related incidents are the number one killer of Lebanese under 35 (especially males). That’s quite telling. With no effective gun laws, four small armed conflicts since 1990, years of concurrent occupation, unrest, and assassinations, the Lebanese can’t even go to the store without worrying about Caramel-Schumacher trying to run them over.

Then again, driving like a saint is pointless when everybody else is so intent on eating up every last inch of your maneuverable space. Overtake at your own risk.

9. I Will Not Be Trapped

Four-hour lunches. Wistful mountain drives. Electric nights. Lazy days at the beach.

Lebanon has a way of trapping people. It’s far too easy to lose sight of other goals, from simply reading a book, planning your next career move, or travelling somewhere new. This time will be different. Inshallah.

10. I Will Not Complain (Neither “Here” nor “There”)

This one’s really for my friends (you know who you are).

You may soon find yourself cursing things in Lebanon. Bad roads that never open up. Power outages, traffic, the constant posturing, the gold diggers and faux-pimps. Francophones (Excuse moi, couldn’t help it!). Daddy’s little boy in a Maserati. Some-other-Daddy’s little girl riding in the Maserati. Zou-zou wants to fight because you bumped him at the bar. Political analysts driving cabs. Never-ending trancelike debates on leisurely issues: beach or mountains; Monot or Gemmayze; Skybar or White; masheweh or just mezze; March 14 or March 8 (oops). And those nosy fucking people!

Just remember the other side of the pond. Miles of road with nobody on them. Flatness. Monotonous automatons riding the Metro or Underground with their Starbucks Mocha-Mix-Cinnaswirlachinos. Smartphones for friends. Smartphones instead of friends. Smartphones in the presence of friends. Tyrone wants to fight because you stepped on his Pumas. Blinking Blackberries. Fratboys in flip-flops. Laptop leftists, suited and booted masters-of-the-world, and the pseudo-spiritualist yoga bunch rocking their $500 mats. Psychotic debates dressed up as discussions of “the issues:” woman’s liberty or child’s life; flat tax or graduated tax; affirmative action or a blind system; war abroad or war at home. And those indifferent fucking people!

I’m starting to sound like George Carlin. Bottom line: it’s all relative, mish heik? Enjoy your vacations, people. That’s why we have them.

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A User Manual for Lebanon: 10 Resolutions for the Summer Season (2011 ed., Part 1)

Posted in Lebanon, tagged , , , , , on July 7, 2011 | 5 Comments »

Like many people of Lebanese origin, I’m gearing up for a periodic trip back. After this summer’s bar exam, I plan to spend some months in Lebanon (And, hopefully, travel elsewhere… more on this later).

In the spirit of summer, and to distract beloved readers from the dismal charades that pass for politics in Beirut, I’ve put together a list of resolutions for my 2011 visit. Because the chance to rant proved irresistible, I’ve had to split the list up. Part 1 is today’s post. Part 2 will follow tomorrow.

Please consider these resolutions to be humble suggestions on how you should behave too. Yep, Zouzou and Hassoun, I mean you.

1. I Will Not Revert to Archetypical Lebanese Behavior Upon Boarding the Plane (Or Disembarking, Or Leaving the Airport)

It starts with a knowing glance. Maybe even a wink (I tend to wink too much, consider this an advanced apology if we cross paths in-transit). The Lebanese pick each other out early in this process, which can involve two or three flights.

As the multicolored human terrain of the U.S. and Europe gradually gives way to the vague sepia tones of Lebanese folk (olive, caramel, bronze, and brown), a primordial “we’re going back” feeling sweeps across the departure gates.

On the plane, something happens. As Fairuz begins to serenade the passengers, who sense they are close to their motherland-cum-seasonal playground, people start YELLING FOR NO APPARENT REASON!!!

“Oh, I’m in your seat? But, wallah, I’m already comfortable.” … 

“Look at that Russian girl! I wonder what she’ll be doing here. Yu’bburneh rabbak! What? No, I had no idea she was your wife.” …

“**No, I can’t stop talking on my cellphone. Because I’m so goddamn important, that’s why. One second baby…** Uh – Anthony was it? – could you move your legs please? I have sensitive hips.” …

“SHOO? Don’t be silly. Who has time to shower before a flight?”

It gets worse in Beirut. Concepts like “standing in line” and “using our indoor voices” disappear into the ”diaspora behavior” and ”civilized human being” interior lobes.

Middle-aged men start lighting their cigarettes, maybe using the NO SMOKING signs as vertical ashtrays (This actually happens, I swear.). Younger dudes suddenly lose three shirt buttons and tack on two scents of cologne. Ladies morph from friendly students and young professionals into uber-Barbies (that’s a euphemism).

Of course, the porters have already taken the liberty of “arranging” your bags for you – but then again, the porters are Beirut-based, so that’s OK. Then comes the maze of General Security, Internal Security, Pseudo-Security, Not-Even-Security interrogations. 

After that, the backgammon-playing, chain-smoking, money-grabbing customs officials that never stop anyone, except random Brittanies and Todds, might just choose to interrogate you today: “Where are you arriving from? Sierra Leone? Somalia? Please go right ahead. Canada? Step aside – ya habibi, step aside! – for further questioning.”

Two or three hours later – I tend to talk back, which slows the process – one must still contend with the obligatory meet-and-greet and possible press conference with family, friends, and the strangers they’ve met while waiting for their beloved babies to land from distant shores.

It’s almost a little too much. Almost ;)

2. I Will Spend (Significant and Meaningful) Time with Family

You know the drill. As a D.C. friend of mine points out when I complain that jet lag hits me harder when “I travel East,” I have a habit of rushing out from the airport to drink, dance, and eat.

To be sure, I make the required visits and do enjoy talking to the “nuclear family.” I do suffer, however, from an inability to properly balance hedonism with family time. The first night sets the tone. This year, even if I get jittery three minutes after landing, I WILL NOT GO OUT AND PARTY.

3. I Will Not Go to Gemmayze Six Nights a Week

Gemmayze is one of Lebanon’s more enchanting neighborhoods, with some of Beirut’s last surviving pockets of late-Ottoman and 1920s French architecture. Since 2004, the district has rapidly cultivated a reputation for its night-life. Gemmayze is simply packed with bars, taverns, clubs, lounges, and restaurants of all kinds (77 establishments in 2008, over 110 by 2010, and probably many more since I’ve been last).

Charming by day and alluring by night, Gemmayze’s got what I need. But traffic is terrible. Every night stains you with the smell of cigars and cigarettes. And although the street meat – perhaps a hot dog at Freddie’s, or a shawarma at Jabbour (God help me) – is delicious, it’s time I start eating a little healthier.

I will not subject myself to hours of whiskey, Jager, and dou-dous (vodka, lemon, hot sauce, olive), followed by two or three sandwiches. There’s plenty more to do, I think,  and that’s that.

4. I Will Not Go to Edde Sands or Any Over-Priced Beaches

Because of curious property laws, typical cronyism, and (conceded) market realities, many of Lebanon’s good beaches are privately owned. That’s all fine, but the prices are simply prohibitive. This year, entrance will run at around twenty dollars (Or more if you opt for the “lounges” and “VIP” areas. It’s a beach. With sand! You know?).

It’s also common policy to exclude food and beverages from home – not that I’m known for brown-bagging – so an afternoon at the beach can run a person $30 or $40. Bottle of wine? Snacks? Call your loan shark.

5. I Will Not Watch the News

If another war breaks out, I’m sure we’ll figure it out at some point. The rest is a waste of time. Enough said. 

(continued tomorrow…)

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Deal With It: In Plain English (or Arabic), Hizbullah Rejects the STL

Posted in Hizbullah, Lebanon, Levant, March 14, Middle East, tagged , , , on July 3, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

Mere days after accusing the U.S. Embassy in Beirut of harboring spies, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah took the opportunity to react to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s indictment of four Lebanese citizens (at least two of whom have ties to the Party of God).

Greeting the STL… and Showing it the Door

In his speech, Nasrallah predictibly denounced the STL as a political instrument at the hands of the United States and Israel. First, Nasrallah guided Lebanese public through an interesting video montage that drew links between the STL and American intelligence services. It was especially surprising to see Robert Baer, of See No Evil/Syriana fame, pop up in the montage – but that’s besides the point, at least in this piece.

After his now-standard “powerpoint presentation,” Nasrallah turned his energies towards the STL’s problematic media leaks. In Hizbullah’s view, he made clear, these leaks were made by U.N. investigators to distort and tarnish the Party of God’s image.

That is, aside from noting the undeniable fact that media leaks can undermine the perception of judicial integrity, Nasrallah is trying to convince the enthralled masses that these leaks are part of an American-Israeli design against the party. (Of course, he failed to mention that his own allies, especially Interior Minister Marwan Charbel, were quick to publicly confirm information that the STL had requested they keep confidential. Just a thought.)

Finally, building upon the earlier criticisms, Nasrallah placed the STL squarely within the struggle his party has waged against Israel since the early 1980s. Basically telling his followers to take heart in the familiar, Nasrallah urged them to fight the STL ”bravely, firmly, and patiently.”

“That’s a Red Line, Son:” You’re Dancing in My Front Lawn

For all the quintessentially Lebanese sidestepping in Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s cabinet statement, Nasrallah has (again) made clear the limits of what his party will tolerate. It will be almost impossible for the Lebanese government to arrest these men (not that the current cabinet had its heart set on the matter).

And it will be just as difficult for March 14 to “oust” this government without the help of other Lebanese factions. The likely candidates – President Michel Sleiman and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt – are practically neutered and squarely within the pro-Syrian camp now, whether by choice or compulsion.

Back in 2008, a feeble and misguided attempt to challenge Hizbullah head-on triggered the hasty unraveling of the March 14 coalition as it then stood. Still struggling to pick up the pieces, March 14 continues to suffer from a leadership deficit: apparently under threat of assassination, former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri has been missing in action; the Phalange’s offerings suffer from internal incoherence and leave much to be desired; and, despite increasing his support within the Christian community, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has yet to escape his past.

Nasrallah has thrown down the gauntlet. It’s highly unlikely that anyone will, or can, step up.

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Another Ripple: The STL Indictment Trickles Down to Lebanon

Posted in Hizbullah, Lebanon, Levant, March 14, March 8, Shiites, Sunnis, Syria, tagged , , , , , on June 30, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

After six years of delay and anticipation, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has issued the first of a series of indictments relating to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri. According to an STL press release, Pre-Trial Judge Daniel Fransen has determined that Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare’s first indictment presents “prima facie evidence for this case to proceed to trial.”

Next Steps

The indictment’s contents will remain confidential for now – as confidential as possible in this day and age – to give Lebanese authorities the time and space to arrest the accused parties. Under U.N. Security Council 1757 (and its annexes), Lebanese authorities must now serve the suspects with the indictments, arrest and detain them, and finally transfer them into STL custody.

Lebanon has 30 days to “report to the STL” what measures it has taken. If the authorities fail to arrest anyone within that time frame, the STL can order a “public advertisement” demanding that the individuals appear before the court. At that point, the suspects would officially be known to all.

Clouds of Controversy

Of course, media leaks and public speculation will reveal quite a bit before then. Sources have already told The Daily Star that the indictment names four suspects - Mustafa Badreddine, Salim al-Ayyash, Hasan Aineysseh, and Asad Sabra – affiliated with Hizbullah.

Badreddine, the reported mastermind behind the attack, is a cousin and a brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyeh, a notorious Hizbullah commander who had disappeared for years before his assassination in 2008. According to The Daily Star, “Badreddine eventually replaced Mughniyeh as Hezbollah’s chief operations officer.” The connection is particularly interesting given speculation that Mughniyeh himself had been involved in the plot to kill Hariri.

Meanwhile, operating below Badreddine, it appears Ayyash ran the cell that executed the assassination in 2005. Aineysseh and Sabra’s roles have not received as much attention, but their alleged involvement was probably in the rank-and-file.

Speculation is not Adjudication… But What About Syria?

After all this time, and after all that has happened in Lebanon, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that speculative tid-bits do not make an indictment, an indictment does not make a trial, and a trial does not make a verdict.
 
Politicians will exploit the judicial process to cull together support or pressure their rivals. The Lebanese are no strangers to grand-standing. Commentators – on this blog, at Qifa Nabki, at The Daily Star, and elsewhere – will continue to weigh in as well.
 
It will be difficult to maintain the perception of judicial integrity with all the leaks and debates, but allowing the indictments and trials to speak for themselves is the best cure over the long term. After all, the STL draws its judges and staff from across the international arena; as with other international tribunals, their work will not be nearly as politicized as the commentary that surrounds it.
 
That said, resisting the urge to speculate about Syria’s role is all but impossible. Under pressure at home, the Asad regime retains much influence in Beirut. As long as it remains in power, the regime will influence events in Lebanon and in relation to the STL.
 
First, although Hizbullah will certainly have its say, Syrian behavior can frustrate or facilitate efforts to track down Lebanese suspects. Second, depending on the content of subsequent indictments, the regime might have to deal with another cut against it (Syrian officials are expected to be named). Third, at the broader level, given the current Lebanese government’s composition, Syria has a proxy in Beirut that may give lip-service to the notion of cooperating with international investigators while dragging its heels as long as possible.
 
Will the Asad regime play ball in hopes of easing international pressure? Or will it conclude that now, more than ever, it needs the support of Iran and Hizbullah? How will the Lebanese themselves, particularly Sunnis and Shiites, react to the indictment? One thing is certain: however these events play out, passions will flair as the STL paints the past and shapes the future of Lebanon and the Levant.

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Get Your Head in the Game: The Two Tales of Lebanon’s Governmental Vacuum

Posted in Lebanon, March 14, March 8 on June 9, 2011 | 1 Comment »

Now that Lebanon’s General Security has declared that Lady Gaga’s Born This Way album is ready for entry, perhaps the Lebanese can return to more important things, like the five-month-long government vacuum in Beirut. Since a Hizbullah-led walkout toppled Lebanon’s national unity government in January, days of anger have given way to weeks of negotiations and months of utter frustration.

The March 8 parties have been haggling with each other and with President Michel Sleiman over shares in the next government, which appears nowhere over the horizon. Yet again, Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun seems to be at the center of the controversy. Aoun has demanded the Interior Ministry, which has been part of the President’s share of late, and has clashed with his own allies over cabinet seats.

Of course, because the Syrian regime is busy with a bloody crackdown at home, it hasn’t bothered to direct Lebanon’s never-ending drama. Without pressure from their Syrian patrons, the March 8 parties are taking their sweet time to divvy up power in Beirut.

Meanwhile, the outgoing government in Lebanon – which will retain a caretaker role until a new cabinet emerges – has lost its steward. After much huffing and puffing about Hizbullah’s scare tactics and non-state arsenal, caretaker Prime Minister Saad Hariri simply disappeared. Speculation abounds. Is Hariri’s heart in the game? Can the family empire continue to bleed resources into Lebanon’s political and patronage games? Is this a calculated move to simply let March 8 dig its own grave?

To be sure, it hasn’t been smooth sailing for Hariri. Six years after his father’s assassination, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon continues to muddle forward in a seemingly aimless fashion. In May, 2008, Hizbullah trounced his rag-tag security services and shattered Beirutis’ false sense of security. His March 14 coalition has captured successive majorities in parliamentary and municipal elections, only to see Hizbullah and its allies subvert legitimate state institutions and pressure allies - namely, Walid Jumblatt -into flip-flopping. His attempt to reconcile with Syria and normalize ties failed for the same reasons many thought it would: the Asad regime is interested in a pliant Lebanon, period.

But many are disenchanted with Hariri’s absence – and rightfully so. The responsibilities of the premiership demand more than pouting, political jockeying, or passive opportunism. Hariri owes his constituents, and the Lebanese more generally, at least an appearance. Someone needs to remind Hariri that, for all his legitimate gripes, he is Lebanon’s premier - not some nameless Saudi prince – and that his office is in Beirut, not Riyadh or Jeddah.

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“Majnoun!” Crazy Couples and Lebanese Politics on Street Corners in Washington

Posted in Lebanon on April 16, 2011 | 2 Comments »

Lately, with a final round of law school exams around the corner, I’ve taken to jogging at night. It’s not because I can’t sleep or because I’m having deep thoughts – explanations my mother apparently prefers – but simply that I’ve been studying late, it’s less crowded at night, and Washington’s spring evenings are perfect. It’s nice to get the legs moving once in a while. (Cue my shrink, who is nodding patiently…)

A week ago, during a measly jog around campus, I was jolted by an all-too-familiar call. More like a shriek actually.

“Majnoun! Anjad sayyer majnoun intah!” (Crazy! You’ve really been crazy lately!)

As I slowed my clip, looking for the siren in question, I noticed a young couple on a street corner. The young lady, who I’ll name Mariam, was absolutely tearing into her boyfriend. Let’s call him Fadi. In turn, he was simply nodding – in that dismissive, distinctly Lebanese way – as he sucked every drop of nicotine from his cigarette.

Eavesdropping normally makes me uncomfortable. We can chalk that up to Catholic guilt. But this was too much to resist. I started “stretching down” across the street as I listened intently to their conversation.

At first, it seemed like a typical couple’s spat. Something was wrong; it was dude’s fault. Dear little Mariam kept talking about some sort of betrayal. “Real juicy stuff,” I thought to myself (referring to the conversation, of course, not her). Here’s what happened next:

Marriam: “Keef btaamil heik fiyyeh?!? Shoo darrab bi mukhak, eh?” (How could you do that to me? What the hell was going through your mind?)

Fadi: “Ya aami, khallas ba’a! Ghlot ghaltah wihdeh OK? Inssiyah!” (Enough already! I made a mistake, alright? Let it go!)

Mariam: “Inssiyah? Mitl el aadeh, eh? Halla bit shouf, baddi khabir el kil ya akhou sharmouta!” (Let it go? Typical… Wait and see, I’m going to let the world know you [INSERT FAVORITE TRANSLATION: piece of shit/son of a bitch/brother of a whore])

Fadi: “Wlik akh aaleykeh! Killo min warra…. INTIKHABET?” (You’re impossible! All this drama over… ELECTIONS?)

Now, I nearly burst out laughing at that last sentence. Apparently, poor old Fadi wasn’t having an affair or anything mundane like that. Oh no, this was much worse for Mariam! Turns out that Fadi, or one of his friends, voted for a particular side during Beirut’s recent Engineering Syndicate elections.

As I jogged back home, I found myself thinking about the Godfather III and Lebanese politics. Sometimes, when you try to get out, they pull you back in!

(NOTE: March 8 won the elections. I’ll never tell which side Fadi voted for, or supported. The story’s too good to taint with politics)

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Movin’ On Up! The Daily Star Remakes Itself

Posted in Lebanon, Levant, Middle East, tagged , , , on April 11, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

Absolutely stunning.

After years of settling for a garish and unwieldy website, The Daily Star has finally adopted a new online format. Gone are the tacky colors, pesky embedded advertisements, and useless clutter. The style is sleek, well-organized, and very accessible. Such change was long overdue.

Hopefully, the website represents part of a deeper commitment to what was once the Middle East’s premier English-language newspaper – rather than a mere facelift. The paper has seemingly crawled back from the abyss it found itself in during 2009, when it closed thanks to financial woes brought on by poor business decisions, the 2006 July War, and the rise of online journalism in the region. Of course, business was never easy in a region dominated by the “patronage press.” 

With new financing – from Qatar or the Hariri family, as rumor has it – The Daily Star has been slowly rebuilding itself over the past year. New journalists – some young, some more “seasoned” – have joined the fine, but overburdened, staff that I worked with in 2008. No longer reliant on the annual summer influx of eager American and European interns, the brass has attempted to retain personnel, has already improved the paper’s consistency, and has apparently reequipped the (perfectly situated!) Gemmayze offices.

Change can be painful. The Daily Star‘s own fortunes and the decline of traditional journalism over the past decade attest to this. On the other hand, change is often necessary. As newspapers around the world reinvent themselves in an ever-evolving market, here’s hoping The Daily Star can help restore and elevate English-language journalism in Beirut and throughout the Middle East.

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Dispatches from Damascus: Where to Look for Updates on Syria

Posted in Middle East, Syria on March 27, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

Dissent in Syria has led to some fascinating, but sometimes utterly gruesome, human stories. Obviously, it is far too early to tell whether protestors can succeed in securing reform or overthrowing the Baath regime. In any case, any form of sustained dissent in Syria will have consequences far beyond the country’s borders. The following sources should help readers of this blog follow the situation as they see fit: 

CNN’s interactive section on “Unrest in the Middle East and Africa” is a useful tool that allows people to click for country-by-country updates.

NOW Lebanon has a section for “live updates from Syria’s uprising.” The portal collects information from various sources, has an impressive collection of videos, and a nice map highlighting areas of unrest.

On Facebook, the “Syrian Revolution 2011” provides updates as well as information on rallies and marches. (NOTE: this is a pro-revolution site, so it’s worth taking in all information with a grain of salt)

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Partying with God? Issues to Consider in the Hizbullah Debate

Posted in Israel, Lebanon, United States, tagged , , , , , on March 24, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

According to The Washington Post’s David Ignatius, an upcoming National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Hizbullah has led the Obama administration to consider whether the U.S. should initiate contacts with the “Party of God.” Although National Security Council Spokesman Tommy Vietor has since said that “U.S. policy toward Hizbullah has not changed and is not changing,” Washington analysts believe that a debate could be underway “at the analyst levels” of the administration.

The U.S. continues to officially designate Hizbullah as a “foreign terrorist organization,” making certain contacts with the group illegal or contrary to American policy. Apparently the anticipated NIE assesses Hezbollah within its political and social contexts, as well as profiling the militia and operational capabilities that have led to the group’s terrorist designation. In that sense, bearing in mind that the NIE will contain varying perspectives on the party, the report will certainly confront the establishment view on Hizbullah.

Whether Hizbullah is still a terrorist organization, retains terrorist capabilities, or has renounced terror tactics altogether, it is a powerful political and social force in Lebanon and elsewhere. How, then, should Washington deal with the “Party of God?”

The Obama administration has certainly displayed a strong impulse to engage in the past. To be sure, parallels made with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) are not entirely misplaced. Like the IRA and PLO, Hizbullah operates in several realms. The party has a powerful militia, has participated in Lebanese politics since 1992, and retains a network of operatives and supporters in West Africa, Latin America, and the United States.

But Hizbullah presents challenges that caution against engagement, particularly loose advances without clear parameters.  

First, unlike the IRA and the PLO, Hizbullah’s ideology transcends the nationalistic aspects of its struggle. Although Israel’s occupation of Lebanon between 1982 and 2000 triggered the emergence of Hizbullah, deeper influences originated in Iran’s efforts to secure and expand the nascent Islamic Revolution.

For decades, ideological subordination to Iran, as well as billions of dollars of funding, training, and social support, have wed Hizbullah to an external patron. Ties with Iran are hierarchical, not lateral, and far exceed any comparable patronage enjoyed by the IRA or PLO before those parties chose moderation. Without significant Iranian involvement, the U.S. will face great difficulty in engaging Hizbullah or even elements within the party.  

Second, attempts to lure the party into trading its arsenal for political influence are misguided. Unlike the IRA before 1997 and unlike Islamist parties in Egypt, Jordan, or Syria, Hizbullah has long enjoyed the fruits of politics. In fact, Hizbullah has had it both ways. The party holds a large stake in Lebanon’s parliament and effectively controls key cabinet portfolios, but operates outside of the political process when it sees fit: to build ties with Iran, fight Israel, protect its militia prerogatives, and secure its logistics and communications lines throughout Lebanon.   

Third, American allies in Lebanon – democrats, unlike despots elsewhere in the region – are locked in a confrontation with Hizbullah over their country’s identity and regional role. Washington must coordinate with its allies in Lebanon to ensure that the Lebanese state does not suffer the consequences of engagement again.

Recent efforts to engage with Damascus rattled Lebanon’s pro-Western factions, as Syria reclaimed influence in Lebanon while using the guise of engagement to ease international pressure against it. To avoid repeating this dance, Washington might consider parameters, or perhaps benchmarks, for engagement, as its allies have demanded in the past. At a minimum, coordination will assuage concerns beforehand and provide valuable avenues for home-grown policy ideas.

Finally, the entire Middle East is now in flux. The regimes in Tehran and Damascus will have to conduct foreign policy while addressing their most serious domestic controversies in decades. On the one hand, the regimes may moderate their foreign policy to ease international pressure as they deal with domestic unrest. Syria, for instance, has already sought to open its doors for peace talks with Israel.

On the other hand, the regimes may become more bellicose in hopes of rallying their publics against American and Israeli bogeymen. If the regimes gamble that a strong stance against Israel or the West will once again bolster their stability, then poorly timed engagement could fuel propaganda efforts that the regimes will doubtlessly use to redirect domestic dissent.

Of course, mere contacts with Hizbullah, Syria, or Iran may seem unproblematic from the administration’s perch in Washington. But a simple American step can seem like an earthquake in Beirut. Engagement can yield results, but the U.S. should tread carefully.

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The Druze Question: Why Lebanese Sovereignists Must Reach Out

Posted in Christians, Druze, Hizbullah, Lebanon, Levant, March 14 on March 18, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

Once again, the Druze of Lebanon have a pivotal role to play in their country’s destiny.

The Druze in Lebanon’s Emergence

Alongside the Maronites, Lebanon’s Druze community can claim a thousand-year presence in Mount Lebanon.  In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Druze Emir Fakhr el-Din managed to harness Druze and Maronite support and carve out a “Lebanese” principality that included parts of modern-day Syria and Israel. Fakhr el-Din’s grab for power and alliance with the Italian Duchy of Tuscany ulimately led the Ottomans to kill him and his family, but he set a precedent for Lebanese autonomists throughout the modern period.

Until the 19th century, the Druze dominated a feudal system that ruled over the Maronite-majority peasantry of Mount Lebanon. Social unrest and geopolitical change, including an internal struggle between the Sublime Porte and the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, disrupted the old feudal order. The mobilization of the peasantry against the feudal lords eventually acquired a sectarian dimension – particularly during clashes in 1841 and 1860. Influenced by their increasingly powerful Church, Maronite peasants, merchants, and elites came to view themselves as part of a “nation.”

Faced with demographic and economic decline, the Druze were eventually pushed aside – and centuries of tumultuous partnership gave way to the dominance of one community. As the Maronites secured international and local elite support for their nationalist drive, their territorial ambitions resulted in the expansion of Lebanon’s borders in 1920.

The creation of “Greater Lebanon” set into motion political and demographic patterns that still impact Lebanon today. A Maronite-Sunni partnership guided Lebanon through the independence period and the First Republic (1943-1975). From 1975 to 1990, Lebanon fell prey to violence between various communal militias and foreign militaries. Maronite-Druze fighting during the “War of the Mountain” was particularly fierce, and resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands Christians from southern Mount Lebanon. 

Although the Druze were able to carve out an autonomous enclave in the late 1980s, much like their Christian counterparts to the north, their milita might could not mask continuing demographic and political decline. Indeed, during the war, previously-acquiescent Lebanese Shiites emerged as a political actor in their own right. As such, in a reality formalized by Lebanon’s Taif Accord, three main communities came to hold sway over state institutions: the Maronites, the Sunnis, and the Shiites. Having gone to war under the leadership of a man – Kamal Beik Jumblatt – who sought to magnify his community’s role in Lebanon, particularly by seeking to eliminate political communalism, the Druze were now even further on the fringes.

Jumblatt the Younger and the Druze since 1990

Walid Jumblatt, who inherited leadership of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Druze from his father Kamal, has operated within this context. Survival is his only imperative; morals, ideals, and political convictions matter, but are secondary concerns. During the 1980s, Jumblatt’s PSP cooperated with Israeli troops who had grown disenchanted with Christian dithering.

Throughout the 1990s, Jumblatt helped prop up a Syrian-Lebanese regime, benefiting himself and his community by holding sway over the Ministry of the Displaced, among others. As the new millenium approached, Jumblatt grew frustrated with the Syrian regime’s increasing reliance on a joint Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus, which exluded him and his political allies and sometimes actively cut against his interests.

After Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, Lebanese calls for an end to Syrian occupation intensified. The Maronite Council of Bishops issued a formal statement calling for Syrian withdrawal. With the “Reconciliation of the Mount,” an agreement that has yet to result in the return of many Christians to their homes in the Chouf, Jumblatt joined the Maronites in their political quest to remove Syria from Lebanon. In 2005, the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri catalyzed the Sunni street to join ranks with the nascent Maronite-Druze opposition.

That moment was pivotal. Never before had the Lebanese streets converged alongside their elites with such force. Between the Maronites, Sunnis, and Druze, the Lebanese opposition to Syrian tutelage was able to mobilize over one million people on March 14, 2005. Since that moment, “realities on the ground” – that is, Hizbullah’s 2008 assault on Beirut and the Chouf – have convinced Jumblatt that the politics have changed.

In short, Jumblatt has danced back to Damascus. But this time, at least for now, his community seems uneasy with his decision. The past decade’s pivotal moments – 2000; 2005; 2008 – have illustrated how relevant the Druze still are. Their relevance now arises from the broader polarization that has afflicted Lebanon. Sunnis and Shiites continue to seeth at one another; the Christians are perpetually divided; the Druze have been able to use their weight to swing elections, determine cabinet compositions, and even oust a prime minister.

A National Appeal: March 14 Must Call on the Druze Once More

Earlier this week, outgoing Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri appealed to Lebanese Shiites to “stand with us [March 14?], next to the state.” Correctly noting that over-assertiveness has cost Lebanese communities in the past, Hariri continued his campaign against Hizbullah’s arsenal. The merits of such an overt approach may be debatable, but the attempt to win over Shiites is necessary. Lebanon has no future without them.

Hariri and his allies in March 14 – even, or perhaps especially, the Lebanese Forces – must reach out to the Druze of Lebanon. If Hizbullah does not represent the Shiites of Lebanon, then shouldn’t self-proclaimed Lebanese sovereignists seek to expose the false monopoly that Jumblatt claims over the Druze?

Many Druze have expressed their discontent with this latest of Jumblatt’s gambits. It’s time for March 14 to offer them a serious alternative.

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A Shepard Emerges: The New Maronite Patriarch and the Way Forward

Posted in Christians, Lebanon, Middle East on March 17, 2011 | 1 Comment »

After a quarter-century under Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir, the Maronite Church has found a new leader. On Tuesday, a Maronite Synod of 38 bishops elected Bechara Rai as the community’s 77th patriarch. Rai, who had served as Archbishop of Jbeil (Byblos), was one of the favorites and may have had the tacit support of the Vatican.

Situating the Church

The Maronite Church has long played an active role in Lebanese politics. In the 19th century, the Church used its vast land resources, its educational institutions, contacts with the West, and the power of the pulpit to mobilize peasants in Mount Lebanon against feudal leaders. Civil unrest in Mount Lebanon eventually acquired a sectarian dimension. The ensuing violence between the Maronites and the Druze, a heterodox offshoot of Shiite Islam, drew European intervention and resulted in the creation of the mutassarifiya, an autonomous Ottoman district that was a Lebanese proto-state of sorts.

After World War I, the Maronite Church supported the formation of an independent Lebanese state, and exerted considerable influence over the shaping of Lebanon’s present boundaries. Memories of famine and blockade that killed more than one-third of Mount Lebanon’s population had convinced the Church that the new Lebanese state would require a breadbasket, namely the Bekaa Valley, to ensure its viability. While other considerations were at play, the Church’s role at that stage was important.

More recently, under Sfeir, the Church spearheaded opposition to Syria’s 15-year-long occupation of Lebanon. With Lebanon’s main Christian political factions in disarray, the Church called for the withdawal of Syrian troops in 2000 and facilitated the “Reconciliation of the Mount,” which purported to put Maronite-Druze tensions to rest.

The Church’s actions in the late 1990s and early 2000s helped the nascent opposition to Syria coalesce, thereby laying the foundations for Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution of 2005. Since that illustrious moment, however, the Church has had to deal with a continuing sense of Christian decline, Christian in-fighting, and an increasingly out-of-touch clergy.

Rai’s Moment

Rai’s election comes at a pivotal moment. Although Christian leaders, including Aoun and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, are back on the scene, the community remains divided. Steeped in Maronite history, with a keen sense of communal, national, and regional politics, Rai has the potential to revitalize the Church and the community.

The new patriarch will have to attend to institutional matters. The bishops are old and divided amongst themselves. Beyond the mere task of filling an evident void, created by the retirement of several bishops over the past few years, Rai will have to cultivate and select the next generation of Church leaders. As many commentators have noted, Rai will also have to shield the Church hierarchy from the divisive influence of politics even as the Church remains engaged in Lebanese political issues.

At the broader level, Rai should promote Christian reconciliation as part of ongoing efforts to put to rest Lebanon’s old war demons. As Rai himself noted in a recent interview, Lebanese Christians continue to share a vision for an independent Lebanese state. Their disagreements are rooted in factionalism and in a false vision that their continuing relevance depends on throwing their lot in with Sunnis in Shiites.

Within this context, Rai will have to recapture Christian initiative. Since the late 1980s, the community has suffered many wounds. Intracommunal fighting, demographic decline, emigration, and fifteen years of Syrian tutelage in Lebanon have all contributed to a sense of irrelevance. 

The community clings to formulaic guarantees, including those which have long been abandoned in actual administrative practice, rather than driving for change. While the pluralistic benefits of Lebanon’s system are undeniable, the divisive and discrimatory consequences are real too. For all their creative talents, which they have deployed at home and in a far-flung diaspora, Lebanese Christians have exhibited little political initiative since the Cedar Revolution of 2005. Perhaps Rai, whose name translates into “shepard,” can once more deploy the power of the Church to lead this flock to a different tomorrow.

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