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A Choice Under Fire: Dissent and Brutality in the Middle East

Posted in Middle East, United States on March 26, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

As people across the Middle East continue to demand change, a group of leaders have proven more obstinate – and far more brutal – than their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts. For all their differences, the regimes in Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, and now Syria  have effectively shown what many Middle East observers already knew: survival trumps all else.

Tumult in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, has led the ruling Sunni regime to call for a Saudi and Emirati intervention. Tanks and troops have poured into the city, where Bahraini police and army personnel had already been brutalizing demonstrators for weeks.

Meanwhile, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh has promised to hand over power to what he called “safe hands.” A deal is in the works, but it took the death of 50 protestors in Sanaa and the defection of a top general to convince Saleh that his continued rule was untenable.

In Libya, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi has vowed to fight to the last. An international coalition has enforced a no-fly zone, destroyed key government installations, and has attempted to protect civilians caught in the crossfire. For now, Libya remains split between Qaddafi-controlled lands and rebel areas. With NATO looking to assume responsibility for international operations, which the U.S. and France have led until now, the fate of Qaddafi and the country he has lorded over for 40 years remains uncertain.

Finally, in Syria, a country that Washington analysts expect will face “the longest, and most difficult, path to change,” the Asad regime has already killed at least 37 people. Dissent in the southern city of Daraa has reached a feverish pitch, and unrest has spread to other parts of the country, including Damascus.

These events call to mind a recent piece in The Huffington Post, in which the author, my friend and colleague Ian Moss, situates the current wave of dissent within a human choice between “the ballot or the bullet.” Drawing from the U.S. Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, Moss presciently argued that the U.S., like the peoples of the Middle East, would soon face a choice. America, he argued, could support the liberties of open societies or overlook the countervailing brutality of regimes desperate to cling to power.

Aside from its action in Libya, which came after the French basically spearheaded international involvement, the Obama administration has approached regional unrest with caution. With the outcome of these demonstrations and clashes uncertain, and given the fear of derailing popular movements by tainting them with “American interventionsim,” that move could be described as prudent.

But if prudence demands silence or pause in the making of foreign policy, it also demands action when events demonstrate that the convenient arrangements of the past are crumbling.

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Partying with God? Issues to Consider in the Hizbullah Debate

Posted in Israel, Lebanon, United States, tagged , , , , , on March 24, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

According to The Washington Post’s David Ignatius, an upcoming National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Hizbullah has led the Obama administration to consider whether the U.S. should initiate contacts with the “Party of God.” Although National Security Council Spokesman Tommy Vietor has since said that “U.S. policy toward Hizbullah has not changed and is not changing,” Washington analysts believe that a debate could be underway “at the analyst levels” of the administration.

The U.S. continues to officially designate Hizbullah as a “foreign terrorist organization,” making certain contacts with the group illegal or contrary to American policy. Apparently the anticipated NIE assesses Hezbollah within its political and social contexts, as well as profiling the militia and operational capabilities that have led to the group’s terrorist designation. In that sense, bearing in mind that the NIE will contain varying perspectives on the party, the report will certainly confront the establishment view on Hizbullah.

Whether Hizbullah is still a terrorist organization, retains terrorist capabilities, or has renounced terror tactics altogether, it is a powerful political and social force in Lebanon and elsewhere. How, then, should Washington deal with the “Party of God?”

The Obama administration has certainly displayed a strong impulse to engage in the past. To be sure, parallels made with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) are not entirely misplaced. Like the IRA and PLO, Hizbullah operates in several realms. The party has a powerful militia, has participated in Lebanese politics since 1992, and retains a network of operatives and supporters in West Africa, Latin America, and the United States.

But Hizbullah presents challenges that caution against engagement, particularly loose advances without clear parameters.  

First, unlike the IRA and the PLO, Hizbullah’s ideology transcends the nationalistic aspects of its struggle. Although Israel’s occupation of Lebanon between 1982 and 2000 triggered the emergence of Hizbullah, deeper influences originated in Iran’s efforts to secure and expand the nascent Islamic Revolution.

For decades, ideological subordination to Iran, as well as billions of dollars of funding, training, and social support, have wed Hizbullah to an external patron. Ties with Iran are hierarchical, not lateral, and far exceed any comparable patronage enjoyed by the IRA or PLO before those parties chose moderation. Without significant Iranian involvement, the U.S. will face great difficulty in engaging Hizbullah or even elements within the party.  

Second, attempts to lure the party into trading its arsenal for political influence are misguided. Unlike the IRA before 1997 and unlike Islamist parties in Egypt, Jordan, or Syria, Hizbullah has long enjoyed the fruits of politics. In fact, Hizbullah has had it both ways. The party holds a large stake in Lebanon’s parliament and effectively controls key cabinet portfolios, but operates outside of the political process when it sees fit: to build ties with Iran, fight Israel, protect its militia prerogatives, and secure its logistics and communications lines throughout Lebanon.   

Third, American allies in Lebanon – democrats, unlike despots elsewhere in the region – are locked in a confrontation with Hizbullah over their country’s identity and regional role. Washington must coordinate with its allies in Lebanon to ensure that the Lebanese state does not suffer the consequences of engagement again.

Recent efforts to engage with Damascus rattled Lebanon’s pro-Western factions, as Syria reclaimed influence in Lebanon while using the guise of engagement to ease international pressure against it. To avoid repeating this dance, Washington might consider parameters, or perhaps benchmarks, for engagement, as its allies have demanded in the past. At a minimum, coordination will assuage concerns beforehand and provide valuable avenues for home-grown policy ideas.

Finally, the entire Middle East is now in flux. The regimes in Tehran and Damascus will have to conduct foreign policy while addressing their most serious domestic controversies in decades. On the one hand, the regimes may moderate their foreign policy to ease international pressure as they deal with domestic unrest. Syria, for instance, has already sought to open its doors for peace talks with Israel.

On the other hand, the regimes may become more bellicose in hopes of rallying their publics against American and Israeli bogeymen. If the regimes gamble that a strong stance against Israel or the West will once again bolster their stability, then poorly timed engagement could fuel propaganda efforts that the regimes will doubtlessly use to redirect domestic dissent.

Of course, mere contacts with Hizbullah, Syria, or Iran may seem unproblematic from the administration’s perch in Washington. But a simple American step can seem like an earthquake in Beirut. Engagement can yield results, but the U.S. should tread carefully.

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Patiently Waiting: Assessing the Slight Dip in American Assistance to Lebanon

Posted in Hizbullah, Lebanon, March 14, United States, tagged , , , on February 15, 2011 | Leave a Comment »

The U.S. Department of State (“State Department” or “DOS”) has just issued its budget request for the fiscal year of 2012. Not surprisingly, the State Department is responsible for coordinating and leading all international assistance programs.

For two reasons, this year’s budget request is particularly important. First, American domestic politics – under the twin impact of an ongoing fiscal crisis and a newly-elected Republican-majority Congress – increasingly disfavor significant international aid initiatives, particularly to countries in which U.S. strategic interests are less than obvious.

Second, from Washington’s perspective, Lebanese politics have taken a worrying turn. A Hizbullah-led coalition recently toppled Lebanon’s national-unity government, which enjoyed the support of the U.S. and other Western states. The March 14 coalition has elected to abstain from participating in the next cabinet, which will likely consist of Hizbullah’s allies and technocrats under the Prime Minister-designate, the billionaire telecom magnate Najib Mikati.

After these developments, the next Lebanese government may seek to abrogate a treaty of cooperation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and otherwise distance itself from the STL’s work. Because the STL operates under the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority, Lebanese maneuvers can only facilitate or obstruct – but not or halt – its progress. Even so, the Obama Administration has stressed that the U.S. expects Lebanon to continue to adhere to its international obligations. 

Another area of concern is Lebanon’s security services, which have benefited greatly from American training, education, and equipping. The extended return of pro-Syrian authority in Lebanon might result in the disruption of this security cooperation – either by a Lebanese withdrawal or by American cuts in aid. Finally, Beirut’s robust financial sector, which has come under fire for suspected money laundering and terrorist financing activities, may suffer from negative perceptions of Hizbullah and its allies in the global marketplace.

In any event, Syria and Hizbullah’s increased influence over Lebanon’s state institutions may create quite a dilemma for American foreign policy-makers and for proponents of Lebanese sovereignty. On the one hand, the U.S. has a strong interest in building up Lebanon’s institutions, including the military, the police force, the judiciary, and the political administration. On the other hand, particularly given the political climate in Washington, the Obama Administration will have a hard time persuading Congress to approve hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance to a Lebanon that is effectively governed by a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.

Importantly, the Obama Administration seems to have adopted a careful approach with an eye on the long term. Assistance to Lebanon has dipped slightly, but not to an extent that suggests Washington is targeting the new government at this point. Indeed, the sections of the budget request pertaining to Lebanon explicitly note the following (or some variant thereof):

The United States is closely watching recent developments in Lebanon. The next government should be judged by its actions and decisions. Until there is a new Lebanese government, it is premature to make any determinations about the future of U.S. assistance to Lebanon. However, it is important to plan for ongoing assistance for FY 2012 as an incentive to the next government and to consolidate gains.

For now, it seems, the Obama Administration is intent on judging the Lebanese government on its performance, not its composition. This is a sensible approach.

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The “Arab Summer?” A Second Season of Dissent Sweeps across the Middle East

Posted in Lebanon, Middle East, United States, tagged , , , , , , , , on January 26, 2011 | 5 Comments »

In 2005, millions of Lebanese marched for their freedom. The streets of Beirut captured the world’s attention and seemed likely to trigger a wave of Arab democratization and reform. But despite glimmers of hope in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, the much-lauded “Arab Spring” soon fizzled out.

In some countries, homegrown activism was absent or fell short of a critical mass. In other places, foreign support was inadequate or insincere. Even the Bush Administration, which publicly adhered to a “freedom agenda,” could ill-afford widespread democracy promotion. After all, authoritarian regimes of one stripe or another governed – and still govern – strong American allies like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. In not-so-friendly countries like Syria or Libya, fears of an Islamist wave or civil strife kept Western democracy promotion at bay.

Now, six years after that fleeting spring, is the “Arab Summer” here?

In the span of a few weeks, protests have unfolded across the Arab world. In Tunisia, a string of protests toppled a decades-old regime, forced President Ben Ali to flee the country, and triggered military measures to re-impose order. In Egypt, a bombing of a Coptic Christian church sparked riots that have exacerbated Christian-Muslim and state-society tensions. After months of turmoil, thousands of Egyptians have now begun demonstrating in the heart of Cairo, presenting the Mubarak regime with the most serious and organized threat to its rule in years.

In Jordan, protests over food prices form part of a growing pattern of clashes. Kuwait’s crisis arose when security forces attacked on a group of academics and lawmakers. While the Jordanian government managed to quell unrest, and while Kuwait silenced dissent by announcing that it would distribute $4 billion to its citizens, dissenters may find their voice if regimes across the region continue to crumble.

These events may appear different on the surface, but their underlying causes are the same. Arabs are increasingly dissatisfied with oppressive regimes that have failed to deliver economic growth, political representation, or social freedom. In a sense, these protests are bound by fortune too. Each success or failure in a given Arab capital, and every image or word that flickers on Al-Jazeera or Twitter, affects the prospects of change elsewhere. 

Of course, the “Revolutions” of 2005 and the “revolts” of 2011 differ significantly. First, democracy advocates – in Washington and in Arab capitals – have yet to brand, promote, and support the latest waves of dissent. In contrast, for instance, the “Cedar Revolution” of 2005 emerged under polished steering and marketing, which harnessed the Lebanese people’s free-minded impulses, made the case for international support, and ultimately secured change.

Second, the hope of 2005 has given way to rage. During the “Arab Spring,” millions of Lebanese marched engaged in peaceful protests against Syrian occupation. In nearby Damascus, academics and other dissidents issued a declaration calling for democratic reform in Syria itself. Although Lebanon’s fortunes have soured, Syrian dissidents continue to languish behind bars, and Iraq’s future remains unknown, the hope of 2005 was real.

This time, protesters are venting their anger. Left unharnessed, such anger – and the violence it engenders – may reinforce fears of instability that have long driven Western support for decrepit Arab regimes. If so, the prospects of change will suffer. Indeed, aside from the stunning developments in Tunisia, the regional status quo has survived (for now).

The “Twitter effect” is another difference. Social media tools have had a paradoxical impact thus far. On the one hand, demonstrators have used social media to communicate with each other and with the broader world. On the other hand, social media have diffused leadership of these potential movements. Without direction, prospective revolutions could die out, run into more organized state security apparatuses, or descend into mayhem.

Despite these cautions, the “Arab Summer” offers a second chance. Arabs must stop blaming oppressive rulers or American foreign policy for their problems. By taking ownership of their futures, Arabs can challenge their regimes and present the U.S. with a moment of choice.

If that moment comes, the U.S. must not fall on the wrong side of history. The Obama Administration should truly embrace the message it has tried to impart on friends and foes alike. False choices – between bread and freedom; between justice and stability; between democracy and security – lead only to empty stomachs and shackled hands.

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Truth in Conflicting Views: Brief Comments on U.S. and Iranian Involvement in War-Time Lebanon

Posted in Christians, Iran, Lebanon, Levant, United States on October 31, 2009 | Leave a Comment »

Earlier this week, NOW Lebanon published an op-ed that Firas Maksad, a Middle East analyst, and I, a humble law student, wrote. The piece basically argued that the Marine Barracks Bombing on October 23, 1983 was an opening salvo in Iran’s bid for expanded power in the Middle East.

On the other hand, Foreign Policy published a piece by Nir Rosen, a fellow at New York University’s Center on Law and Security, who argues that the United States’ participation in Lebanon’s complicated civil war was the impetus behind the attacks. Rosen’s piece, though perhaps mistaken in its ultimate conclusions, makes several important points regarding the complexity of the issues involved here.

Specifically, Rosen argues that the United States, by shelling the Suk al-Gharb area to aid the Lebanese Army (then dominated by remnant Christian elements after the fragmentation of the army during an earlier stage of conflict, but not a “sectarian Christian militia,” as Rosen argues), acted against Muslim factions in Lebanon and behaved as a militia itself. As such, U.S. troops were fair game just like the Lebanese, Israelis, Syrians, Palestinians, and a host of other actors were.

There is truth in this view, but it is important to appreciate the disconnect between perceptions in Washington and Beirut. At the time, perhaps simplistically, the U.S. believed it was helping the Lebanese state reestablish control over a fragmented national territory. Many Lebanese circles, perhaps reflecting their narrower ambitions, saw this as an attempt to restore Maronite Christian ascendancy in Lebanon.

The fact is, Christians were (and still are) prominent in Lebanon’s state institutions – Maronites controlled the presidency, the top post in the army (fractured as it may have been), and the highest position in Lebanon’s Central Bank. Any attempt to help the state would necessarily help the Christians, barring a drastic change in Lebanon’s political system, though it would also be fair to note that a functioning state should be viewed as a benefit to all, especially compared to the chaos of the civil war. Whether that means the U.S. actually intended to participate as a “militia” backing the Christian factions is open to debate, and there is evidence to support both views.

Assuming that the U.S. did indeed participate - what matters more is that it was perceived to have done so - in an imbalanced manner, and that several locally based factors contributed to the attack, does not exclude the possibility that Iran used the attack as part of a wider strategy.

The question is not entirely one of fault, but also of consequences. The U.S. may have failed to completely appreciate the complexity of Lebanon’s war and may have failed to fully consider the security environment (both points arise from Rosen’s argument), but that does not mean that Iran did not harness local frustration and American complacency to strike.

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Regional Context: Articles to Read

Posted in Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United States on October 3, 2009 | Leave a Comment »

Selected reading for information only, as it is worth keeping the regional game in mind. This post does not endorse or reject the content of these articles…

The National Newspaper (UAE) on Syria-Saudi ties: http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090710/FOREIGN/707099796/1011/rss

Foreign Policy on the “Other Threat” from Iran: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/02/the_other_ticking_clock_in_iran

Council on Foreign Relations on US-Iran relations: http://www.cfr.org/publication/20344/road_ahead_for_usiran_relations.html?breadcrumb=%2F

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Right ‘Round, Right ‘Round

Posted in Druze, Hizbullah, Lebanon, March 14, March 8, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United States, tagged , , on August 21, 2009 | 1 Comment »

He’s done it again.

Walid Jumblatt has left the March 14 coalition – or maybe not.

Being the leader of the fiercely proud and historically influential Druze minority, “Walid Beik” operates to keep his community secure and his dynasty relevant. With that said, it appears that three trends have led Jumblatt to move away from the March 14 coalition.

First, the Druze leader believes the regional winds are blowing in a new direction.

At the very least, he is unsure how Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Syria, and America’s attempt to follow suit, will affect politics in Lebanon. Uncertainty led the chieftain to mend fences with Damascus and, when met with an immediate domestic and regional backlash, to retreat from the “Beau Rivage declaration” (fittingly, the Beau Rivage Hotel was long a center of Syrian intelligence activity in Lebanon).

Second, Jumblatt fears a conflict that would threaten his community’s fragile presence in the Levant.

A repeat of Hizbullah’s 2008 assault on Beirut and the Chouf certainly qualifies as such a hazard. While the Druze repelled the attack, the community cannot afford sustained conflict with the Shiite party, which dominates areas that surround the Druze heartland.

Jumblatt is also wary of a Sunni-Shiite conflict that could ensnare the Druze. Mistrust prevails in the wake of last year’s fighting, and a controversial Der Spiegel report linking Hizbullah officials to the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri has only magnified the potential for strife.

Additionally, in reconciling with Hizbullah, Jumblatt may be shielding his community from internal maneuvers designed to protect supply lines and communications networks in the event of another Israel-Hizbullah war. Hizbullah’s channels, linking the Bekaa Valley with South Lebanon, traverse areas near Jumblatt’s own mountain stronghold and the party will certainly go to great lengths – as it did in May 2008 – to protect its infrastructure.

Third, Jumblatt had taken a backseat in the March 14 coalition and has acted to increase his political autonomy and influence.

Since inheriting his father’s political mantle in 2005, Future Movement leader Saad Hariri has gradually (and, at times, frustratingly) found his bearings. Quite simply, Hariri has not had to lean on Jumblatt for a while, and the latter ceased being the coalition’s driving force.

Nor was Jumblatt the coalition’s spearhead. March 14 Christians, particularly Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, have increasingly assumed that role and gained Hariri’s ear over the past year. Of course, Jumblatt’s political gymnastics made his allies trust him less and decreased his sway within the movement.

In short, Jumblatt sees more value as a wild card. But what does his shift mean for others?

As it stands now, Lebanese leaders have coalesced around three alignments: a pro-Western camp; a pro-Iranian camp; and a “centrist” camp influenced by Syria. These groups are not mutually exclusive and their relationship, mirroring the regional dynamic, will ebb and flow.

The United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to back Hariri, who leads the pro-Western camp, even if their relations with Syria thaw. Similarly, Iran will continue to support and bankroll the Hizbullah-led opposition. The “centrist” bloc’s actions will presumably depend on how the Asad regime positions itself in the region.

If Syria is serious about playing a constructive role in the Middle East, the situation in Lebanon might improve. Conversely, if Syria merely aims to buy time and extract concessions from the United States, then Lebanon will pay the price.

At the local level, Jumblatt’s move may encourage opposition figures to join the pro-Syrian bloc on some issues. For instance, Marada chief Suleiman Franjieh and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri both have an interest in opposing privatization, stalling anti-corruption measures, and crafting a pro-Syrian foreign policy.

Such a shift, if it occurs, will not diminish the March 8 bloc’s power. Most Shiites support Hizbullah, which Iran supplies and funds; and former General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement retains much support within the Christian community.

Even so, Jumblatt’s departure is not a disaster for the March 14 movement. Whatever happens, Hariri can still count on Jumblatt’s support. Realistically, the Druze leader cannot afford to alienate Sunnis any more than Shiites. After all, Sunnis are a dominant majority in the Middle East and Jumblatt’s own electoral survival depends on good relations with Sunnis in the Chouf.

Moreover, Hariri’s Future Movement may move closer to the Lebanese Forces and Phalange, at least in the near term. These parties embrace Lebanon’s liberal economic tradition, oppose Syrian interference in Lebanon, and are comfortable in calling for serious talks on Hizbullah’s arms. Though smaller, the surviving coalition is more cohesive than its predecessor.

As always, the Beik fascinates and exasperates. An opportunist with a flair for making extravagant and contradictory declarations, the man is neither consistent nor accountable.

In some regard, however, he must be thanked. Unabashedly committed to his own survival, and that of his community, Walid Jumblatt has revealed – once more – the truth at the heart of politics in Lebanon.

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